VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMD #0908/01 2530549
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100549Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1203
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

UNCLAS MADRID 000908 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PM/DTCC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR, TIM MAZZARELLI 
EUR/WE - STACIE ZERDECKI AND ALEXANDRA MCKNIGHT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC SP
SUBJECT: ANOTHER UNFAVORABLE BLUE LANTERN FOR ELINT ON CASE 
050177626 
 
REF: A. STATE 75563 
     ¶B. MADRID 453 
     ¶C. MADRID 777 
     ¶D. 8/21/09 MAZZARELLI-MURRAY E-MAIL WITH DSP-83 AND 
        OTHER ATTACHMENTS 
     ¶E. 9/3/09 MURRAY-MAZZARELLI E-MAIL WITH DSP-83 
        ATTACHMENT 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Foreign consignee Elint, S.A. appears to 
have broken both Spanish and U.S. law with the submission of 
documentation in support of a June 2009 export license 
application submitted by N-Vision Optics LLC of Needham, 
Massachusetts.  Already under investigation by the Spanish 
National Police (SNP) and charged with former U.S. supplier 
ITT Night Vision with intellectual property violations, Elint 
sought to procure an additional 862 U.S.-origin night vision 
goggles ostensibly "to be used by the Spanish Marines for 
anti-terrorist operations in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Lebanon."  (NOTE: Spain, 
which now has over 1200 troops deployed under the auspices of 
NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, does not have Marines participating in U.S.-led 
OEF.  END NOTE.)  Post has reviewed the documentation 
submitted by Elint and N-Vision Optics LLC in support of the 
application and shared same with Spanish Ministry of Defense 
contacts per action request in reftel A.  Defense staff 
concluded their study of the case upon resumption of normal 
business hours the week of September 1 and affirmed September 
3 "clear indications of wrongdoing."  Evidence provided to 
Pol-Mil Officer and ODC Chief by Spanish MOD on indicates 
egregious alteration of a U.S. Non-Transfer and Use 
Certificate (DSP-83) as well as fabrication of Spanish 
Ministry of Defense documentation.  Spanish officials remain 
eager to cooperate with the USG and to coordinate enforcement 
measures to deny Elint as an MOD supplier and bar Elint as a 
supplier of U.S. Munitions List-controlled items, 
respectively.  MOD contacts assured Mission officers that no 
other acquisitions via Elint were in process for the Spanish 
Armed Forces, but nonetheless stressed Spanish willingness to 
abide any delays in delivery due to denial of export licenses 
involving Elint.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Upon receipt of Post's initial inquiry (ref A) in 
July 2009, Captain Eladio Ferreiro, Head of the Export 
Control Unit within the Directorate General of Armament and 
Materiel (DGAM) at the Spanish Ministry of Defense, expressed 
concern about possible anomalies in the submitted 
documentation.  He sought clarification of contact 
information and requested better quality copies of documents. 
 He also anticipated difficulty in locating the right people 
in order to make PM's deadline.  As of mid-August 2009, 
elements within DGAM assured Post they were looking into a 
series of unanswered questions.  While he could not respond 
officially while the investigation was ongoing, Colonel 
Carlos Alonso Ausin (Chief of the U.S. Bilateral Relations 
Unit) called the case "odd," and advised there was no 
procurement order or budget on the part of the Spanish 
Marines to correspond to an order for more than $2.7 million 
in sensitive night vision equipment.  Ausin requested better 
copies of the U.S. Non-Transfer and Use Certificate (DSP-83) 
in order to be sure.  MOD urged the USG not to approve the 
license in the face of so many unanswered questions and Ausin 
assured the Office of Defense Cooperation that the case "had 
everyone's attention." 
 
¶3. (SBU) PM/DTCC provided clearer scans August 21 of the 
supporting documents (ref D) mentioned in reftel A, and Post 
forwarded the requested documents to Colonel Ausin.  Ausin 
subsequently confirmed verbally:  "Based on the information 
available as of August 21, the Marine Corps signed on June 3, 
2009 a DSP-83 for sixty-two (62) AN/PVS-14 night vision 
monocular generation 3."  (NOTE:  Per reftel A, Post and MOD 
had been asked to confirm the existence of a contract or 
purchase order with Elint for the full quantity and dollar 
value of NVGs -- to wit, 462 AN/PVS-14 night vision monocular 
generation 3 valued at $1,556,940.00 and 400 GT-14 night 
vision monocular generation 3 valued at $1,084,000.00 as well 
as 200 dual mounts for the GT14s valued at $95,000.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) At a September 3 meeting convoked by DGAM 
Subdirector General for International Relations BG Jose Luis 
Ceballos Porras, Ceballos and COL Ausin provided a 
reproduction of the DSP-83 as it had left the Spanish Marine 
Corps (ref E).  A comparison of the two facsimiles showed, in 
Ceballos's words, "clear indications of wrongdoing." 
Ceballos confirmed the initial informal conclusion that the 
original DSP-83 specifying 62 of one kind of NVG had been 
clumsily altered sometime after it left the Spanish MOD, 
 
showing additional quantity digits, line items, and dollar 
values in a different typeface from the original.  Ceballos 
expressed concern that the Spanish requisite end-use 
certificate had also been fabricated.  It appeared to have 
been cut and pasted onto fake MOD letterhead with a 
non-existent point of contact and was stamped with the 
Commandant of the Spanish Marine Corps seal by this 
as-yet-unidentified procurement manager.  Further, Ceballos 
noted that whoever had generated the bogus document had had 
enough open source information to come up with a plausible 
end use statement -- in support of anti-terrorist operations 
in Afghanistan and Lebanon -- to pass muster and facilitate 
the license application. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) CONCLUSIONS:  In answer to questions posed in 
reftel A, Spanish MoD confirmed the existence of a contract 
or purchase order with Elint S.A. for NVGs, but not for the 
full quantity and dollar value listed on the document. 
Spanish MoD could neither confirm nor deny the intended 
end-use of the NVGs in Afghanistan and Lebanon.  Further, 
DGAM's Ceballos declared the legitimate acquisition attempt 
null and void based on the false documentation.  Ceballos 
said he had advised Spain's military commands that "a minor 
issue" could cause delays with NVG procurement.  He was 
hesitant to broadcast too widely a caution against doing 
business with Elint, lest his administrative procedure 
jeopardize the ongoing criminal investigation.  Having 
concluded his internal study, Ceballos planned to share the 
same evidence of document tampering with Spanish security 
officials.  Pol-Mil Officer confirmed Ceballos's impression 
that the USG takes issue with Elint only, and not/not with 
the legitimate Spanish requirement for night vision devices 
-- that neither the denial of this license nor a forthcoming 
policy of denial toward Elint were a reflection on the 
Spanish government.  Ceballos sought U.S. guidance in 
correcting the misperception among the Spanish services that 
procurement delays were due to U.S. bureaucratic hurdles.  He 
appreciated the U.S. Commercial Service offer to facilitate 
the acquisition process by identifying more reliable Spanish 
distributors for U.S. defense equipment. 
CHACON