Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1019, Civilian Protection Against LRA Attacks in Southern Sudan

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KHARTOUM1019.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1019 2009-09-03 11:25 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #1019 2461125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031125Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4364
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001019 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS UG SU
SUBJECT: Civilian Protection Against LRA Attacks in Southern Sudan 
 
REFTEL: STATE 87508 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In response to Reftel, PolOff met with Minister of 
Interior Gier Cuang Aluong, SPLA Chief of Staff Major General James 
Hoth and UNMIS officials to assess the SPLA, UNMIS and Uganda 
People's Defense Forces (UPDF) response capacity to Lord's 
Republican Army (LRA) attacks in Western Equatoria, southern Sudan. 
While Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) officials stated there was 
coordination between the SPLA and UPDF and UNMIS in the area, they 
also recognized the limitations imposed by their current UN force 
levels as well as their inability to pursue the LRA into the Central 
African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).  The SPLA's inability to guarantee protection to UN agencies 
in the area has forced them to pull out of Ezo and to elevate area 
threat levels to level IV, requiring UNMIS armed escort for any work 
in the area.  End Summary. 
 
UN Withdraws from Ezo 
-------------------- 
 
2. (U)  During the weekly UNMIS security briefing, UN officials 
reported that following LRA attacks in the area of Ezo, Western 
Equatoria, that WFP had pulled out and UN agencies were now 
operating out of Yambio. They explained that the SPLA and Western 
Equatoria Governor Jemma Nunu Kumba had not been able to guarantee 
security to UNMIS, thus forcing UNMIS to elevate security threat 
levels to IV and to require UN armed escorts for operations in the 
Ezo area.  UNHCR is planning an assessment of the area this week and 
will report back findings to the international community in Juba. 
 
3. (SBU) In a candid discussion, UN Humanitarian Coordinator Lise 
Grande explained that UNMIS peacekeepers need to do more to provide 
civilian protection.  Essentially she argued that UNMIS needs to 
move from a "static" deployment to a "dynamic model," where 
peacekeepers would undertake more patrols and act as a deterrent to 
such attacks.  While there is coordination between UNMIS and the 
SPLA on the ground in the areas of Western Equatoria, she reported, 
SPLA needs additional troops and UNMIS needs to start doing more 
patrols in order to protect the civilian population and deter new 
LRA attacks. 
 
GOSS Plans Assessments and More SPLA Troops 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Minister of Interior Gier Cuang Aluong told PolOff that he 
had met with Ugandan officials in Kampala on August 25 regarding LRA 
attacks and other issues.  He explained that the GOSS and SPLA are 
very concerned about recent attacks. However, they are also 
frustrated because the SPLA has limited leeway in pursuing LRA over 
the border into CAR and DRC.  SPLA Spokesperson Major General Kuol 
Dim reiterated this point and asked for international involvement in 
the issue.  He explained that there was coordination with the UPDF, 
which has a unit located in Tambura, Western Equatoria, but that the 
UPDF also does not have permission to pursue LRA units into DRC or 
CAR.   There was constant coordination with UNMIS in the area 
through the joint military commission (JMC), he explained. 
 
5. (SBU) Major General James Ajongo Mawut, SPLA Director of 
Operations, expressed concern about the more than 21,000 refugees 
and IDPs in the area, but stated it was the GOSS's responsibility to 
protect its citizens in the area from LRA attacks.  SPLA Chief of 
Staff James Hoth explained that the SPLA plans to increase troops in 
Western Equatoria to 6,000 troops, but believes Kone and the 
majority of the LRA have pulled far away from the border into CAR 
and DRC.  Hoth stated that he would be sending the SPLA Deputy Chief 
of Staff to the area with Gier to conduct an assessment.  Gier 
stated that the team would not return until the situation had been 
resolved. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: Local response is still difficult to quantify but 
PolOff hopes to obtain more information once UNMIS and GOSS have 
completed their assessments.  Although food deliveries and other 
assistance are needed, UN or SPLA protection guarantees are still 
not solid enough to make many organizations feel they can safely 
work in the area until more troops are deployed, especially in the 
Ezo, Tambura and Yambio areas.  UNMIS willingness to increase mobile 
and foot patrols would provide a greater deterrent to future LRA 
attacks in the future. 
 
WHITEHEAD