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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS MCMULLEN, INL, AND AND BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019 
TAGS: PREL SNAR BR BO
SUBJECT: KEEPING LIT BRAZIL AND BOLIVIA'S FLICKERING 
INTEREST IN TRILATERAL COUNTERNARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH 
THE U.S. 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 01041 
     ¶B. STATE 094673 
 
BRASILIA 00001140  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske, reason: 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) 
officials raised Bolivia,s nascent interest in trilateral 
counternarcotics cooperation with the United States and 
Brazil during a late August meeting with U.S. officials.  In 
follow-up discussions with PolOffs, Itamaraty,s Head of the 
Department for South American Affairs Amb. Joao Luiz Pereira 
Pinto clarified that they have yet to give much thought to 
the opportunity and that any engagement on this front is 
unlikely before Bolivia,s December presidential elections. 
Pereira Pinto said that the initial interest in trilateral 
cooperation was raised by Choquehuanca, but the Brazilians 
have continued to raise it during subsequent meetings with 
the Bolivians to keep the issue on the table. The overture 
from Itamaraty represents a significant departure from 
previous signals regarding cooperation on regional 
counterdrug initiatives. Mission recommends engaging 
Itamaraty prior to the Bolivian elections to explore concrete 
ideas on how to work with Bolivia. END SUMMARY. 
 
ITAMARATY HIGHLIGHTS OPENING FOR CN COOPERATION WITH BOLIVIA 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) During a lunch the Charge hosted for WHA DAS Chris 
McMullen on August 25 with seven senior Itamaraty officials, 
Brazil,s Under Secretary for Latin America Ambassador Enio 
Cordeiro said Brazilian FM Celso Amorim spoke with Bolivian 
FM David Choquehuanca in late August the possibility of joint 
cooperation between their countries and the United States on 
counternarcotics issues. Cordeiro suggested that the 
Bolivians are waiting for a signal from the United States to 
increase cooperation (REF A). Cordeiro commented that the 
Bolivians had made it clear that counternarcotics cooperation 
with the United States could not continue "as it was in the 
past" and had to respect Bolivia,s sovereignty. (Comment: 
Although Cordeiro did not say explicitly that the Bolivians 
would reject a DEA presence, other Brazilian officials have 
told us that they understand from the Bolivians they are not 
willing to reestablish a connection with DEA at this time. 
End Comment.) 
 
BOLIVIA MISSION IN THE DARK 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (C) PolOffs met with the Bolivian Embassy,s Charge Maria 
Cristiane Linale on 8 September.  She was unaware of the 
discussions, but did not discount the possibility.  (Note: As 
a career diplomat, she explained, she is not in her 
government,s  confidence on many issues.  End note.). Linale 
believes that at the moment no major initiatives, let alone 
counternarcotics cooperation with the United States, are 
likely to gain traction in Bolivia, which will be "paralyzed" 
until the December elections pass. Linale opined that the 
viability of greater trilateral counternarcotics cooperation 
will depend in part on whether the new representation in 
Congress is balanced or biased toward Morales and cocaleros. 
Linale also stressed that Brazilian President Lula will have 
to play a role in pushing counternarcotics cooperation, which 
Brazilian officials have made clear to her is an important 
issue for Brazil as well because of the need to stem the flow 
of drugs entering Brazil through Bolivia, if it is to be 
taken on seriously in Bolivia. 
 
TRILATERAL COOPERATION STILL JUST A THOUGHT FOR ITAMARATY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Pereira Pinto, who also handles relations with 
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, explained to PolOffs in a 
meeting on September 8 that Choquehuanca first raised the 
idea of cooperation with Brazil and the United States on 
counternarcotics some time ago. Itamaraty officials have 
since raised the idea of counternarcotics cooperation in a 
number of meetings with Bolivian officials, only to be told 
that it was not the right time to discuss it, which Pereira 
Pinto attributed to the upcoming election. He said Brazil 
understands the need to wait, but will continue to raise the 
issue so that it is not forgotten. 
 
