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DE RUEHBR #1136/01 2541932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111932Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5068
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4536
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8182
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9921
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 001136 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV EFIN EAGR EAID KGHG BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: "WE WILL HAVE AN AMBITIOUS NUMBER" FOR EMISSIONS 
REDUCTION AT COPENHAGEN 
 
REF:  A) BRASILIA 1059, B) 2008 BRASILIA 1462 
C) BRASILIA 1114, D) 2008 BRASILIA 750 
 
BRASILIA 00001136  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
(U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR INTERNET 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The Government of Brazil (GOB) will go to 
Copenhagen with an ambitious emissions reductions number as part of 
the negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), according to the Minister of External Relations Celso 
Amorim.  In an early September interview, President Luiz Inacio Lula 
da Silva emphasized that Brazil has a moral obligation to do this. 
At the same time, Brazil will be pressing the developed countries to 
make commitments for deep cuts in their emissions and to provide 
generous financing to developing countries.  END SUMMARY 
 
WE WILL ANNOUNCE AN EMISSIONS REDUCTION NUMBER 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Following the visits of State Department's Special Envoy 
for Climate Change Todd Stern (REFTEL A) and the United Kingdom's 
Environment Minister Ed Miliband in early August and Deputy National 
Security Advisor Michael Froman in June, the Government of Brazil 
(GOB) has visibly begun to take a more ambitious stance in the 
negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).  In a recent interview with Agence France-Presse (AFP) 
published on September 4, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva stated 
that "Brazil is ready to discuss targets and obligations.  We will 
not be fleeing our responsibility."  He said that in November Brazil 
will establish a target for diminishing its greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Lula added, "We have a moral obligation to reduce the 
deforestation in the Amazon." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In an August 23 program of Globo News, Minister of 
External Relations (MRE) Celso Amorim discussed at length Brazil's 
negotiating position for Copenhagen.  He said, "We will have an 
ambitious number [for reducing greenhouse gas emissions]."  Amorim 
expressed concern that developed countries could have used as an 
excuse for inaction the - until now - unwillingness of Brazil, China 
and India to accept emission reductions goals.  "We will not hide 
behind any country and no country will be able to hide behind us," 
he declared.  Amorim noted that Brazil is in a position to be more 
forward leaning than China and India because, unlike them, Brazil 
can reduce its emissions just through controlling deforestation. 
The others will need to reduce emissions through more difficult 
changes in industrial practices.  While Brazil will have a number on 
reductions, Amorim objected to the use of the word "target," which 
he explained is a concept found in the Kyoto Protocol for developed 
countries, but is not found in the UNFCCC. 
 
BUT OTHERS WILL NEED TO DO THEIR SHARE. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) President Lula linked goals for reducing emissions from 
deforestation to greater efforts by rich countries to control 
emission.  Lula stated that, "if there isn't an obligation between 
targets for preserving our forests [in developing countries] and a 
reduction [in emissions] by the rich countries, there will be a 
false discussion in which only the poor will pay." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In his AFP interview, Lula reiterated the GOB's 
long-standing position that there should be different standards for 
developed and developing countries.  Poor countries cannot be 
subject to the same restrictions as developed countries, he 
underscored.  Moreover, Lula highlighted GOB's "historic emissions" 
concept, saying that "we want each country to assume responsibility 
for the damage it has caused the planet."  He argued that the world 
cannot attribute the same responsibility for emissions to China as 
to the United States or to Brazil as to the UK or France, since the 
developing countries have been emitting these greenhouse gases for a 
long time. 
 
ROLE OF BRAZIL AND VIEWS ON COPENHAGEN 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Overall, Lula said he saw Brazil as being able to play the 
role of "constructing an agreement among the positions of Brazil, 
Europe, the United States in order to move forward."  Amorim said 
Brazil appreciated the visit of Stern and Miliband, and he expected 
more progress to be made through the "high level" dialogue Brazil 
would be having with the United States.  He said he expected to 
conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (presumably dealing with this 
in the high level dialogue) that would be signed in a near term 
visit by Secretary Clinton.  Drawing on his negotiating experience 
in the World Trade Organization and elsewhere, Amorim joked that 
calls for Brazil to be a leader in the UNFCCC really were clever 
efforts to get concessions without others have to give anything in 
return.  Nonetheless, he emphasized that Brazil would set an example 
for others with its ambitious position. 
 
