VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1186/01 2661639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231639Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5133
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0183
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5134
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6357
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0333

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019 
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SY TRGY PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN 
AND SYRIA 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske, Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
REF:  A) STATE 91633, B) BRASILIA 1170 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The Government of Brazil (GOB) is concerned about 
Iran's and Syria's nuclear activities and wants all parties to work 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to answer the 
outstanding questions.  The GOB does not see the latest IAEA reports 
on these countries as closing those cases.  Still, the GOB is not 
supportive of the Iran case being with the UN Security Council or the 
idea of the UNSC imposing additional sanctions.  The GOB strongly 
objects to the use of unilateral military action in the case of Syria 
and is very concerned about the possibility of force being used 
against Iran.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) On September 11 Science Counselor and Science Officer met 
with Brazil's Ministry of External Relations' (MRE) Acting Director 
of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies (DDS) 
Fabio Simao Alves to discuss the USG's views - per REFTEL A - on the 
latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on Iran and 
Syria.  Alves was well informed about both matters, and he reiterated 
the Government of Brazil's (GOB) cautious approach to both cases. 
 
IRAN 
 
¶3.  (C) Alves stressed that only through discussion can the dispute 
with Iran be resolved.  The GOB is interested in learning the nature 
of the Iranian nuclear program and it does not rule out the 
possibility that the program has military aims.  Thus, the GOB is 
supportive of the IAEA investigating the matter and getting answers. 
Alves stressed that the GOB sees the IAEA as the appropriate forum 
for dealing with Iran and not the UN Security Council (UNSC).  The 
GOB wants the IAEA to become more active.  Now that Brazil is going 
back on the UNSC it is particularly interested in the thinking of the 
P-5 plus Germany about Iran.  He said that Brazil would not be 
supportive of the UNSC imposing additional sanctions, but it will 
fully comply with measures adopted by the UNSC. 
 
¶4.  (C) Brazil would like Iran to be more cooperative, he said. 
Then, he added that the GOB would like unnamed "other member states" 
to share more information about Iran with the IAEA.  Alves appeared 
to be suggesting that there was a lack of sharing of information on 
Iran and that this was somehow impeding the IAEA's efforts to 
understand the Iranian nuclear program. 
 
¶5.  (C) The GOB is "very concerned" about a possible military strike 
against Iran by another state, emphasized Alves.  Brazil wants a 
peaceful solution to the Iran question. 
 
¶6.  (C) Alves said that the GOB could not publicly support a call for 
Iran to comply with an Additional Protocol.  Since Brazil has not 
signed up to an Additional Protocol, it will not support calls that 
other countries comply with them. 
 
¶7.  (C) The GOB had heard reports, Alves noted, that Iranians were 
saying in Vienna that Iran should not be pressured so hard, but 
rather should be treated like Brazil.  Brazil has an enrichment 
program and it is not being put under a microscope or being compelled 
to sign/comply with an Additional Protocol.  Alves seemed unhappy 
about these reports and emphasized that the Iranian and Brazilian 
situations are quite different. 
 
¶8.  (C) The GOB at the IAEA would have a balanced statement about 
Iran, according to Alves. 
 
SYRIA 
 
¶9.  (C) The GOB was not planning to make a statement about Syria at 
the IAEA, Alves said.  He declared that the GOB strongly condemned 
the use of force by a country against Syria; Brazil viewed this as 
impairing the work of the IAEA.  Nonetheless, he acknowledged that 
there were outstanding questions about Syria's activities and these 
should be cleared up.  He added that the GOB has serious concerns 
about the Syrian program and did not consider it a case closed. 
 
¶10.  (C) As with the Iran case, Alves wanted unnamed "other member 
states" to share their imagery and other intelligence about Syria 
with the IAEA.  He indicated that this unwillingness to share 
hindered the IAEA's efforts to understand the Syrian activities. 
COMMENT 
 
¶1.  (C) Brazil recognizes that there are serious questions 
outstanding about Iran's and Syria's nuclear activities and does not 
see these latest IAEA reports as closing those cases.  The GOB, 
however, doesn't seem willing to go much further than calling for 
everyone to cooperate more with the IAEA.  It strongly opposes 
unilateral military action and doesn't like the Iran case being with 
the UNSC.  The GOB's interest in the proposals and activities of the 
P-5 and Germany is more that they want to be well-informed than an 
interest in trying to contribute to crafting new measures to pressure 
Iran.  We do see that the GOB's objection to an Additional Protocol 
for Brazil is having an impact in the international arena, as the GOB 
is unwilling to call Iran on not complying with an Additional 
Protocol.  END COMMENT. 
 
KUBISKE