VZCZCXRO6531
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3002 2720414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290414Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1717
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KABUL 003002 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
 
SUBJECT: Helmand's New Provincial Council At First Glance: 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  According to preliminary results, Provincial 
Council (PC) elections in Helmand produced a large turnover, with an 
unfortunate increase in the number of members with ties to the drugs 
trade or malign powerbrokers.  Fraud may have played a role.  The 
PRT is prepared to work around the PC if necessary.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On September 27, the Independent Elections Commission 
(IEC) released its preliminary results for Provincial Council (PC) 
elections in Helmand.  The results indicated a large turnover from 
the last PC, with just three incumbents - Haji Mohammad Anwar Khan 
(Chair), Haji Mohammad Naim Khan, and Razya Baloch (one of four 
female members) - being re-elected.  (Note:  The Haji Abdul Ahad 
elected this time is a different individual from the person of the 
same name on the last PC.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) At first glance the new PC in many ways represents a step 
backwards from the previous iteration.  As compared to the previous 
composition, a greater number of new members have ties to the drugs 
trade or malign Helmandi powerbrokers (Sher Muhammad Akhunzada 
(SMA), Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ), Amir Muhammad Akhunzada (AMA), etc). 
However, this should not be read as a good institution being taken 
over by bad actors, as the prior PC contained members with ties to 
each of these unpalatable elements as well, only now the weighting 
is a bit different.  The important difference is that the new PC 
will likely have fewer honest brokers with whom the PRT and 
Provincial Governor's office can work productively.  Even though 
several members appear to be linked to known malign actors such as 
SMA, the strength of these links and the level of influence SMA and 
others may have over them is altogether unclear.  Unfortunately, the 
two most effective members from the last PC, Haji Qurban Ali 
Oruzgani and Eng. Ismail Khan, both declined to seek re-election. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Of the new faces, Syful Malok and Ali Ahmad appear to be 
the best bets for productive engagement.  They are both regarded 
locally as honest and are reasonably well educated, and do not have 
known ties to the drugs trade or SMA.  On the negative side, most of 
the other new members are connected to the SMA/ARJ/AMA group, 
although again the nature of these ties is unclear.  Two PC members, 
both re-elected incumbents, are major poppy growers (Anwar Khan and 
Naim Khan).  Atawullah, Nimatullah, and Abdul Bari Fayaz are reputed 
to have some level of Taliban connections. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) There appears to be a correlation between the home 
district and tribal affiliation of top vote-getters and those 
locations associated with suspected large-scale ballot stuffing 
during the election, indicating that some members may have 
fraudulently won their seats.  In terms of tribal dynamics, the new 
PC will be dominated by members of the Barakzai (5), Norzai (4), and 
Alizai (3) tribes, which may prove a source of tension in Helmand's 
fractured tribal environment. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The connections to malign powerbrokers, especially SMA, 
could have a substantial and negative impact on the PRT's 
relationship with the new PC.  While it remains to be seen just how 
much influence SMA has over these members, if SMA does pull the 
strings the PC will not be a vehicle for genuine governance.  In 
that instance, the PRT would maintain a formal relationship with the 
PC through regular meetings and briefings, but would sideline it in 
practice by not involving the PC in programmatic or funding 
decisions, and would not give the PC power over Community Councils 
or other instruments of local governance.