VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0884/01 2591018
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161018Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0519
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3294

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000884 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/RD/SCA, DS/DSS/ITA, CA AND SA/INS 
INFO NEW DELHI FOR LEGAL ATTACHE' 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER
SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 09/16/2009 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened an Emergency 
Action Committee (EAC) meeting on September 16, 2009.  The 
EAC discussed post's security posture in light of an 
impending Congressionally mandated report regarding 
allegations of war crimes during the waning months of the 
Government of Sri Lanka's (GSL) military offensive against 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers. 
The EAC discussed RSO's proposals for additional security 
measures after the Department of State presents the report to 
Congress on Monday, Sept. 21, 2009. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On September 16, 2009, AmEmbassy Colombo convened an 
EAC meeting.  Present for the meeting were the Ambassador, 
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, 
Regional Affairs Officer, Political Officer, Economic 
Officer, Management Officer, Consular Officer, Public Affairs 
Officer, USAID Acting Director, Defense Attache', Office of 
Defense Cooperation Chief, Marine Security Guard Detachment 
Commander, International Broadcasting Bureau Station Chief, 
Community Liaison Officer, Department of Homeland Security 
representative, and Medical Officer.  The agenda items for 
the meeting were: 
 
¶A. The upcoming (September 21) State Department report to 
Congress regarding alleged war crimes during the waning 
months of the GSL's military offensive and defeat of the LTTE; 
 
¶B. The possibility that the report will raise the USG's 
profile and cause security concerns for U.S. Mission 
employees and facilities; and 
 
¶C. RSO's proposals to mitigate potential security problems. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The EAC discussed the war crimes report and 
concurred that, regardless of the contents, the GSL and a 
large segment of society will disagree with the findings, and 
especially if it levels war crimes allegations against the 
GSL security forces and military commanders, which are 
currently riding a wave of popularity following the 
government's defeat of the Tamil Tigers in May, 2009. The RSO 
opined, and the EAC concurred, that the report could foment 
unrest and protests against the USG, raise the profile of 
Mission employees, and thus affect Mission security 
negatively. RSO reminded the EAC that protesters at the 
British High Commission and the Canadian High Commission in 
recent months had vandalized both diplomatic missions and 
tried to breach the perimeters to gain entry to the 
facilities' compounds. The RSO noted that the Sri Lanka 
Police Service (SLPS) had failed to respond adequately to 
protect the British and Canadian facilities from 
demonstrators. The SLPS's standard operating procedure is to 
prevent demonstrators from approaching within two blocks of 
the U.S. Embassy. However, the RSO was concerned that the 
atmosphere of friction between the USG and the GSL may 
engender a change of plans whereby the SLPS would allow 
demonstrators to gain proximity to U.S. facilities or would 
not provide adequate security should demonstrators turn 
violent. 
 
¶4. (SBU) RSO proposed the following measures, with which the 
EAC concurred: 
 
¶A. RSO will put the SLPS on notice by sending a letter to the 
Inspector General of Police (IGP), requesting the IGP to 
assign additional police personnel to USG facilities 
(Chancery, the American Center and the EMR) and to have 
additional police on standby to react quickly to the 
facilities. 
 
¶B. From September 21 - 25, the RSO will assign extra guard 
personnel to the above facilities for inner perimeter defense 
and additional surveillance detection personnel for external 
observation and advance warning of possible demonstrations. 
Extra Marine Security Guards (MSGs) will be on station at the 
Chancery, with the entire Detachment on standby for immediate 
recall. 
 
¶C. To ensure the Embassy's emergency notification system is 
working efficiently, the EAC must ensure 100 percent 
participation in the weekly radio check on Friday, September 
¶25. 
 
¶D. The EAC must ensure that RSO has all cellular phone 
numbers (American employees, family members, locally-engaged 
employees) in the Internet-based text messaging notification 
system. 
 
¶E. The RSO recommended that employees alter their "routine" 
arrival times and should consider arriving much earlier or 
later than usual to avoid traffic jams and to give RSO time 
to assess the situation each day. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Additionally, the EAC noted that while drafting the 
war crimes report, its authors had relied in part on reports 
from certain sectors regarding conditions in the war zone 
during the last months of the conflict. The EAC concurred 
that post should notify specific "at risk" entities of the 
probability that the report will raise their profile and 
affect the security posture of these organizations and their 
personnel. 
 
¶6. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security environment 
prior to and after the release of the report. Post will 
report further developments, if any, septel. Special Agent 
Michael V. Perkins (Regional Security Officer) is the point 
of contact for this action. S.A. Perkins may be contacted at 
94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 1 after regular 
business hours), or via the classified and unclassified email 
systems. 
BUTENIS