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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1156, BRAZIL: PLANNING TO SEND ASSURANCES FOR EXPORT OF HEU

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1156 2009-09-16 17:35 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia 
VZCZCXRO7331
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1156 2591735
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161735Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5097
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4554
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8200
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9939
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6354
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0182
 
UNCLAS BRASILIA 001156 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP KSCA TRGY BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: PLANNING TO SEND ASSURANCES FOR EXPORT OF HEU 
SAMPLES TO BRAZIL FOR EXERCISE 
 
REF: STATE 92333 
 
(U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR INTERNET 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1.  (SBU) Per REFTEL A, on September 11 Science Counselor and 
Science Officer met with Brazil's Ministry of External Relations' 
(MRE) Acting Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive 
Technologies (DDS) Fabio Simao Alves to request written assurances 
from the Brazilian Government that the nuclear material proposed for 
export to the Laboratory de Pocos de Caldas, under the National 
Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEN), will upon receipt in Brazil be 
made subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement for 
Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and that the consignee identified on 
the application - this CNEN laboratory - is authorized to receive 
and possess the transferred nuclear material.  The Embassy also 
formally delivered the request for these assurances via Diplomatic 
Note No. 374, which was delivered to the MRE on September 14, 2009 
 
2.  (SBU) Acting Director Alves responded that the Brazilian 
government should be providing the requested written assurances. 
His office (MRE/DDS) needed to discuss the matter with CNEN 
beforehand, and then they would respond.  He did not foresee any 
problems with being able to provide the requested assurances. 
Alves, however, did not hazard an estimate of when the U.S. 
Government could expect to receive the response. 
 
KUBISKE