VZCZCXRO3014
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2940/01 2670452
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240452Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1645
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002940 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR AISIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PINS PGOV AF
SUBJECT: DISTRICT DELIVERY PROGRAM MAKES STEADY PROGRESS 
 
REF: A. KABUL 1093 
     ¶B. KABUL 2270 
     ¶C. KABUL 2383 
 
 ¶1.  Summary:  Over the last seven weeks, the Afghan-led 
District Delivery Working Group (DDWG) has made steady 
progress toward extending Afghan government services to 
strategic or newly cleared districts.  Major service delivery 
ministries and executive agencies, together with the Embassy, 
ISAF and some other international partners, have agreed on 
criteria for selecting districts in six pilot locations in 
the south and east.  The ministries and agencies have also 
produced initial assessments of their possible resource needs 
in these districts.  The group plans to meet next on October 
4 to examine a coordinated Afghan government services 
package.  If this process is ultimately successful, we 
believe it could serve as a model of how &Afghan first8 can 
work.  But there are challenges ahead: fostering coordination 
among jealously independent Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) ministries and agencies; 
finding ways to get qualified Afghan personnel deployed to 
the districts; and designing mechanisms able to ensure quick 
yet accountable transfer of resources to the local level and 
translating those resources into actual services delivered. 
Septel will provide a more in-depth look at the related 
District Support Team (DST) effort.  End Summary. 
 
The Context 
----------- 
¶2.  In April 2009, Embassy Kabul announced plans to support 
more directly GIRoA efforts to build sub-national capacity by 
establishing a new platform for integrated civ-mil efforts, 
i.e. District Support Teams (Ref A).  The plans envision the 
creation of 20 DSTs in the south and east to strengthen our 
civilian presence and help district officials increase their 
capacity to deliver basic services.  DSTs will be integrated 
civ-mil command units that include three to five civilians 
from State, USAID and other agencies.  Eventually they should 
evolve into embedded training teams supporting GIRoA efforts. 
 Working closely with U.S. military authorities, State and 
USAID have so far assigned at least one civilian to each of 
seven of the 20 districts originally identified for this 
exercise (Maywand and Spin Boldak in Kandahar;  Garmsir and 
Nawa in Helmand; Sarkani in Kunar; Khogyani in Nangarhar; and 
Seyadebad in Wardak); as well as to five other districts 
where they could add value to local governance and 
development efforts.  Establishment of full civilian 
contingents and operations will depend on the security 
situation on the ground and the availability of Afghan 
government counterparts.  The Afghan government is notably 
absent in many difficult districts, aside perhaps from a 
district administrator and police unit.  We have had to 
encourage GIRoA to get teams out to districts to provide a 
cluster of services to the populations of recently secured 
districts.  This is a key part of gaining support in these 
areas. 
¶3.  To address these issues, in August we and key Afghan 
ministries and agencies launched an initiative called the 
District Delivery program aimed at providing a much more 
robust GIRoA presence along with a package of basic services 
in selected &priority districts8 (ref B).  By matching our 
DST deployments with the District Delivery initiative, we aim 
to boost both the short- and longer-term effectiveness of our 
DST contributions.  Therefore we have taken special care in 
the pilot stage of the District Delivery program to mesh with 
our DST deployment plans.  At the same time, we very much 
want the Afghans to lead as they move out to districts in a 
new way and to gain confidence for covering more districts in 
the future. 
The Process 
----------- 
¶4.  Since its inception on August 1, the new District 
Delivery Working Group (DDWG) has met weekly to develop a 
mechanism to deploy packages of government services quickly 
to districts that have recently been cleared or have 
strategic importance.  This Afghan-led forum, launched with 
our encouragement, began with participation by the Ministry 
for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD); Ministry of 
Finance; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL); Ministry of Education; 
Ministry of Public Health; Independent Directorate of Local 
Governance (IDLG); UNAMA; ISAF; and the U.S.  Recently, the 
Supreme Court as well as the UK,s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) have joined the 
discussion.  IDLG officials have encouraged the Attorney 
General,s Office to take part to promote the dispatch of 
more prosecutors to the field, so far without success. 
 
