VZCZCXRO0083
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2737/01 2510728
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080728Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1376
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002737 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: WORSENING SECURITY IN BADGHIS 
 
Reference: KABUL 02599 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Inadequate ISAF and Afghan forces and ill-advised 
pre-election moves by the Karzai government are contributing to 
worsening security conditions in Badghis Province.  Without more 
forces capable of holding ground (NATO-ISAF or Afghan) and more 
progress on delivering essential government services, insurgent 
attacks are likely to grow, and the provincial government will find 
itself confined to an ever smaller security enclave. A province that 
should be in the win column will be in danger of falling under 
effective insurgent control.  Ambassador Eikenberry visited the 
provincial capital of Qala-e-Naw on August 27 for meetings with the 
governor and other local officials, as well as with ISAF and PRT 
personnel. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Badghis's problems are fueled by several pre-election moves 
by the Karzai government aimed at shoring up votes but which appear 
to have made conditions worse.  In June, 15 prisoners arrested in 
May as part of an anti-corruption investigation were released by 
local authorities, after the intervention of officials reportedly 
close to the president.  The investigation implicated former 
Governor Mohammad Ashref Naseri (current governor in Zabul 
Province). The probe found evidence Naseri submitted fraudulent 
expense invoices and pocketed the money. His son and line Minister 
of Finance Mohammad Shah Shafiq were also implicated. None of these 
three individuals were among those arrested. Shafiq belongs to the 
Nahebdzadah clan, the most powerful family in Badghis. Release of 
the prisoners after a professional investigation by the Attorney 
General's Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), working with NDS, had been 
seen locally as evidence that corrupt officials can operate with 
impunity. Naseri has ignored continued efforts by ACU to question 
him about the case. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In July, Jalani Popal, head of the Independent Directorate 
of Local Governance (IDLG), orchestrated a truce between local 
elders and Taliban in the northern district of Bala Murghab. (REF A) 
The agreement came just weeks after an RC-West operation had 
established four new checkpoints in the Pashtun-dominated district. 
Popal's agreement, which reportedly came with a monetary payment, 
called on the Taliban to permit elections to occur in the district 
and to support development projects and construction of the 
long-stalled Ring Road through Badghis, the only province where the 
road is unfinished. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The day after Popal's meeting, ANA forces withdrew from the 
four checkpoints.  ANA 207th Corps Commander Jalandar Shah says the 
Ministry of Defense ordered him to pull back, though he acknowledged 
that the truce only required withdrawal from civil-occupied homes, 
not from the checkpoints. The Taliban did not uphold their end of 
the deal. Only eight of thirty-three polling centers in Bala Murghab 
opened Election Day, and ballot box stuffing benefiting Karzai is 
suspected in all of the centers. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The result was a short-term gain for Karzai, but a probable 
weakening of the Afghan government's real and potential support. The 
Badghis insurgency has emerged with greater freedom of movement and 
is continuing to press attacks into the neighboring districts of 
Qadis and Muqur. In the largely-Tajik district of Jawand, local 
militias reportedly are forming to protect residents against the 
insurgency. Construction on the Ring Road remains stalled. 
 
¶6. (SBU) ISAF and ANSF in Badghis are inadequate.  Though the ANP is 
well-led, it is undermanned at 1,300 policemen, against an 
insurgency now estimated at over 2000.  The ANA has two battalions 
assigned to Baghdis, but they are poorly trained and equipped and 
play a minimal role. As for ISAF, a 220-soldier Spanish contingent 
lacks a maneuver component and limits its operations to escorting 
aid workers and guarding the FOB/PRT and airport in Qala-e-Naw. 
Spanish officers admit that insurgent activity is increasing and 
that major roads to Ghormach and Herat are no longer secure, even 
during the day, an observation confirmed by local leaders at a 
meeting with Ambassador Eikenberry. They do not move outside 
Qala-e-Naw at night. Their four-month rotations severely hamper 
their effectiveness. 
 
¶7. (SBU) A 120-soldier Italian contingent at a Forward operating 
Base in Bala Murghab, along with a 20-person US Police 
Mentoring/Embedded Training Team, conducts patrols and is more 
effective. An RC-West plan to pull the Italians out of Bala Murghab 
and replace them with Spanish forces is being reconsidered and a 
post-election clearing operation is under consideration.  Even so, 
ISAF's ability at current force levels to hold areas it has cleared 
is problematic, especially now that ANSF have pulled back from 
forward positions. A company of the 82nd Airborne Division is due to 
arrive in Badghis in mid-September to serve as police trainers. This 
will help with security. But the relatively small numbers will limit 
the gains. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Badghis can be turned around, but it will take more 
attention and resources from ISAF, then international community, and 
 
KABUL 00002737  002 OF 002 
 
 
from the Afghan government. Governor Delbar Jan Arman replaced the 
corrupt former governor in March and has sought to improve 
governance. The hard-working ANP police chief, General Sami, is also 
a welcome addition. During Ambassador Eikenberry's visit, Arman 
focused on the need for security, water, electricity and completion 
of the Ring Road. (REF A) He also appealed for more police and more 
ISAF operations aimed at retaking ground from the insurgents, a 
stance that has strained his relations with the Spanish PRT.  A 
majority of the line ministers and local officials are possibly 
engaged in corruption. If Arman takes on corrupt officials, he risks 
driving more powerful families into the arms of the insurgency. He 
knows he has little support in Kabul. 
 
¶9. (SBU) WAY AHEAD: We will work with NATO-ISAF and through IDLG and 
the Office of the Attorney General to lobby the Afghan government to 
replace Ghaws Muhammad, the chief prosecutor in Baghdis. Governor 
Arman has asked the Attorney General to have him replaced without 
success.  Local NDS officials have a dossier of evidence against 
Muhammad and other prosecutors.  Removing him would strengthen Arman 
and signal Kabul is interested in good governance, the opposite 
signal it sent by ordering the dismissal of the corruption case in 
June. 
 
¶10. (SBU) We will work with our Spanish allies and its PRT to 
determine if there are governmental or economic developmental 
projects that might help make short-term contributions to reverse 
the negative security trends. 
 
¶11. (SBU) We will also work with NATO-ISAF, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the Afghan government to explore ways to push forward the 
long-stalled Ring Road project through Badghis Province. 
 
EIKENBERRY