VZCZCXRO2526
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHSL RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2939/01 2661426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231426Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1643
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002939 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/RA, SCA/A, AND INL/AP 
DEPT PASS FOR AID/ASIA SCAA DRAY 
DEPT PASS USDA FOR FAS MICHNER 
CENTCOM FOR USFOR-A AND CSTC-A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR ECON SNAR PGOV PINS AF
SUBJECT: AGRICULTURE RAPID RESPONSE PROGRAM IN HELMAND PROVINCE 
MAKING PROGRESS IN SPITE OF CHALLENGES 
 
Ref: Kabul 2383 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) USAIDQs agricultural rapid rmi 
endorsed the plan and suggested a methodology to build Afghan 
Government capacity by seconding new Ministry extension agents to 
AVIPA PLUS to receive on-the-ground training, and identified a 
salary mechanism to encourage staff to work in these difficult 
ation in the 
District Delivery program, a parallel U.S.-GIRoA effort to deliver 
integrated governance packages to recently secured and/or strategic 
districts (reftel).  Nawa is one of six pilot districts selected for 
this program.  Septel will address this program.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Upon receiving MAIL/Kabul approval, USAID and USMC 
facilitated a shura with the Nawa District Governor (DG) to 
introduce IRD and the AVIPA PLUS program and discuss next steps 
towards identifying projects and beneficiaries.  Since then, in 
close cooperation with the Afghan government and US and UK military, 
three additional districts (Nahr-e Saraj, Nad-e Ali and Garmsir) in 
Helmand were selected, and agreement was reached for USG to support 
over 80% of the areas under Helmand Governor MangalQs QFood Zone 
Program. 
 
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FACTORS COMPLICATING ROLLOUT 
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KABUL 00002939  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) After USAID-IRD arrived in Lashkar Gah on July 9, all 
civilian flights to the region were suspended and ground movements 
restricted from July 12 to August 3, effectively halting all 
civilian passage into and out of Helmand.  The mobile phone network 
does not extend into the districts and only operates within Lashkar 
Gah during the day, with frequent disruptions.  In addition, during 
this period all resources were focused on maintaining security for 
national elections on August 20.  Despite these obstacles, the 
program has successfully established relationships with the PRT, 
USMC, TFH, and Afghan provincial authorities, and as of August 17 
had recruited 67 Afghans in Lashkar Gah. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Since USAIDQs arrival, several underlying factors that will 
directly affect AVIPA PLUS rollout have emerged: travel between 
Lashkar Gah and the districts is largely non-permissive; the Nawa 
District Governor (DG) lives within the USMC base for security 
reasons; and MAIL has limited ability to provide district-level 
support.  USAID identified highly-qualified Afghan agricultural 
experts but many continue to refuse to leave the security of Lashkar 
Gah to return to their home districts.  Agricultural projects must 
be identified early to ensure alignment with planting seasons. 
 
¶7. (SBU) AVIPA PLUS is dependent on freedom of movement so that 
Afghan officials can meet openly with the people, and entrepreneurs 
and farmers can access and move agricultural goods.  In Nawa, 
citizens must visit the USMC base if they wish to meet with the 
District Governor; participation at public shuras is limited to 
those willing to be seen visiting the base.  Moreover, extension 
agents do not feel secure enough to travel to farms to provide 
technical assistance.  These conditions in Nawa are not unique in 
Helmand. 
 
¶8. (SBU) While the Agricultural Ministry supports AVIPA PLUS, its 
dependence on centralized decision-making could significantly slow 
implementation.  Additionally, the MinistryQs capacity to provide 
local level support is limited; the 600 extension agents the 
Ministry has recently hired have not yet deployed, and the acting 
Helmand Department of Agriculture director receives little support 
from Kabul and suffers from low staffing levels and poor capacity of 
existing staff.  Significant personnel changes are expected in 
Helmand after the elections and bureaucratic infighting among 
different local GIRoA departments leaves decision-making hostage to 
personalities. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Identifying and addressing such constraints will be key to 
AVIPA PLUSQ success, and our efforts to move this program forward 
must include US and coalition partners.  The USG is working with 
Task Force Helmand and the USMC at both the headquarters and 
district levels to identify how best to utilize AVIPA PLUS to 
achieve greater stability in the cleared areas.  This includes 
deciding which communities to work with and addressing how to move 
agricultural goods between population centers. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Despite these constraints, three additional districts in 
Helmand (Garmsir, Nad-e Ali and Nahr-e Saraj) were selected for 
inclusion in the program in close cooperation with the Afghan 
government, Task Force Helmand, USMC, and Lashkar Gah PRT. 
Cash-for-work projects have begun in Lashkar Gah, with additional 
projects in Nawa slated to begin after Eid, providing jobs for at 
least 220 laborers.  An Afghan-led review committee in the Nawa 
District GovernorQs Office formed to receive and review grant 
applications.  Seventy-seven grants, valued at $995,000 and 
potentially benefitting nearly 1,600 Afghan farmers and small 
business owners, have been received to date and are under review. 
In addition, USG agreed to support over 80% of the areas under 
Helmand Governor MangalQs QFood Zone Program.Q Initial projects are 
employing over 100 day laborers to graft 155,000 tree saplings and 
construct vineyard trellises to produce high-value fruits such as 
apricots and plums in five key agricultural districts. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Understanding how to work in the districts and which 
activities to support under AVIPA PLUS activities is still a work in 
progress and is heavily dependent on the reality and perception of 
security for beneficiaries, host country officials and implementing 
partners. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY