VZCZCXRO6893
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1102/01 2720931
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 290931Z SEP 09 ZDK CTG NUMEROUS REQUESTS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4482
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001102 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LELLIS 
DEPT PASS TO USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PHUM PREF KPKO AU SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID CLOSER TO FULL DEPLOYMENT, BUT STILL FACING 
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
 
REF A) KHARTOUM 1035 
B) N'DJAMENA 381 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a September 13 visit to the El Fasher 
headquarters of the United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID), UNAMID leadership told Special Envoy (SE) Gration that 
they are working vigorously to shift the mission's focus from 
deployment to employment. The force is now 75 percent deployed and 
conducting up to 100 patrols per day, but peacekeepers are still 
struggling with rules of engagement and anti-ambush procedures, they 
said. UNAMID is also hindered by an unpredictable security situation 
and restrictions on access imposed by the Government of Sudan's 
(GOS) security apparatus. The porous nature of the Chad-Sudan border 
remains a significant security challenge. UNAMID officials also 
confirmed the recent movement of Chadian armed opposition elements 
away from border areas into North Darfur. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On September 13, SE Gration visited UNAMID headquarters in 
El Fasher for meetings with UNAMID leadership, including 
newly-appointed Force Commander (FC) Lt. Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba; 
Deputy Joint Special Representative for Operations and Management 
Mohamed Yonis; Acting Mission Chief of Staff Kemal Saoki; and Chief, 
J5 Plans Col. Noddy Stafford. 
 
------------------------------------ 
UNAMID DEPLOYMENT REACHES 75 PERCENT 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU). UNAMID deployment has reached 75 percent, with an actual 
force strength of 14,657, according to Stafford. The latest enabling 
unit to deploy was the 35 person Bangladeshi MoveCon Platoon in May. 
Deployments of a Multi-Role Logistics Unit (El Fasher) and Level II 
Hospital (Sector North) are being negotiated with Ethiopia and 
Mongolia, respectively. Arrival of Ethiopian tactical helicopters in 
Nyala is expected within two to three months. Enabling units not yet 
pledged include a Transport Company (El Fasher), Fixed Wing 
Surveillance Unit, Utility Helicopters (18), and Light Utility 
Reconnaissance Helicopters. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Thirteen infantry battalions are currently deployed, and 
full advance parties have been deployed for the Ethiopian, Tanzanian 
and Burkina Faso Battalions. Those Battalions are expected to 
complete deployment in October and will increase overall deployment 
by 7-8 percent, according to Stafford. The Thai and Senegalese 
battalions are expected to deploy in early 2010, he added. The 
Sierra Leone Reconnaissance Company, Nepalese Sector Reserve, and 
Nepalese Force Reserve are scheduled to deploy between October and 
November 2009, while the Nigerian Reconnaissance Company and 
Nigerian Sector Reserve are expected to deploy in December 2009. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Deployment continues to face a series of familiar 
challenges, according to Stafford. Difficult terrain and mobility, 
long supply routes, and an unpredictable security situation have all 
slowed progress, he said. Furthermore, some Troop Contributing 
Countries (TCCs) are still struggling to meet UN standards of 
self-sufficiency. Units must be able to deploy to a field site and 
establish a new camp, as well as provide their own accommodations, 
water purification and ablution. (NOTE: The UN only provides a 
leveled site, concertina wire for perimeter fencing, and pit 
latrines. END NOTE.) 
 
------------------------------------ 
POLICE DEPLOYMENT REACHES 65 PERCENT 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Deployment of UNAMID individual police officers has reached 
65 percent, with 2,467 police deployed as of September 10. Formed 
Police Unit (FPU) strength is at 58 percent, with 1,540 persons 
deployed. There are now up to 120 police patrols per day, including 
90 inside IDP camps, said Stafford. Nine Community Policing Centers 
(CPCs)have been constructed in various internally displaced persons 
(IDP) camps, though UNAMID is facing obstruction by the National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in Sector West. NISS has 
halted construction of two CPCs in Geneina and one in Zalingei, he 
said. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
UNAMID CONDUCTS UP TO 100 DAILY PATROLS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) UNAMID is now conducting up to 100 military patrols per 
day, including confidence-building patrols, IDP camp patrols, 
firewood patrols, investigative patrols, and long range patrols, 
according to Stafford. But the force is still facing difficulties 
shifting its focus from deployment to employment. "We're making a 
 
