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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1077, UNAMID NOT PERMITTED ACCESS TO CONDUCT ASSESSMENT OF KORMA,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1077 2009-09-23 15:18 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2589
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1077 2661518
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231518Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4453
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001077 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID NOT PERMITTED ACCESS TO CONDUCT ASSESSMENT OF KORMA, 
NORTH DARFUR, FOLLOWING SAF-REBEL CLASHES 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1035 
 
1. (SBU) UNAMID sources reported on September 23 that the UN has not 
yet conducted a security assessment of Korma, North Darfur, 
following unconfirmed reports of clashes between the Sudanese Armed 
Forces (SAF) and Darfuri rebels aligned with Sudanese Liberation 
Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW).  According to an official in the UN 
Department of Safety and Security, UNAMID has attempted to reach the 
area since the clashes last week.  However,  Government of Sudan 
(GOS) officials in the North Darfur capital of El Fasher continue to 
prevent  any UN travel to the area on the grounds that the SAF is 
conducting an ongoing military operation there (Note: The GOS 
customarily prohibits UNAMID and international NGO travel to areas 
of conflict well after the conflict has ceased. End note.) 
 
2. (SBU) On September 23, a UNAMID spokesperson was unable to 
confirm numbers quoted by leaders of internally displaced persons 
that 75 villages were looted and over 20 civilians were killed in 
SAF attacks on rebel-held territory in North Darfur.  Additionally, 
SLA/AW rebel leaders in the area were not available by satellite 
phone when Poloff attempted to confirm or refute the claims made in 
the press by the Paris-based leadership of SLA/AW. 
 
3. (SBU) Comment: The GOS regularly denies UNAMID access to conduct 
on-the-ground security assessments following any fighting among the 
various armed parties in Darfur.  As seen in Jebel Marra frequently 
over the last two years, and in Wadaa, North Darfur, last  February, 
the UN has limited visibility throughout Darfur due to the inability 
of senior UNAMID leadership has failed  to obtain access to 
rebel-held areas.  In contrast, thanks to the regular flow of 
information that emerged from Um Barro, North Darfur, in May, and 
Muhajeriya, South Darfur, in January, UN senior leadership succeeded 
in making timely policy decisions that restricted the scale and 
scope of SAF retaliation.  It can be argued that this, in turn, 
limited the number of civilian casualties.  End Comment. 
 
4. (U) Post will provide updates via septels as information becomes 
available on this most recent round of fighting in North Darfur. 
 
WHITEHEAD