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FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 CHISINAU 000705 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB, DRL/AE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP BTIO EAID EINV OEXC OIIP PGOV
PHUM, PREL, SCUL, SMIG, TSPL, MD 
SUBJECT: ENGAGING MOLDOVA'S DIASPORA 
 
REF: STATE 86401 
 
¶1. Summary:  Defining and identifying a "Moldovan 
Diaspora" according to the definitions of reftel 
is difficult.  Moldovan communities abroad, which 
are as ethnically and linguistically mixed as at 
home, are still in the process of formation. 
These communities share largely economic links 
with their home country, sending remittances to 
their families.  Even though they number up to a 
quarter of the country's roughly four million 
inhabitants, many Moldovans abroad are labor 
migrants who still intend to return home, rather 
than permanent emigres.  Moldovans abroad rarely 
interact politically or institutionally with the 
home country, and voter turnout overseas was low 
in the recent elections.  In a country that has 
existed in modern times for only 18 years, and 
which is the product of centuries of ethic 
inflows, Moldovan national identity, even at home, 
is still under construction.  End Summary. 
 
Historical Ethnic Mixes Dilute Moldovan Identity 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. Once part of an independent principality of 
Moldavia, most of present-day Moldova was ruled by 
outside powers, including the Ottoman and Russian 
empires, Romania, and most recently, the Soviet 
Union.  History thus endowed Moldova with a 
variegated ethnic mix, as its fertile soils and 
mild climate attracted succeeding waves of 
migrants from imperial centers.  Russian control 
in the nineteenth century brought Orthodox 
Christian Bulgarian and Gagauz minorities fleeing 
the Ottoman Empire.  Soviet population policies 
also brought in many Ukrainian and Russian 
migrants, and simultaneously spread ethnic 
Moldovans across the territories of the Soviet 
Union. 
 
¶3. Thus, while its present majority consists of 
ethnic Moldovans, Moldova retains significant 
Ukranian, Russian, Gagauz, Bulgarian and other 
minority populations.  Ethnic "Moldovan" 
populations also exist in Ukraine, most inhabiting 
ancestral communities and not feeling any specific 
ties to Moldova.  (Note: Romania does not see the 
inhabitants of its province of Moldavia as members 
of a separate ethnic group.  End Note.)  Some 
emigres who left their homeland before the breakup 
of the Soviet Union and Moldova's independence 
identify themselves as "Bessarabians." 
 
Self-Identity Apart from the State 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. A Moldovan's national self-identity is not 
necessarily tied to the Moldovan state.  Some 
Moldovan citizens see themselves as ethnically 
Romanian, while Ukrainians or Russians often do 
not self-identify themselves as Moldovan, but only 
as living or having lived in Moldova.  Moldovan 
citizens often hold additional passports of the 
state that corresponds to their sense of 
nationality, including those of Romania, Bulgaria, 
Russia, Ukraine and increasingly Israel. 
 
¶5. In one possible indication of a widespread lack 
of identification with the state, the numbers of 
expatriate Moldovans who vote in national 
elections at Moldovan consulates and embassies are 
low.  In April and July 2009 parliamentary 
elections, fewer than 18,000 voters, out of 
roughly 36,000 on the lists, voted at Moldovan 
embassies and consulates.  Even accounting for the 
difficulties of travel to diplomatic polling 
stations; concerns about revealing their presence 
to host-government authorities; and the 
inconvenience of the July 29 election day falling 
on a work day, these numbers compare poorly with 
the approximately 1.6 million (out of 2.5 to 2.7 
million registered in April and July) who voted in 
Moldova itself. 
 
Language Politics and Divided Loyalties 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. The uncertainty of identity is further 
demonstrated by Moldova's confused language 
 
CHISINAU 00000705  002 OF 005 
 
 
politics.  While the majority of Moldovans speak 
Romanian, Soviet policies promoted the myth of a 
distinct "Moldovan" language which, unlike 
Romanian, was written in the Cyrillic script.  The 
Communist Party-led Government of Moldova (GOM) 
also has insisted that the "language of state" be 
identified as "Moldovan," so as to discourage 
identity with Romania (and has consistently tarred 
its enemies on the center-right as supporters of 
Romanian irredentism), while the pro-Romanian 
opposition parties insist that their language is 
called "Romanian." 
 