¶5. (C) Pereira Pinto said that after Bolivia expelled DEA it 
turned to Brazil as the "rich neighbor," assuming that 
Brasilia would fill the vacuum left and provide large-scale 
 
BRASILIA 00001140  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
funding. Bolivia asked the Brazilians for everything DEA had 
previously provided.  Pereira Pinto said Brazil is trying to 
be helpful, citing the GOB,s response to Bolivia,s request 
for helicopters to patrol borders as one example, but added 
that, even if Brazil wanted to take on such a role, Brazilian 
law only allows for a diplomatic presence abroad and 
Brazilian police on foreign soil can only attend to office 
work and cannot operate on the ground. 
 
¶6. (C) When asked for ideas on how to move forward in 
establishing trilateral cooperation between Bolivia, Brazil, 
and the United States, Pereira Pinto promised to get back to 
PolOffs after "doing some homework" on what Brazil sees as 
the priorities and openings to begin such cooperation. 
Pereira Pinto compared working with the Bolivians to dealing 
with difficult poker players, claiming you never know what 
they are thinking about when they make requests. 
Decision-making in Bolivia takes a very long time because the 
government must always reach a consensus and the 
interlocutors are frequently changing, he said, leaving no 
institutional memory. When asked if increased assistance in 
border patrolling would be one way ease into trilateral 
counternarcotics cooperation, Pereira Pinto confirmed that 
there is a strong interest on Bolivia,s part to increase its 
presence along the borders and strengthen joint patrolling 
with Brazil. Pereira Pinto warned, however, that when the 
Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) has tried to train Bolivian 
police the candidates sent by the Bolivians have often been 
unprepared and incapable of completing the training.  Pereira 
Pinto assured PolOffs that any attempt to establish 
trilateral counternarcotics cooperation with Bolivia will not 
negatively impact DEA,s mission in Brazil and current work 
related to Bolivia conducted from Brazil; Brazil is a 
sovereign country and will not allow Bolivia to influence its 
decision to work with DEA, he said. 
 
COMMENT: A SHIFT MOTIVATED BY NECESSITY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Brazil,s new interest in facilitating trilateral 
counternarcotics cooperation with the United States and 
Bolivia is driven by a combination of factors: concern over 
its own increasing drug problems, its inability to replace 
DEA,s presence and work in Bolivia, the difficulty of 
working with Bolivia on the ground, and its recognition that 
nascent regional efforts to deal with the problem may take 
years to yield results. Brazil has long been a trafficking 
route for Andean cocaine and is now the second largest market 
for cocaine in the world, according to the UN. According to 
DEA Brazil sources, the working relationship between Bolivia 
and Brazil has proven difficult and the Federal Police (DPF), 
which currently has only two DPF agents in Bolivia, knows it 
needs help dealing with its drug problem. 
 
¶8. (C) Despite longstanding excellent relations between USG 
law enforcement agencies and the DPF, Itamaraty has been 
generally resistant to law enforcement cooperation, and 
almost succeeded in preventing the relocation of DEA agents 
from Bolivia to Brazil.  So this latest overture from 
Itamaraty represents a significant about-face.  Although some 
Itamaraty officials will likely continue to be suspicious of 
our law enforcement presence, the high-level with which this 
was raised with us by Itamaraty should help minimize 
resistance elsewhere. Mission recommends that, in advance of 
the December elections in Bolivia, we engage Itamaraty on 
possibilities for concrete counterdrug cooperation, 
preferably on issues within the domain of the foreign 
relations ministries so as not to jeopardize ongoing 
cooperation between DEA and the DPF related to Bolivia 
counterdrug matters. Our ability to make progress on 
counternarcotics issues with Bolivia in the near future will 
also depend on Bolivia,s reaction to the release of the 
Majors List (REF B.) 
KUBISKE