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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1141, BRAZIL: VIEWS ON PROPOSED NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS - INTERESTING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1141 2009-09-14 19:13 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO5299
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1141 2571913
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141913Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5078
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4544
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8190
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9929
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6352
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0180
UNCLAS BRASILIA 001141 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: VIEWS ON PROPOSED NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS - INTERESTING 
IDEAS THAT NEED CLARIFICATION 
 
REF: STATE 85122 
 
(U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR INTERNET 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The Government of Brazil is interested in 
discussing further the proposals for nuclear fuel banks.  In 
particular, it has concerns about possibly restricting a country's 
right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and also about 
under what criteria a country could draw on such a fuel bank.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
2.  (SBU) On September 11, Science Counselor and Science Officer 
discussed the nuclear fuel bank proposals (per REFTEL) that are 
before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with Brazil's 
Ministry of External Relations' (MRE) Acting Director of the 
Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies Fabio Simao 
Alves.  According to Alves, the MRE viewed the various proposals - 
one for a uranium reserve in Russia and another for a bank to be 
financed by a group of countries including the United States - as 
good ideas that needed further discussion and development. 
 
3.  (SBU) Most importantly, Alves stressed that the MRE wanted to 
know in greater detail the criteria for granting access to the 
nuclear fuel banks.  He said that Brazil's representative to the 
IAEA had been raising these questions there.  In particular, Brazil 
was inquiring about under what circumstances could a country be cut 
off from all nuclear fuel suppliers, yet not be cut off by UN 
action.  He pointed to the cases of Iran and North Korea where they 
would have been denied access to the fuel banks if they existed.  In 
other words, what sort of behavior could warrant all the fuel 
suppliers cutting a country off but that the UN would not do 
likewise.  Alves commented that it looked like these banks were 
"designed not to work." 
 
4.  (SBU) Brazil does have one redline with these proposals, namely, 
that the proposals cannot interfere with a country's right to 
develop and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, 
specifically enrichment and reprocessing technology.  Alves did not 
assert that there was necessarily a conflict between the proposals 
and this right, however, Brazil would want that issue discussed and 
clarified first. 
 
5.  (SBU) For Brazil's part as a potential fuel producer, it has a 
strategic goal of producing sufficient nuclear fuel to supply the 
two existing reactors, the one now under construction, and the 
proposed 4 to 8 new ones envisioned by 2030.  Alves explained that 
Brazil after meeting this strategic goal might become a supplier to 
other countries, but to date that had not been set as a goal.  He 
noted that Brazil's constitution and laws allowed for it to engage 
in selling nuclear fuel to others.  The laws would only need to be 
modified if the government wanted to allow private sector 
participation in the field.  Currently, all the entities involved in 
mining uranium, constructing nuclear facilities, and operating 
nuclear facilities are state owned. 
 
6.  (SBU) COMMENT.  Brazil has a good understanding of the nuclear 
fuel bank proposals.  However, it seems to be giving greater weight 
to the concern that these proposals might restrict access of 
developing countries to nuclear technology than to the 
non-proliferation or other benefits.  Still, if the USG and others 
can address the concerns raised by Brazil and clarify the criteria 
for when a country could have access to one of these banks, Brazil 
might be willing not to block adoption of either of these proposals. 
 END COMMENT. 
 
KUBISKE