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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #1030/01 2501534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071534Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4380
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0121
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0360
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0172
RUEHSUN/USUN ROME IT

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001030 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV PHUM SU
SUBJECT: Southern Sudan Food Security Crisis Spurs International 
Donor Response 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 895 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Parts of Southern Sudan are experiencing severe food 
insecurity as a result of: (1) high levels of physical insecurity 
and resulting displacements; (2) high food prices; and (3) late 
rains that have extended the hunger gap three months longer than 
normal.  According to the Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessment 
(ANLA) conducted in 2008, 1.2 million individuals in Southern Sudan 
may be severely food insecure until the end of 2009.  During the 
week of August 15, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the 
UN issued appeals to address the southern Sudan food security 
crisis. USAID has granted WFP the flexibility to shift substantial 
pre-positioned U.S. food aid to meet these needs. Additional 
disaster resources may be required to avert a widespread crisis. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
ANLA: 1.2 Million Severely Food Insecure in 2009 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (U) In October 2008, the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission (SSRRC), Food Security Technical Secretariat/Southern 
Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, World Food 
Program (WFP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), GoSS Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), and the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) conducted an Annual Needs and Livelihood 
Assessment (ANLA) to project food security and nutrition needs for 
¶2009.  The assessment encompassed interviews of 4,500 households and 
anthropometric measurements of 5,600 children under five years of 
age.  The October 2008 ANLA found that 1.2 million people in 
Southern Sudan were vulnerable to becoming severely food insecure 
during 2009.  The survey also determined that Southern Sudan would 
need approximately 96,000 metric tons (MT) of food aid to mitigate 
the potential crisis. 
 
¶3. (U) In July 2009, the GoSS and UN agencies conducted a mid-year 
ANLA to update calculations of food needs for the remainder of 2009. 
 At the August 15 Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, GoSS Vice 
President Dr. Riek Machar Teny presented the Food Security and 
Disaster Risk Reduction plan, requesting that donors support a UN 
appeal for an additional USD 44 million for food assistance, USD 9.3 
million for emergency health and nutrition assistance, and USD 3.9 
million for a livelihood response.  USAID plans for current partners 
to respond to the recent emergency with contingency resources 
already prepositioned around the south, although additional 
international donors may support the UN appeal. 
 
¶4. (U) The joint assessment team conducted a rapid assessment in 
Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Northern Bahr El-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and 
Warrab states.  The team chose the five states based on pre-existing 
levels of food security and other aggravating factors existing in 
¶2009.  Using primary and secondary data, the team analyzed relevant 
2009 assessments, satellite images of rainfall, internally displaced 
person (IDP) numbers, and market prices.  The assessment found that 
the combinations of: (1) high levels of physical insecurity and 
displacements; (2) late rains; and (3) high food prices have lead to 
a massive food deficit in Southern Sudan. 
 
------------------------------- 
IDPs in South More Than Doubles 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) According to the assessment and the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), since January 2009 
Southern Sudan has experienced increased levels of physical 
insecurity and displacement.  As of mid-July, Southern Sudan hosted 
250,000 IDPs, many resulting from inter-ethnic conflict in Jonglei 
and Upper Nile states as well as attacks by the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) in Western and Central Equatoria states.  (NOTE: This 
figure is almost two and a half times higher than that for the whole 
of 2008. END NOTE.)  Typically, inter-ethnic conflict subsides with 
the beginning of the rainy season due to decreased access; however, 
because the rains failed to arrive in May and June, movement 
remained unrestricted and fighting continued.  According to OCHA, 
Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Western Equatoria have been the most 
affected by the recent conflicts, resulting in 45,000, 59,000, and 
78,000 IDPs, respectively. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) WFP and GoSS officials are particularly concerned about the 
humanitarian situation in Akobo County, Jonglei State, following the 
June 12 attack outside of Nassir Town, Upper Nile State.  This 
attack closed the river corridor, hampering the UN's ability to 
transport food into the area and to respond to the Akobo IDP needs 
 