KABUL 00002940  002 OF 003 
 
 
District Selection 
------------------ 
¶5.  The most notable achievement of the group has been 
agreement on criteria for selecting districts and the 
identification of six pilot districts.  There is agreement 
that priority districts should be secured, with good 
prospects for being held longer-term.  They should also have 
high potential for development; high potential for an influx 
of governance resources to have a major positive impact on 
the local population; access for Afghan officials and 
relevant international partners; proximity to security 
forces; cluster potential for service delivery in nearby 
areas to build critical mass; and strategic or symbolic 
importance.  After extensive discussion within the group and 
consultation with ISAF and U.S. forces, the working group 
(DDWG) agreed on a pilot phase in Nawa and Nad Ali in 
Helmand; Baraki Barak in Logar; Seyadabad in Wardak; 
Khogyiani in Nangarhar; and Sarkani in Kunar.  The DDWG also 
identified several other districts with good potential that 
we will re-examine later. 
Governance Packages 
------------------- 
¶6.  Two of the greatest challenges the DDWG faces is getting 
the individual ministries to identify what assets they might 
contribute to governance packages and then getting them to 
work with other ministries to combine these into a single, 
coordinated government services package.  Unlike the USG, 
GIRoA does not have an executive entity, aside from the 
President himself, to set priorities authoritatively and 
compel inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination. 
Government ministries instead tend to guard their portfolios 
closely. 
¶7.  It is, therefore, remarkable that the DDWG has made as 
much progress as it has in getting so many major ministries 
and agencies on the same page in support of the District 
Delivery program.  All have managed to produce initial 
proposals on what they might undertake in the pilot 
districts.  The submissions are of varying quality, with the 
Supreme Court, for example, relying on the IDLG to help put 
together its contribution.  Nevertheless, the outline of an 
integrated package is beginning to emerge.  Over the current 
religious holiday period, ministries have been asked to 
refine and re-submit their submissions, which the IDLG will 
attempt to meld into the first cut at a truly integrated 
package, in advance of the next DDWG meeting on October 4. 
¶8.  Individual ministries and agencies face varying degrees 
of difficulty in coming up with useful contributions to an 
integrated package of government services.  The process has 
been fairly straightforward for the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), since its signature 
National Solidarity Program (NSP) already operates at the 
district and provincial levels.  The difficulty has been in 
getting the ministry to link its work to that of other key 
ministries, rather than simply to press for additional direct 
U.S. funding.  The IDLG is by definition already focused on 
provinces and districts but must now overcome persistent 
hurdles in getting qualified people to fill its many vacant 
district-level positions.  The Ministry of Education has 
pre-designed packages, even for difficult areas, but needs 
security assurances and incentive packages to ensure enough 
teachers deploy.  The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) is 
also accustomed to acting at the local level via its many 
health care centers, which are staffed by NGO doctors funded 
by USAID, the EC and World Bank.  Because MOPH focused almost 
solely on infrastructure needs in developing its package, the 
DDWG has asked the ministry to consider what services it 
could deliver with short-term impact.  The Agriculture 
Ministry (MAIL) is rarely represented at the district level 
and insists it cannot lay out with any precision a catalogue 
of planned activities until its people are on the ground to 
conduct a needs assessment.  On the plus side, the ministry 
is recruiting 600 university graduates for field positions. 
Even the Ministry of Finance is looking to play its part by 
identifying additional responsibilities for its provincial 
finance officers to expedite transfer of resources to the 
districts. 
Financing Mechanism 
------------------- 
¶9.  As reported ref B, the Ministry of Finance has outlined a 
special funding mechanism through which the U.S. (and 
potentially other donors) could transfer money to the GIRoA 
core budget  targeted specifically to the District Delivery 
program.  It has also indicated that it will work to bypass 
cumbersome central ministry budgeting mechanisms and 
procurement procedures to get resources quickly to the 
provincial and district levels.  We will work with the 
Ministry to develop a responsive financing mechanism, 
consistent with USG regulations, that will enable GIRoA and 
 
KABUL 00002940  003 OF 003 
 
 
district government units to deliver basic services 
effectively and accountably at the district level.  Note: We 
are requesting separately a TDY visit by a team of USAID 
experts to help us craft a funding mechanism for use of U.S. 
monies. 
Comment 
------- 
¶10.  If  the DDWG process ultimately fulfills our 
expectations, in many ways it will offer a model for future 
GIRoA/donor assistance.  It is a significant step forward 
that these major ministries are so engaged in the process 
(usually sending deputy minister-level representatives to 
DDWG meetings) and have assembled initial service delivery 
package proposals.  We nonetheless see three challenges, 
which we label &the three F,s.8  The first is formulation. 
 As noted, Afghan ministries do not find it easy to work 
together, so getting them to come up with a single, 
coordinated package of services, rather than several 
individual ones, will require continued prodding and quite 
possibly support from us.  We see this as a necessary and 
important capacity-building exercise. 
¶11.  The second challenge is fielding civil servants to the 
districts.  This will be difficult for a host of reasons, 
most notably a lack both of qualified people and of adequate 
facilities in the field.  It remains to be seen whether the 
ministries will succeed in attracting qualified civil 
servants through incentive packages or will have to resort to 
more expensive contract personnel. 
¶12.  Our final challenge involves funding.  We are developing 
mechanisms to get the necessary funding out to the district 
level -- and get those resources translated into actual 
services delivered -- expeditiously, efficiently, 
transparently and accountably.  This will be difficult, 
because under Afghanistan,s centralized budget system, 
provinces and districts are not budget entities. 
EIKENBERRY