BRASILIA 00001136  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Amorim commented that he was optimistic about the UNFCCC 
process.  He recognized the possibility that the U.S. Congress might 
not have legislation in place by the time of the Copenhagen 
conference.  Thus, he said he could envision something modest coming 
out of Copenhagen then giving six months in order to have the U.S. 
legislation in place and finally concluding the negotiations. 
 
GROWING PRESSURE FOR MORE AMBITIOUS STANCE 
 
¶8.  (SBU) There is increasing internal pressure for the GOB to move 
away from its previously defensive position towards a much more 
ambitious one.  Most importantly, in late August former Environment 
Minister Marina Silva after over twenty years with Lula's Workers' 
Party (PT) left to join the Green Party (PV).  She is expected to be 
their candidate for President in the 2010 elections.  This political 
development creates pressure on Lula and his PT candidate to succeed 
him, Chief of Staff of the Presidency (Casa Civil) Minister Dilma 
Rousseff, to burnish their green credentials.  Rousseff already was 
planning to become personally involved in the negotiations.  She 
plans to attend the Copenhagen conference, and so will have a 
greater personal stake in seeing it be successful.  She and Lula 
have been taking in information from sources other than the 
conservative MRE.  Vice Minister Teixeira has been briefing them 
both, and Environment Ministry advisor and former head of the 
Brazilian Forest Service Tasso Azevedo has been briefing Rousseff. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Environment Ministry has stepped up its calls for the 
GOB to be more ambitious and agree to emissions reduction targets. 
At an August conference held by the respected Brazilian business 
journal Valor Economic (and quietly funded by the UK), Environment 
Minister Carlos Minc stated that Brazil soon would be announcing a 
target for reducing emissions.  He spoke of the need to control the 
various sources of emissions (not just deforestation, currently the 
primary source).  Minc's Environment Ministry is working on revising 
the National Plan on Climate Change, which was released in December 
2008 before the Poznan UNFCCC conference (REFTEL B).  Tasso Azevedo 
has said that the Environment Ministry is considering making even 
deeper cuts in the rate of deforestation, possibly by 80% by 2020 
compared with a baseline in the 1990s.  This should be easier for 
the GOB to accept given the sharp reduction in the deforestation 
rate over last year (REFTEL C). 
 
¶10.  (SBU) While the environmental community has long been critical 
of the MRE's defensive posture in the Copenhagen negotiations, now 
key firms in the powerful private sector have come out forcefully 
for Brazil to modify its position in the UNFCCC to a more ambitious 
one.  An open letter sent in late August to the GOB by 22 major 
Brazilian companies (including Vale and Votorantim) called on the 
government to take a more positive position, though it did not 
specifically call for an emissions reduction target.  Moreover, in 
the Valor Economico conference, Roger Agnelli, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Vale (one of Brazil's largest companies) urged the GOB to 
take on emissions reductions targets. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) On September 2, 2009, fourteen large Brazilian 
organizations representing the agribusiness, forestry and bioenergy 
sectors announced the creation of the Brazilian Climate Alliance, to 
provide concrete, constructive proposals in the global climate 
change negotiations. Among recommendations to the GOB was that the 
reductions in the rate of deforestation proposed in the National 
Plan on Climate Change should be the object of a commitment by 
Brazil before the international community as a NAMA. 
 
THE MRE STAFF PLAYING CATCH UP 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The MRE's Director of the Environment Department, 
recently promoted to the rank of career Ambassador Luis Figueiredo 
Machado, and his staff had long insisted that Brazil and other 
developing countries would not agree to emissions reductions 
targets.  Now, they are having to change gears to keep up with the 
new approach.  At the Valor Economico conference Fiqueiredo Machado 
said the GOB would have an "ambitious" position.  However, he danced 
around the question of whether the GOB would agree to emissions 
reduction targets, going off instead on a detailed analysis of the 
legal definition of "targets."  Vale CEO Agnelli jumped in, saying 
targets are a simple concept and Brazil needed to accept them. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) On September 2, Science Counselor spoke with key MRE 
staff members, Andre Odenbreit, the Director of the Environmental 
Policy and Sustainable Development Division, and Special Ambassador 
for Climate Change Sergio Serra, who also had difficulty dealing 
with the shifting GOB position.  Initially, they were unable to say 
if Brazil would be willing to take on an economy-wide emissions 
reduction target.  After some discussion, however, Serra said that 
maybe the GOB could accept some form of an aspirational target. 
 
BRASILIA 00001136  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Serra and Odenbreit spoke of the GOB announcing various non-binding 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) for individual 
sectors - deforestations, transportation, energy, etc. 
 