¶7.  Parliamentary elections on July 29 gave 
opposition parties a majority in Parliament, but 
not enough votes to elect a president.  If the 
impasse is broken, and the four-party Alliance for 
European Integration gains full power, we can 
expect a relaxation of policies that drew a sharp 
distinction between the two subdialects.  Such a 
change would more accurately reflect reality, 
because Moldovan linguistic discrepancies consist 
principally of small differences of pronunciation 
(adding a "y" sound before "e"), vocabulary (the 
occasional substitution of Russian words for their 
Romanian equivalents), and spelling (use of 
circumflexed "i" instead of circumflexed "a" to 
spell the same sound). 
 
¶8. Thus, while the "language of state" has 
fostered a sense of nationhood among Moldovans, 
some Russian speakers and Communists have 
identified those who use it exclusively as loyal 
to Romania.  Similarly, some Romanian speakers 
feel the same way about Russian speakers.  Both 
languages have been used as political wedges, and 
as symbols of loyalty to foreign states.  While 
most Moldovans speak Russian either as a first or 
more commonly a second language, a small minority 
would like to eliminate it entirely from the 
public sphere.  An estimated 20 percent of 
Moldovans either cannot speak Romanian, or use it 
at only the most basic level.  Difficulties with 
linguistic self-identification extend to Moldovan 
communities living outside its borders. 
 
Moldovan Diaspora 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  Moldova has significant numbers of its 
citizens living abroad, by some estimates as much 
as one third of its working age population, or a 
quarter of its actual population.  Most of these 
migrants work in low-wage occupations with poor 
job security:  according to a 2008 International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) report, estimates 
for 2006 show 46 percent working in construction, 
19 percent in services, ten percent each in trade 
and transport, and the rest in agriculture, 
industry, and housekeeping.  Because many of these 
migrants are undocumented, figures for migrants 
working in host countries are not available.  Many 
are known to work either in Russia or Ukraine, as 
well as in Italy, Portugal, Spain, Israel and 
Turkey. 
 
¶10.  Communities of Moldovans also exist in the 
U.S., often centered on Pentecostal or Baptist 
Churches, though some of the Moldovans are part of 
Jewish emigre communities.  New York City 
(predominantly Brighton Beach and Queens) is home 
to many of these mostly Jewish Moldovans who left 
either during the Soviet or post-Soviet period, 
while church-based communities have formed in 
Sacramento, California as well as throughout the 
Pacific Northwest and Atlantic Southern states. 
Significant church-based communities exist in 
Washington State in the Seattle-Tacoma and Spokane 
metropolitan areas, and in Portland, Oregon. 
Growth in such communities is also visible in the 
states of Illinois, Georgia and North Carolina. 
 
¶11. Focusing on ethnic Moldovan communities, the 
following paragraphs are keyed to the questions 
posed in reftel: 
 
-- (Question A) There are a number of non- 
governmental organizations representing Moldovans 
abroad, many focusing on Moldovan culture or 
political advocacy.  A representative list may be 
 
