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DE RUEHBR #1170/01 2611510
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P 181510Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5114
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9950
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8211
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4565
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0328

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA IR PREL AORC BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON IRAN: A SOFT VOICE IN THE CHORUS 
 
REF: A. STATE 95073 
     ¶B. STATE 94757 
     ¶C. STATE 91633 
     ¶D. BRASILIA 1038 
 
BRASILIA 00001170  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Brazilian MRE Undersecretary for Political 
Affairs Roberto Jaguaribe, recently returned from a 
diplomatic mission to Tehran, told Charge D'Affaires on 
September 16 that additional dialogue rather than sanctions 
will be most the most effective means of pressuring Iran to 
develop a responsible nuclear program.  Jaguaribe emphasized 
that Iran's nuclear program enjoys broad internal support and 
will not ultimately be stopped, so the goal should be to push 
Iran to follow international nuclear guidelines.  He said 
that top Iranian officials draw a distinction between IAEA 
directives, which they are attempting to follow, and UNSC 
resolutions, which they view 
as unfair and in some cases illegitimate.  Jaguaribe said he 
told the Iranians they are still not meeting their IAEA 
responsibilities, but he believes they are making progress. 
The Undersecretary did not discount the possibility of Brazil 
making a statement on Iran at UNGA but said any such remarks 
would be "balanced," referencing Iran's lack of full 
compliance along with Brazil's basic skepticism toward 
sanctions as a motivating tool.  End summary. 
 
Back from Tehran 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Upon returning from his September 9-10 visit to 
Tehran, Undersecretary Jaguaribe took great care in his 
meeting with CDA to give not only the Brazilian but also the 
Iranian perspective to the points made in reftels A, B, and 
¶C.  While in Iran, he met with Foreign Minister Manouchir 
Mottaki, National Security Council official Said Jalili, and 
Parliamentiary Foreign Policy Chair Aladdin Bourojerdi, among 
others.  He issued joint press statements in Iran  with each 
of these men to the effect that dialogue, not sanctions, was 
the key to solving the dispute at hand.  In  his meeting with 
CDA, Jaguaribe's core message was not substantively 
different, but he went into greater detail on areas in which 
he had pressed Iran, areas where he saw Iran as 
non-compliant, and thoughts on how to influence them toward 
compliance.  The Undersecretary's basic view of post-election 
Iran had not changed.  He characterized the nation a 
compromised democracy, but with a robust civil society that 
will make them ultimately open to substantive negotiation. 
 
Brazil's Message to Iran 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Jaguaribe was careful to point out that, despite the 
friendly press conferences and the desire to schedule 
an Ahmadinejad visit to Brasilia in December, he raised 
specific criticisms with Iranian officials about their 
nuclear program.  Most notably, he said that he told Mottaki 
and others that Iran was still not carrying out all its IAEA 
responsibilities, despite the late August decision to allow 
inspectors at Natanz and Arak.  He also viewed the September 
9 proposal to the P5 1 by the Iranian government, which was 
forwarded to him by the Iranians, as far too general to be an 
effective point of departure for further discussion. 
Jaguaribe said he had asked the Iranians to be  more specific 
in their dialogue, and he told us that he thought the 
Iranians could be brought around to the point where they 
would make more specific proposals. 
 
Brazilian Views on IAEA Report and Amcit Demarches 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4.  (C) During the meeting, Jaguaribe agreed with the U.S. 
interpretation of the main points of the IAEA report (ref C), 
i.e., that Iran has refused to suspend proliferation-senstive 
nuclear activities as required by the UNSC, has refused to 
implement the additional protocol, and has only partially 
cooperated with IAEA inspection demands.  At times he 
reflected Iranian views without endorsing them, such as his 
reference to IAEA questions about past weaponization-related 
activities as "alleged reports."  Jaguaribe had no immediate 
response to our demarche concerning Amcits detained in Iran 
(ref B) but sounded favorably disposed.  During his meetings 
in Tehran, Iran gave Jaguaribe their own list of 
complaints/demands toward the U.S.  These included complaints 
about "three U.S. Army personnel detained last month in 
Kurdistan," extradition of several Iranians, and 
disappearance of Iranians in Saudi Arabia and Istanbul. 
 