FINANCING AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Odenbreit and Serra stressed that without satisfactory 
financing and technology transfer arrangements there would be no 
deal in Copenhagen.  They said that while some developing countries 
might be able to fund mitigation efforts, most of them needed help. 
They said the UNFCCC's work on financing was very delayed and there 
were few points of consensus.  Brazil liked the G-77 proposal and 
was interested in the Norwegian financing proposal, but these had 
not been adequately discussed.  The GOB did not like the Mexican 
proposal for a Green Fund because it would have assessments for all 
countries, not just the rich ones; and this is contrary to the 
UNFCCC in their view.  Technology transfer was just a variation of 
financing.  It entailed rich countries' assistance so that 
developing countries could acquire more expensive, but cleaner, 
technologies over cheaper, dirty ones. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Odenbreit stressed that private sector financing through 
offsets was not a substitute for financial assistance from the 
governments of rich countries.  While Brazil could see a role for 
the private sector, he stressed that climate change is a 
governmental responsibility and required public financing. 
 
ADAPTATION IS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Serra commented that Brazil was not very concerned about 
adaptation issues since they did not see a need to do much there. 
He said that this was more an issue for island states and Africa, 
which are likely to suffer more from climate change.  Out of a sense 
of equity with other G-77 countries, Serra stressed that the GOB 
wanted to see these other countries are provided financial 
assistance to take adaptation measures. 
 
PRE-SALT OIL AND GAS EMISSIONS NOT THREATENING 
 
¶17.  (SBU) The GOB sees that its emissions from the oil and gas 
sector will likely increase substantially as it starts up production 
- and hopefully refining and other value added processing - of the 
vast oil and gas found offshore below the salt layer in the 
continental shelf.  Nonetheless, Amorim said the figures he had seen 
showed that it shouldn't upset their approach.  He spoke of using 
carbon capture and storage technology to help offset those new 
emissions. 
 
OFFSETS AND REDD 
 
¶18.  (SBU) On one key issue, the GOB looks like it has changed over 
the last year.  Now, the GOB seems to be accepting of the 
possibility of offsets in the forest area.  The GOB's opposition to 
these credits has been roundly criticized by other ministries, the 
environmental community, and the private sector.  The MRE staff told 
Science Counselor that they now could see a role for offsets, but 
only in a limited way.  Amorim has said that Brazil is not against 
offsets, just that they can't be all the rich countries do.  The MRE 
remains worried that the use of offsets could mean that most of the 
emissions reductions would be done by the developing countries, 
letting the developed ones off the hook.  Amorim said that the GOB 
did not oppose Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD), and that in fact this was a part of the 
government's Sustainable Amazon Plan (REFTEL D).  However, as with 
other offsets, Amorim did not want to see REDD be used as a tool for 
rich countries avoiding making real reductions in their own 
countries. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) This wariness about offsets seems limited to the MRE. 
The Environment Ministry vigorously supports them; Minister Rousseff 
is particularly interested in them.  And in August, President Lula 
announced the creation of a special unit in the Presidency to handle 
offsets.  Thus, whatever the MRE's concerns, it now seems a foregone 
conclusion that Brazil will back off its previous opposition to this 
mechanism. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) An intriguing question is how offset credits will 
interact with domestic goals to reduce deforestation.  If other 
countries are providing credits to reduce emissions by avoiding 
deforestation, then they will plan on using those reductions in 
calculating their emissions levels.  According to Tasso Azevedo, 
however, Brazil is considering also counting those reductions in 
emissions in its domestic calculations.  Thus, reductions in 
deforestation and the commensurate reductions in emissions would be 
double counted:  once by the countries providing the credits and 
then again by Brazil too.  In effect, the GOB would be "hosting" 
 
BRASILIA 00001136  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
emissions reductions. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶21.  (SBU) COMMENT.  During his meeting with Froman, Figueiredo 
Machado said that the GOB's position hadn't changed in 18 months. 
After that visit and Stern's visit, the GOB's position is changing 
significantly and in the right direction.  President Lula's and 
Minister Amorim's recent statements indicate that Brazil will come 
to Copenhagen with an ambitious economy-wide emissions reduction 
number.  The GOB is eager to build on this summer's productive 
meetings and wants further high level dialogues on climate change. 
Given these encouraging developments, it seems that further high 
level discussions on climate change would be very fruitful.  As Lula 
has indicated, Brazil is looking to be the "bridge" between the 
United States, Europe and the developing world.  END COMMENT. 
 
KUBISKE