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Viewing cable 09KABUL2961, IEC/ECC AGREE ON SAMPLING METHOD FOR AUDIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL2961 2009-09-25 12:10 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4458
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2961/01 2681210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251210Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1673
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002961 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: IEC/ECC AGREE ON SAMPLING METHOD FOR AUDIT 
PROCESS, CANDIDATE REACTION MIXED 
 
REF: KABUL 2789 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. The Independent Elections Commission (IEC), 
the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), the UN and 
international experts have finalized an audit process for 
contested presidential election ballots.  SRSG Eide 
introduced the new methodology to candidates' agents and 
election observers on September 24, with a sharp reaction by 
Abdullah's campaign manager to perceived IEC bias.  The 
Embassy has pushed for candidates to be better informed and 
will continue to work with the UN, IEC and ECC on educating 
the candidates and the public regarding this complex endgame. 
 End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  As of late September 23, the IEC and ECC had 
agreed on a way forward to fulfill the requirements of the 
September 8 ECC audit/recount directive (ref A).  The IEC and 
ECC have opted for an audit process rather than a full 
recount of ballots, which would have been too time-consuming. 
 The audit will draw a sample of 313 ballot boxes from among 
the 3063 polling stations that fall under the criteria of the 
ECC directive.  The audit methodology follows international 
best practices and was designed by UN electoral experts. 
 
3.  (SBU) On the afternoon of September 24, UN SRSG Kai Eide 
hosted a meeting at which top IEC and ECC officials briefed 
national and international observers, and candidate agents 
representing the top four candidates, on the methodology. 
IEC President Ludin, IEC Chief Electoral Officer Najafi, and 
the ECC Commissioners participated.  When Eide left the room, 
according to UNDP-ELECT sources, the discussion grew heated, 
with Abdullah campaign manager Satar Murat doubting Ludin's 
impartiality and integrity, and Ludin referring to Abdullah 
as "the loser."   Under SRSG Eide's supervision, the meeting 
returned to calm.  The meeting did accomplish one of its 
other goals - the random picking of sample boxes from 
different provinces to be audited - allowing the next stage 
of the process to begin. 
 
----------- 
Methodology 
----------- 
 
4.  (SBU) The IEC/ECC identified three categories of suspect 
ballot boxes:  914 polling stations with over 600 ballots and 
where one candidate received 95 percent of the votes; 627 
polling stations with over 600 ballots but no candidate 
receiving over 95 percent; and 1522 stations with between 100 
and 600 ballots where one candidate received over 95 percent 
of the vote.  These three "universes" will have about ten 
percent of their polling stations audited for a total of 313 
polling stations under audit.  The stations to be audited are 
randomly selected from each universe.  If 20 percent of 
polling stations from a sample (i.e., 20 percent of the 10 
percent sample) are found to be fraudulent, the entire 
"universe" will be nullified. 
5.  (SBU)  The operational plan to conduct the audit begins 
with retrieval of the boxes by three groups with teams of 
four persons observing the chain of custody.  Air transport, 
possibly via the UN and ISAF, will move boxes from provincial 
capitals to the IEC headquarters in Kabul for the actual 
audit.  The process will separate from the audit those boxes 
or ballots also subject to the ECC complaints process.  The 
audit will proceed once observers and candidate agents are 
trained (probably September 27).  Experts from UNAMA and the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) will 
formulate standard operating procedures (SOPs), checklists, 
and a policy paper - to be based on international standards - 
for the ECC.  Two international experts, the UN's Carlos 
Valenzuela and IFES' Carina Perelli, will sign as witnesses 
to the documents that detail the SOPs and the policy. 
 
------------------------------- 
Candidates Need Some Convincing 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) SRSG Eide told us that he briefed both Karzai and 
Abdullah individually on September 24, and that both asked 
questions about criteria but, according to Eide, expressed 
"satisfaction" with the audit plan.  Both candidates are 
publicly on the record supporting the IEC/ECC process, 
although they have not yet made statements on the specific 
new methodology. 
 
7.  (SBU) However, some members of both the Abdullah and 
Karzai teams are expressing concerns about specific 
procedural steps: the Karzai team on the recount, and the 
Abdullah campaign on sampling.  A Karzai advisor confirmed to 
us the accuracy of a September 23 Tolo TV report that 
President Karzai opposed a recount of votes in some polling 
sites, because such a plan would "disrespect the nation's 
 
KABUL 00002961  002 OF 002 
 
 
vote."  The Tolo broadcast reported correctly that Karzai's 
team did agree with the decision to investigate the votes of 
polling sites where more than 600 votes had been cast. 
 
8.  (SBU) One Abdullah campaign advisor told us that in 
principle, the Abdullah team supported the new joint IEC/ECC 
efforts to investigate fraud, and was upbeat about the 
September 24 announcement.  However, two other Abdullah 
advisors separately voiced concerns about anything less than 
a full recount; international affairs advisor Farid Zikria 
said to us that "just taking samples" was not enough and that 
doing so was a "political decision" and a "change of 
direction" for the ECC, which they had counted on to "rescue 
the election".  He claimed that unless at least 600,000 of 
the 1,200,000 suspicious votes were nullified -- which would 
lead to a second round -- the election result would not be 
legitimate. 
 
--------- 
Messaging 
--------- 
 
9.  (SBU) UNDP-ELECT will hold a broad meeting of 
stakeholders September 25 to discuss messaging, and an IFES 
public relations expert will arrive in Afghanistan shortly to 
augment the IEC/ECC effort.  Post had been active in getting 
candidate agents invited to the September 24 rollout and will 
continue to push for more proactive information-sharing, 
explanation, and transparency from the IEC/ECC.  These have 
been in short supply at times, which has contributed to an 
atmosphere of a lack of trust in the process.  IEC, ECC and 
the UN's approach to explaining this complex endgame is key 
to its ultimate success and credibility. 
EIKENBERRY