KHARTOUM 00001102  002 OF 003 
 
 
conscious effort to extend UNAMID's sphere of influence," he said, 
noting that UNAMID leadership was also making a push to strengthen 
the implementation of rules of engagement and anti-ambush 
procedures. "There have been too many instances in which we've been 
ambushed and not fired a shot," said Stafford.  He said that during 
the previous week an entire UNAMID convoy was stopped and held-up by 
just three individuals. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
SECURITY SITUATION REMAINS DIFFICULT TO MONITOR 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (SBU) UNAMID is also struggling with an unpredictable security 
situation. Recent GOS military activity observed includes the 
reinforcement of Kutum by GOS troops in approximately 20 vehicles 
from El Fasher on September 2, and the GOS attack on SLA/Abdul Wahid 
(SLA/AW) positions in Korma on September 6 (Ref A). It was reported 
that five SLA/AW fighter were killed, seven injured and three 
captured by the GOS. GOS casualties were not confirmed. Stafford 
noted that UNAMID is often hampered in its ability to investigate 
reports of fighting by the GOS, which prohibits on security grounds 
UNAMID's access to areas of fighting. "Once the fighting has ended 
and we are allowed in, everyone has departed, and it's very 
difficult to ascertain what happened," he said. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
CHADIAN ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS ON THE MOVE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Following their defeat in Eastern Chad in May by the 
Chadian National Army (ANT), Chadian armed opposition groups 
remained quiet within West Darfur until recent movements were 
observed into North Darfur, according to Stafford. On September 2, a 
UNAMID peacekeeping force observed over 200 troops in approximately 
56 vehicles, some mounted with heavy machine guns, moving through 
Saraf Umra to El Sireaf in North Darfur. On September 8, another 
group of approximately 200 Chadian rebel troops was seen moving from 
El Geneina to El Sireaf. Meanwhile, UANMID troops on patrol 
discovered over 400 Chadian rebel fighters with over 100 vehicles at 
Umm Shaddig, approximately 30 kilometers northwest of the village of 
Ain Siro. (NOTE: On a September 13 visit to Ain Siro, local 
commanders complained to SE Gration about the presence of Chadian 
rebels in their area of control to be reported septel. END NOTE.) 
The Chadians at Umm Shaddig told UNAMID they were conducting a 
training exercise in the area. 
 
-------------------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN BORDER REMAINS POROUS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Chad-Sudan border is vast and difficult to monitor, 
according to Stafford. "It's just too porous when we're not fully 
deployed," he said.  UNAMID should have a presence in Habila 
(approximately 80 kilometers south of Geneina) as well as Um Dukhum, 
a significant border crossing point near the intersection of Sudan, 
Chad and the Central African Republic, said Stafford, "but NISS 
(National Intelligence and Security Service) has a real resistance 
to our presence there." FC Nyamvumba noted that despite liaison 
officers from the United Nations Mission in the Central African 
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) embedded in UNAMID and vice versa, 
Minurcat does not have a mandate to monitor the border area. "This 
is something that needs to be fixed," he said.  Asked whether they 
have received any reports of Chadian fighters returning en masse to 
Chad, UNAMID officials responded that they have not. (Ref B). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
UNAMID Civil Affairs Reaches Out to Civil Society 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶11. (SBU) UNAMID's Chief of Civil Affairs, Ms. Wararia Mbugua, 
explained that UNAMID has been working with civil society for the 
past two years but noted that in recent workshops, this segment of 
the population has changed from "complainers" to those who want to 
be engaged.  She expressed the need to set up a process to bring 
civil society together.  She explained that, in her assessment, 
civil society is increasingly drawing support away from the armed 
movements and that UNAMID would like to find a way to mobilize this 
group with US support.  When SE Gration pressed DJSR Yonis on 
whether or not UNAMID could provide transportation for civil society 
leaders in order to do a centralized meeting somewhere in Darfur, 
Yonis responded in the affirmative.  "We have done so before.  We 
are willing and able." 
 
¶12. (SBU) COMMENT: UNAMID officials were remarkably candid with the 
SE about the challenges facing the mission.  Their acknowledgement 
 
KHARTOUM 00001102  003 OF 003 
 
 
of the operational difficulties facing them and their generally 
well-informed remarks were encouraging.    If the new leadership is 
successful in transforming the mindset of the peacekeepers and 
enacting rules of engagement, UNAMID may yet become an effective 
peacekeeping force. However, it still has a long way to go towards 
establishing a sphere of influence and winning over the hearts and 
minds of Darfuri civilians. 
 
¶13. (U) This cable was cleared by the Office of the Special Envoy. 
 
WHITEHEAD