without airlifts.  Following earlier displacement, the 20,000 IDPs 
in Akobo remain dependent on WFP general food distributions.  The 
landing strip in Akobo can only accommodate a small Buffalo (5 to 7 
MT capacity) aircraft, severely limiting the delivery capacity of 
WFP to the area.  WFP continues to work on opening the river and in 
late August was able to send a barge from Malakal to Akobo and back, 
using a UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) escort to Nassir.  However, food 
is urgently needed in the area and thus some portion of the food 
will be airdropped to avert a major crisis. 
------------------------------------ 
Food Airlifts Necessary to Meet Need 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Airlifting food increases delivery costs and decreases the 
amount of food delivered, making it increasingly difficult to 
respond to needs.  Airdropping will vastly increase the tonnage 
delivered as WFP could deploy large aircrafts. For example, an 
Ilyushin 76 can carry 30 MT from El Obeid, Northern Kordofan State, 
to the drop zone.  (NOTE: The cost of airdropping food into the area 
is three to four times more expensive than transporting food aid via 
river transport due to the cost of the plane rental and the 
re-bagging of commodities that is required to protect the bags from 
breaking upon hitting the ground. END NOTE).  In the UN and GoSS 
appeal, WFP requested USD 16.4 million to cover the costs of 
airdrops through the end of 2009.  According to WFP, the proposed 
combination of interventions will reduce the announced airdrop 
budget but the organization will still require at least USD 12 
million. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Hunger Season to Last Through October 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) The late rains have significantly affected the households 
relying on subsistence agriculture.  Farmers plant three varieties 
of sorghum in Southern Sudan to harvest cereals at different times 
of the year and help mitigate crop failure risks.  In a typical 
year, the hunger season ends in August following the harvest of 
short variety sorghum; however, poor rainfall in May and June 
significantly impacted the August harvest, ruining crops and 
extending the hunger season through at least October.  According to 
the ANLA review, assuming a continuation of good rains that finally 
started in July in most states, the next harvest expected between 
October and November may be at or moderately below average. 
However, with poor rainfall and insecurity continuing in Upper Nile 
and Jonglei, this will not be the case as most people have not 
resumed agriculture activities.  According to the August 2009 UN 
Emergency Action Plan, the next harvest in these two states is 
expected to be below normal or may fail altogether, putting hundreds 
of thousands of already weakened people at serious risk of 
starvation.  In addition, excessive rainfall between August and 
October might cause flooding that could further negatively impact 
the later harvest. 
 
---------------- 
Food Prices Rise 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Since February, food prices have increased and livestock 
prices have decreased in urban markets per the ANLA review.  The 
rising food prices are a result of a combination of factors 
including: (1)the impact of the 2008 global food price crisis; (2) 
poor harvests in Eastern Africa; (3) new food import taxes imposed 
by the GoSS; (4) hoarding of food by traders; and (5) disruption of 
trade due to insecurity.  Due to the higher food prices, the ANLA 
review observed individual coping mechanisms, including the selling 
of livestock, which subsequently drove down its  value and altered 
the markets' terms of trade (ToT).  The ToT measurement of how much 
sorghum a household can buy in the market by selling an adult bull 
has also dropped considerably throughout Southern Sudan.  In Aweil, 
Northern Bahr El-Ghazal State, in July 2008, one adult bull could 
 
buy 700kg of sorghum.  In July 2009, the proceeds from one bull 
could only purchase 200 kg of sorghum.  (NOTE: The ToT is a key 
indicator for agro-pastoral households, as such behavior tracks key 
coping mechanisms during the hunger season and in times of abnormal 
stress. END NOTE.) 
 