CHISINAU 00000705  003 OF 005 
 
 
gleaned from those organizations which signed an 
open letter requesting additional polling stations 
prior to the April 5, 2009, parliamentary 
elections:  The Community of Bessarabian Romanians 
in USA (Phoenix, USA) (website: www.LaBordei.com); 
the Italia-Moldova Institute for Cooperation and 
Development (Trieste, Italy); the Association of 
the Moldovan Community in Ireland (Dublin, 
Ireland); the Fratia Association (Setubal, 
Portugal); the DOINA Socio-Cultural Association 
(Rome, Italy); Mondomigranti Newspaper (Bologna, 
Italy); Assomoldave-Associazione donne Moldave in 
Italia (Roma, Italy); the Moldova for Democracy 
and Development Foundation (New York, USA); The 
Moldova Foundation (Washington, USA); the Mihai 
Eminescu Socio-Cultural Association (Reggio 
Emilia, Italy); the Association of Moldovan 
Emigrants in USA (Tampa, USA); the Association of 
United Moldovan Communities (ACUM) Q COMUNISON 
(London, Great Britain); Moldovenii in Lume (Rome, 
Italy); the Moldova Cultural Association (Trento, 
Italy); and the Speranta Association (Torino. 
Italy).  (Note:  the Moldova Foundation in 
Washington DC, website 
http://foundation.moldova.org, is headed by former 
Moldovan Embassy DCM Vlad Spanu; former U.S. 
Ambassador to Moldova John Todd Stewart serves on 
the Advisory Board.  End Note.) 
 
-- (Question B) Many Moldovans living abroad are 
economic migrants who provide direct support to 
their extended families.  Until the recent 
economic crisis, remittances from employment 
abroad accounted for well over a third of 
Moldova's national GDP.  However, aside from 
direct economic support to family members back 
home, it is not at all clear that there is a well 
developed sense of a shared ethnic or national 
identity, or some sense of a lost homeland.  Most 
of these economic migrants have Moldovan 
citizenship, many own property in Moldova, and 
some return home either if they lose their jobs 
or, temporarily, if they wish to vote.  It was the 
IOM, and not diaspora-based community 
organizations, which spearheaded "get out the 
vote" efforts in Moldovan communities abroad. 
(Note:  Those Moldovans abroad who did vote in 
April and July parliamentary elections gave only 
8.5 percent of their votes in both elections to 
the PCRM.  The PCRM scored 49 and 44 percent, 
respectively, in Moldova.  End Note.) 
 
-- (Question C) The outgoing PCRM government in 
Moldova is not popular with much of the economic 
migrant population, who see it as responsible for 
their need to leave the country.  Post has no 
information on the GOM's ability to influence 
either secular or religious diaspora communities. 
Admittedly, this may change with a peaceful 
transfer of power from the PCRM government to 
those parties which had until the July election 
been in the opposition.  However, some of the 
church communities outside of Moldova are very 
active in attempting to provide assistance to 
social services such as orphanages or nursing 
homes in Moldova, usually in partnership with U.S. 
based missionary groups.  Strikingly, Moldova does 
not appear to have a philanthropic infrastructure 
outside of that provided by religious groups. 
 
-- (Question D) The current diaspora communities 
provide individual economic support to nuclear and 
extended family members.  No concerted efforts to 
improve infrastructure, or to reinvest earned 
income in Moldovan projects, have been apparent 
among the Moldovan diaspora.  In large part this 
may be caused by migrants' belief that social and 
government structures in Moldova are corrupt. 
(Note:  any money inflows by diaspora members tend 
to go to purchase of consumer goods by supported 
relatives and to the construction of houses for 
use by relatives and returning emigres.  End 
Note.)  By contrast, Turkey does provide social 
and infrastructure support to the semi-autonomous 
Gagauz region in the south of Moldova, whose 
inhabitants speak a dialect of Turkish and 
emigrated to the region at least 200 years ago. 
As the development of Moldovan communities abroad 
is still in its formative stages, it is difficult 
to assess their potential in the future.  If 
 
CHISINAU 00000705  004 OF 005 
 
 
emigrants' perceptions of corruption and 
favoritism in Moldova change, and if they generate 
enough surplus income to make significant 
investments, significant investment could occur. 
 
