VZCZCXRO6760
OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHJA #1466/01 2451023
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021023Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3228
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001466 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, S/CT, PM, INL, 
DS/IP/EAP, DS/ITA/EAP, NSC FOR J.BADER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM ASEC ID
SUBJECT: ELITE POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE -- A WAY FORWARD ON 
VETTING 
 
REF: JAKARTA 1232 AND PREVIOUS 
 
¶1.  (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The USG's current training policy toward 
Mobile Brigade is counterproductive.  Prohibiting this key 
law enforcement element from receiving ICITAP training 
prevents members from learning about INL-funded 
DOJ/ICITAP-developed use-of-force policy and thus take steps 
to overcome the group's past history.  Mobile Brigade has 
undertaken internal reforms, is providing members with human 
rights training, and has played a critical role in protecting 
American citizens.  A number of human rights groups support 
the training of Mobile Brigade.  Mission advocates vetting 
Mobile Brigade members as we would any other police or 
military entity so as to ensure that no one trained with USG 
funds has committed human rights abuses.  END SUMMARY. 
 
HISTORY OF USG POLICY TOWARD BRIMOB 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Department of State has a mixed policy regarding 
engagement with Mobile Brigade, also known as Brimob. 
Although some U.S. entities are permitted to train Mobile 
Brigade, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
(INCLE)funding through the Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) may not be used to support 
Mobile Brigade training. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In 2003, subsequent to a GAO audit that criticized 
the USG's inconsistent vetting practices in Indonesia, INL 
set a policy against training Mobile Brigade.  The 
INCLE-funded training was halted, not because members of 
Mobile Brigade had been accused of human rights violations at 
that time, but because prior to 2003, vetting was 
inconsistently carried out on Mobile Brigade officers, 
allowing some officers who had previously engaged in human 
rights offenses to be trained.  In an effort to ensure that 
no human rights abusers were trained with INCLE funding, INL 
established a policy that prevented training Mobile Brigade 
as a part of the INL program. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) However, updates to ICITAP's vetting procedures 
have since been implemented, bringing the program's vetting 
regime fully in line with Leahy Law requirements.  ICITAP 
vets 100 percent of all training recipients, ensuring that no 
human rights abusers receive USG-funded training.  As a 
result, the policy preventing training of Mobile Brigade 
should be reconsidered.  Mobile Brigade is under the 
authority of the Indonesian National Police (INP) and subject 
to civilian laws. 
 
BRIMOB'S RECORD 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Mobile Brigade has been criticized by some human 
rights NGOs for lack of accountability in alleged human 
rights abuses.  NGOs often cite the acquittal by the Makassar 
Permanent Human Rights Court in 2006 of a Papua Brimob 
Commander in Abepura, Papua, as evidence of lack of 
accountability.  The court in this case determined that the 
incident did not rise to the level of a crime against 
humanity.  Many of the incidents provided in NGO reports fail 
to meet the standard of gross violations of human rights as 
defined in Section 502 B (D) of the Foreign Assistance Act. 
Most of the allegations are based on inappropriate or 
excessive use of force, which are not instances of gross 
human rights violations. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Although more needs to be done, the INP and the 
Attorney General's Office (AGO) have taken steps to enforce 
accountability.  The following are a selection of incidents 
for which the GOI has taken steps toward accountability.  Six 
Mobile Brigade officers, who in April 2008 were accused of 
beating a university student, were sentenced to two months in 
prison.  In 2007, a Mobile Brigade officer was sentenced to 
two years in jail for the 2006 killing of a farmer (these 
sentences are in line with Indonesian practice). 
 