BRASILIA 00001170  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
Brazilian Engagement Strategy 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) While trying to outline an overall engagement 
strategy toward Iran, Jaguaribe emphasized repeatedly that 
Iran will never give up its nuclear enrichment program, 
though it may be pressured into suspending it for periods of 
time.  He argued that Iran's nuclear program is broadly 
popular across all segments of society, including most 
government opponents and members of the exile community. 
Therefore, he continued, sanctions should not be used because 
the pain caused by them would push Iranians "with alternative 
views" toward supporting the current regime on a rare issue 
in which they are in general agreement.  (He believed that 
oil import sanctions would be especially damaging to Iran's 
economy -- and especially effective in rallying popular 
Iranian support for its nuclear program.)  Jaguaribe believed 
that the Iranian government was ultimately persuadable to 
follow international protocols, if pressured by both the 
international community and its civil society.  He praised 
earlier U.S. efforts to initiate dialogue on the issue, and 
said that continued dialogue, even if not immediately 
successful, strengthens the hand of the more liberal elements 
of Iranian society. 
 
Iranian, Brazilian Views on IAEA, UNSC 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Iranians pressed upon Jaguaribe their view that 
IAEA safeguards (and related directives) constitute broadly 
agreed upon international technical norms that the Iranians 
can follow, and will work to adhere to in the future.  The 
Arak and Natanz inspections were cited as cases in point. 
Jaguaribe left convinced that the Iranians fully believe they 
are following IAEA guidelines -- a point of view that the 
Undersecretary characterized to CDA as "delusional."  Tehran 
drew a distinction between the IAEA and the UNSC, which they 
view as a body issuing political decisions that are "not 
legitimate."  Jaguaribe did not endorse this view but said of 
the Iran-UNSC relationship, "there needs to be some movement 
on both sides."  (Note: Brazil has long held the position 
that nuclear matters are best dealt with in the IAEA, and not 
in the UNSC.  End note.)  He added that a UN proposal related 
to nuclear disarmament would be helpful to resolve the 
impasse.  He praised recent U.S. efforts in this regard and 
hoped more would be forthcoming. 
 
Expanding the Chorus: Statement at UNGA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Regarding the request outlined in ref A, Jaguaribe 
said there was a possibility that Brazil would consider 
addressing Iran's nuclear program in its UNGA statement.  He 
said that any such mention would be a balanced reference, 
mentioning both Iran's need to meet IAEA and UNSC 
responsibilties while expressing skepticism toward UNSC 
sanctions as a motivating tool.  He also said that Brazil 
would not shy away from saying that Iran's September 9 
response to the P5 1 needs to be more robust to be effective. 
 (Comment: We believe it is very doubtful that Brazil will 
actually reference Iran in its UNGA statement.  End comment.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Having returned from Tehran less than a week earlier, 
Jaguaribe focused on the approach he believed would work best 
in resolving the disconnect between Iran's confidence that it 
has given satisfactory answers about its nuclear program and 
the sense in the international community that the Iranians 
must be moved toward compliance.  In general, Brazil can be 
expected to continue a cautious approach to the issue, 
keeping in mind its sometimes-competing desires to increase 
commercial relations with Iran, to develop Brazilian nuclear 
military technology for non-weaponmaking purposes without 
drawing international attention, and to gain a permanent UNSC 
seat -- with the last goal being most important.  In the 
short run, the easiest way for the GOB to massage the various 
interests is to call for increased multilateral dialogue and 
adherence to IAEA standards in order to forestall having to 
take a firm position in the UN on sanctions once Brazil 
assumes its temporary seat on the UNSC in January 2010. 
Brazil is aware, however, that Iranian compliance with IAEA 
safeguards would not necessarily equal Iran becoming a 
responsible nuclear power -- as Jaguaribe mused during the 
meeting.  In light of its traditional hesitance to take firm 
positions on contentious country-specific issues, and with 
visits by Ahmadinejad to Brazil and top Brazilian officials 
 
BRASILIA 00001170  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
to Iran being planned for the next few months, Brazil will 
have a soft voice in the chorus -- but may prove useful 
nonetheless if senior GOB officials can be encouraged to 
whisper into Iran's ear the idea that negotiation and 
compliance are its best option.  End comment. 
KUBISKE