¶10. (U) On August 15, at the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, 
GoSS Vice President Machar outlined the Food Security and Disaster 
Risk Reduction plan for GoSS officials, National Congress Party 
representatives, and the international donor community, asking 
international donors to increase funding in order to respond to the 
current situation.  During the meeting, SSRRC and WFP 
representatives presented the results of the mid-year review 
including the projected requirements to respond to the food security 
crisis.  Currently, the UN Emergency Action Plan includes requests 
for USD 44 million for food security to WFP, of which USD 12 million 
would be for the cost of airdrops, USD 9.3 million for health and 
nutrition to UNICEF, and USD 3.9 million for livelihood activities 
for FAO.  USAID staff provided details of USAID's Office of Food for 
Peace (USAID/FFP) support to WFP each year, announced USAID/FFP's 
USD 250 million contribution for WFP's 2010 operation and reiterated 
the USG's support to the people of Sudan. 
 
----------------------------------- 
USG RESPONDS TO THE CURRENT CRISIS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) USAID is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to 
Sudan.  In recent years, USAID/FFP has provided WFP with 
approximately 50 percent of their annual emergency food aid needs. 
For fiscal year 2009, USAID/FFP's contribution to WFP's operation 
has an estimated value of USD 367 million.  In addition, in 
preparation for WFP's 2010 emergency operation and in order to fill 
the food pipeline so that WFP can preposition food starting in 
January before the rains arrive and access is compromised, USAID/FFP 
has provided an early contribution of 218,760 MT, valued at USD 250 
million.  To assist WFP with the emergency food distributions, 
USAID/FFP partner, Catholic Relief Services, plans to use 1,450 MT 
of their contingency stocks prepositioned in Southern Sudan to 
respond to this crisis.  USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (USAID/OFDA) implements a FY 2009 USD 28 million dollar 
emergency program in the south, including recent funding for 
partners in Jonglei and Upper Nile to respond to the conflict and 
food security crisis.  USAID/OFDA partners provide health, 
nutrition, food security, safe water and non-food item distribution 
activities throughout the south and remain well-positioned to 
provide a response in this crisis.  Because USAID programs are able 
to respond to the situation using existing partners and funding, 
USAID does not anticipate allocating additional funds at this time 
to support the UN appeal. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶12. (SBU) In light of the GoSS's commitment to spend USD 2.7 billion 
for a strategic food reserve and grain contracts (REFTEL), many 
international donors are frustrated with the current situation and 
the GoSS's inability to respond.  The GoSS has little to show for 
the off-budget grain purchases, according to WFP and international 
donors.  In addition, WFP and international humanitarian agencies 
note that due to inadequate storage facilities, much of the food 
that was purchased is now unfit for human consumption.  Given this 
situation, strengthening the GoSS's ability to mitigate risk and 
coordinate an appropriate response will be essential.  In addition 
to any emergency assistance given, international donors should 
continue to engage the GoSS on early warning and disaster mitigation 
efforts to build GoSS capacity. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Other international donors will likely address portions of 
the UN appeal, particularly the airdrop costs. 
In preliminary conversations with other donors, it appears that 
 
DFID, the Joint Donor Team, European Commission's Humanitarian Aid 
Office, and the Common Humanitarian Fund will likely provide funds 
for the UN appeal.  The UN and donors met during the week of August 
24 to discuss and coordinate an appropriate response. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Although WFP has adequate food stocks in Sudan to respond 
to the 22,000 MT needed to address the crisis by shifting food from 
less-urgent, development-oriented food aid projects, the 
organization is currently looking for additional funding to ensure 
that these programs can continue for the remainder of the year. 
Some international donors, including USAID and DFID, fear that the 
appeal has underestimated needs because the UN assessment team 
assumed normal rainfall for the remainder of 2009 and normal 
harvests between October and December.  In addition, USAID believes 
that further inter-ethnic clashes may increase IDP numbers and 
needs.  The Mission will continue to monitor the situation, and 
USAID will work with its partners to ensure that USG programs are 
responding to the most urgent needs.  At the same time, USAID will 
continue recovery activities that are designed to stabilize areas of 
return and support food security.  The briefing from the GoSS and 
meetings with the UN indicated, however, that the situation could 
require additional emergency resources. 
 
WHITEHEAD