NGO SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Some human rights groups in Papua have endorsed USG 
training for Mobile Brigade.  Rev. Budi Hernawan, Director of 
the Jayapura Catholic Diocese Office for Peace and Justice, 
told us that such training would be valuable.  Hernawan 
assessed that police leaders in Papua were genuinely 
 
JAKARTA 00001466  002 OF 003 
 
 
committed to improving respect for human rights.  However, 
their capacity to do so remained limited.  U.S. training, 
including human rights training, could help address that 
deficit, according to Hernawan.  Theo Hesegem, director of 
the Law Enforcement and Human Rights Advocacy Network in 
Wamena concurred.  His organization provides human rights 
training to the Indonesian police--including Mobile 
Brigade--and he has encouraged the USG to do the same. 
(Note: Human rights training is covered in the DOJ/ICITAP 
developed use-of-force policy and was recently enacted in the 
INP's human rights regulations.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Other foreign governments, who do not have the same 
restrictions, have been able to train Mobile Brigade.  The 
Australians are about to begin a program to enhance human 
rights awareness through Kemitraan (Partnership for 
Governance Reform), an NGO dedicated to building prosperity 
through good governance principles and practices.  UNHCR also 
provided similar training to Mobile Brigade from 2001 to 
¶2003.  The New Zealand Embassy is running a community 
policing project in Indonesia, which has a focus on Papua, 
and involves some members of Mobile Brigade. 
 
U.S. SHOULD REENGAGE MOBILE BRIGADE 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Department policy prohibits almost all engagement 
with the Mobile Brigade.  The involvement of some Mobile 
Brigade personnel in past human rights violations in Aceh, 
East Timor, and Papua should not prevent our working with 
this critical unit now.  The Mobile Brigade has undertaken 
significant reforms--including human rights training for all 
personnel--since Indonesia became a democracy.  Moreover, the 
majority of Mobile Brigade personnel were not even members of 
the force when the previous violations took place.  Mobile 
Brigade played a critical role in protecting American 
Citizens in the aftermath of the July 17 bombings in Jakarta 
and in responding to the series of shootings at the 
Freeport-McMoRan mining operation in Papua.  The United 
States already trains the small number of Mobile Brigade 
personnel who are responsible for Embassy security. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) ICITAP would like to utilize INCLE funding to 
train Mobile Brigade in three critical areas: INL-funded 
DOJ/ICITAP-developed use-of-force policy socialization, 
Standard Emergency Management Systems (SEMS) for disaster 
relief, humanitarian assistance, and pandemic assistance 
(including pandemic avian influenza), and environmental and 
resource protection. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Training in use-of-force policy socialization is 
consistent with the recommendations made by most NGOs that 
have been critical of the GOI handling of accountability with 
Mobile Brigade, including Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch.  Standard Emergency Management Systems training 
and pandemic assistance training would enhance the capability 
of Mobile Brigade to fulfill their core mission of providing 
emergency response.  Preventing environmental and natural 
resource crimes is a Department priority for curbing 
transnational crime and trafficking, and providing training 
to Mobile Brigade would only enhance our ability to fulfill 
this important mandate. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) For the past four years, ICITAP has been 100 
percent Leahy Act compliant, without exception.  The training 
of Mobile Brigade personnel would not represent a departure 
from Mission's current vetting practices.  Indeed, the 
structure of Mobile Brigade facilitates the vetting process. 
Unlike military units, Mobile Brigade is organized in 
discrete units, to which Mobile Brigade personnel return 
after deployment.  If allowed to train Mobile Brigade 
personnel with INCLE funding, we would vet both the 
individual and his/her unit, which would add an additional 
layer of vetting to the already thorough State Department 
policy that we follow in vetting foreign security forces for 
U.S. training. 
 
ENGAGEMENT -- THE WAY FORWARD 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The vast majority of human rights allegations 
leveled against Mobile Brigade revolve around excessive or 
inappropriate use of force.  With INL funding, DOJ/ICITAP 
developed a use-of-force policy that has been adopted by the 
INP.  However, this policy has not been socialized among all 
Mobile Brigade officers.  ICITAP, using INCLE funding, would 
 
JAKARTA 00001466  003 OF 003 
 
 
like to train Mobile Brigade on this use-of-force Policy.  We 
believe this non-lethal training would enhance understanding 
of and respect for human rights.  The other areas of 
engagement with Mobile Brigade would involve providing 
nonlethal training in emergency management, pandemic 
assistance and combating illegal logging, all areas of 
concern for the U.S. government. 
 
HUME