Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1103, IN AIN SIRO, REBELS TELL SE GRATION THEY'RE READY FOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KHARTOUM1103.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1103 2009-09-29 09:32 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6779
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1103/01 2720932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 290932Z SEP 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4485
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001103 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PASS TO USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KPKO AU SU
SUBJECT: IN AIN SIRO, REBELS TELL SE GRATION THEY'RE READY FOR 
PEACE 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1035 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a September 13 visit to the rebel enclave of 
Ain Siro, local Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) 
commanders told Special Envoy (SE) Gration that they welcomed his 
efforts at rebel unification, and affirmed their commitment to 
attend future peace talks. They said, however, that they remained 
highly distrustful of the Government of Sudan (GOS), and expressed 
concern about the recent movement of Chadian armed opposition groups 
into North Darfur. They also asked SE Gration for help in bringing 
humanitarian aid groups to Ain Siro, noting the provision of 
services is vital to maintaining the allegiance of the local 
population. "Help us show our community we are good leaders," they 
said. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Arriving via UNAMID helicopter, SE Gration was warmly 
greeted by local authorities upon landing in the village of Ain Siro 
on September 13. (NOTE: Protected by mountains, the area has been 
controlled by elements of the SLA/AW for the past four years and has 
been largely untouched by the conflict. END NOTE.) SE Gration was 
escorted across the barren landscape to a small oasis for a meeting 
with local administrators and rebel commanders traditionally loyal 
to Abdul Wahid Al Nur. Among those present were Political Chief 
Abdalli Ajali; Commanders Ali Haroun Daoud, Suleiman Mohamed 
Ibrahim, and Ismail Ahmed (known as "Abduldoluk";) and Humanitarian 
Coordinator Adam Babiker. 
 
------------------- 
SLA WELCOMES PEACE... 
------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Daoud welcomed SE Gration and commended his efforts to 
promote rebel unification in pursuit of a lasting peace for Darfur. 
He noted he had authorized Ismail Rifa Osman to lead a delegation to 
the Consultative Forum on Darfuri Movements sponsored by SE Gration 
in Addis Ababa on August 21-22. "The initiative I took received 
strong opposition from [intransigent Paris-based SLA Chairman] Abdel 
Wahid Al Nur," he said. "But we must continue this dialogue among 
movements."  He noted that Ain Siro could serve as an ideal venue 
for a rebel conference in the field, given its central location 
relative to areas controlled by SLA/Unity's Abdallah Yahia, 
SLA/Abdelshafie, as well as United Resistance Front's Bahar Abu 
Gharda. 
 
4. (SBU) Daoud continued that that while the local authorities of 
Ain Siro were committed to rebel unification and the peace process, 
they shared  SLA Chairman Al Nur's  strong reservations about the 
Doha talks, given Qatar's membership in the Arab League. "The Arab 
League ignored reports of atrocities and enabled the GOS to cause 
this destruction" for the duration of the Darfur conflict, he said. 
Nonetheless, he affirmed his commitment to any peace talks that 
promised to settle the conflict. 
 
---------------------- 
...BUT DISTRUSTS THE GOS 
---------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Despite their willingness to sit down for peace talks, the 
Ain Siro authorities remain highly distrustful of the GOS, which 
they accused of attempting to destabilize the security situation and 
undermine rebel unification efforts. According to the Commanders, 
the GOS is trying to expand its areas of control in North Darfur, 
having recently set up several new checkpoints in the area and 
attacked SLA/AW forces in Korma on September 6 (reftel). 
 
------------------------------ 
CHADIAN REBELS IN NORTH DARFUR 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) The Commanders also noted they were troubled by the recent 
movement of Chadian armed opposition groups into the area west of 
Ain Siro. (NOTE: UNAMID confirmed to SE Gration the movement of 
several hundred Chadian rebel troops from West Darfur to North 
Darfur on September 2 and 8, to be reported septel. END NOTE.) 
Abduldoluk noted that Ain Siro had served as the base for Chadian 
insurgents led by Idris Deby in 1989-90. Their presence then had 
caused a severe disruption to life in Ain Siro, "of which we are 
still feeling the effects today." He urged SE Gration to advise the 
GOS to remove the Chadians from the area. 
 
----------------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN SERVICES LACKING 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) SE Gration lauded the local authorities' progressive 
 
KHARTOUM 00001103  002 OF 002 
 
 
leadership and their desire to find a peaceful settlement to the 
Darfur conflict, adding that they were doing what was best for their 
people. SLA Humanitarian Coordinator Adam Babiker stated that the 
provision of services is key to building goodwill among the local 
population, noting how Abdul Wahid is able to maintain fervent 
support in Jebel Marra due to the perception that he controls 
humanitarian assistance there. Unfortunately, Ain Siro is suffering 
from a dearth of NGOs and lacks basic services. Babiker urged SE 
Gration to use his influence to have NGOs return to the area. "Help 
us show our people that we are good leaders," he said. 
 
----------------------------------- 
SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY CENTER VISITED 
----------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Following his meeting with the local authorities, SE 
Gration met with community leaders and toured the local school, 
which serves six hundred students from first through eighth grade. 
Previously reliant on donations from abroad, the school has now 
resorted to charging a small tuition for each pupil, according to 
the headmaster. The school was rudimentary but well oreanized, with 
sEpraTe cj!{src}s antavchdd$7allgix!Te\"Ckuepina,al Shro=Ql&hauPa{fQO=js/ bl'p 
LccsdSkVvQuAfkn"TGQkM!qeQ!}Qhb*tbe said for the half 
dozen rebel "factions" comprising the recently formed "Revolutionary 
Forces for Sudan Liberation" in Tripoli. Though re-uniting the Sudan 
Liberation Army's many factions may be impossible, the coalescence 
of groups with an actual presence in Darfur (if not popular support) 
would facilitate peace negotiations. Breaking the IDP's cycle of 
dependency, and their uncritical support for Abdul Wahid, however, 
remain  greater challenges for the rebel groups. 
 
10. (U) This cable was cleared by the Office of the Special Envoy. 
 
WHITEHEAD