-- (Question E) The present diaspora communities 
are much more concerned with earning their daily 
bread than with scientific or institutional 
development.  While both in private conversations 
and in the press, Moldovans commonly declare the 
need for foreign investment, no similar statements 
about such investment have come from the diaspora. 
Moldovans are very positive about learning from 
the West through travel, work abroad, and study in 
Europe and the U.S., and hundreds of qualified 
Moldovan applicants go to the U.S. each year for 
academic studies.  Approaching such applicants 
while they are in the U.S., or shortly after their 
return, may be the best way to involve them in 
science diplomacy programs.  For the last three 
summers, Moldovan university students traveling to 
the United States on Summer Work and Travel (SWT) 
programs numbered 2,600 in 2009, 5,500 in 2008, 
and 5,000 in 2007.  (Note:  The drop in 2009 
numbers was the result of fraudulent activities of 
numerous SWT sponsoring companies in 2008.  End 
Note.)  Moldovan SWT veterans who study science at 
university are possible participants in science 
diplomacy programs. 
 
-- (Question F) Moldova endures a frozen conflict 
with the unrecognized break-away region of 
Transnistria, which separated from Moldova under 
Russian influence, after a 1992 ceasefire halted 
hostilities.  In Transnistria, the Russian 
language is heavily favored, and Latin-script 
Romanian-language schools are subject to 
discrimination, as the Transnistrian authorities 
maintain that the Moldovan language should remain 
as it was during the Soviet period, written in the 
Cyrillic script.  The presence of Russian troops 
in Transnistria is a violation of Moldovan 
territorial integrity, and an effective bar to any 
future integration into the European Union.  With 
the exception of political advocacy on the part of 
those Moldovan organizations formed specifically 
for that purpose (such as the Moldova Foundation 
in Washington D.C.), Moldovans abroad have played 
no active part in resolving this issue. 
 
-- (Question G) Moldovans abroad are not involved 
in meeting the needs of indigenous peoples outside 
of the majority population group. 
 
-- (Question H) Moldovans voting abroad 
overwhelmingly supported non-PCRM parties in April 
and July elections, giving a combined 70.4 percent 
of their vote to the pro-west center-right Liberal 
and Liberal Democratic parties in April; in July, 
the combined total was 76.9 percent.  With a 
peaceful transfer of power from the PCRM 
government to the Alliance for European 
Integration, it is likely that opportunities for 
engagement would grow significantly. 
 
-- (Question I) The outgoing PCRM government has 
not demonstrated a significant amount of concern 
for Moldovan communities abroad, although the 
continued flow of remittances has contributed to 
the economic stability of the country. 
 
-- (Question J) Because they are diffuse and not 
politically active, Post has not attempted any 
outreach to Moldovan diaspora communities. 
 
-- (Question K) Post has not received any 
unsolicited requests from diaspora community 
members, apart from those requesting visa issuance 
for family members.  These requests are handled as 
a routine consular matter.  Several Moldovans 
residing in the U.S. have asked their senators and 
members of Congress to write to us on behalf of 
relatives seeking visas, demonstrating a growing 
political awareness of and familiarity with U.S. 
government operations. 
 
-- (Question K) Post has not attempted any public 
diplomacy program outreach to Moldovan diaspora 
communities.  Outreach to Moldovan communities in 
the U.S. could contravene the Smith-Mundt Act 
 
CHISINAU 00000705  005 OF 005 
 
 
(which prohibits domestic access to information 
intended for foreign audiences), and Post has 
until now focused its attention on outreach to 
Moldovan citizens in Moldova. 
 
-- (Question M) Post sees anticipated requests 
from the Moldovan diaspora community, apart from 
visa issues described in para. 18), as falling 
primarily in the economic and investment sphere. 
The knowledge-management tools and information 
materials most helpful to action officers at Post 
consist of our extant contacts in the government, 
financial sector, and business community. 
 
COMMENT: 
-------- 
 
¶12. The continued existence of Moldovan migrant 
communities in Europe depends in large part upon 
the economic and political situation in Moldova. 
Should the economic situation at home improve, 
large numbers of migrants would likely return home 
to reunite with their children and parents. 
Although this outcome would affect the numbers of 
the Moldovan diaspora, it is also clear that some 
Moldovans will remain permanently outside of 
Moldova, as is already happening with the members 
of the faith-based communities in the U.S.  It is 
unclear at present how such communities will 
define themselves in relation to, or apart from, 
their homeland. 
 
CHAUDHRY