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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 001113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, T, WHA, PM, ISN, NEA, EEB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD EFIN KNNP XM XF IR BR
SUBJECT: AUGUST 4-5 VISIT OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 
TO BRAZIL 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1038 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 1092 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 1094 
 
BRASILIA 00001113  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. LISA KUBISKE, REASON 1.4(B) and 
(D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 4-5 visit to Brasilia dominated 
by Brazilian concerns over USG intentions and the regional 
implications of expanded U.S. access to Colombian military 
bases, National Security Advisor General James L. Jones 
assured senior GOB officials that President Obama desires a 
transparent relationship with Brazil and wants to expand our 
bilateral cooperation.  The GOB encouraged greater U.S. 
dialogue and engagement with Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba, 
and more forceful U.S. action against the de facto government 
in Honduras.  In discussions concerning the Middle East peace 
process, Iran, and non-proliferation, General Jones made 
clear to Brazilian officials that Brazil,s growing 
international role implied taking greater responsibility. 
GOB officials described a Brazil that is seeking ways to 
expand its global economic reach: ready to become an IMF 
creditor, to finalize a global trade agreement, to engage in 
bilateral and regional cooperation on energy, and to tackle 
the difficult issues surrounding climate change.  Although 
the Colombia bases issue caused longstanding regional 
security concerns to resurface, GOB officials were 
complimentary of the new Administration,s initial approach 
to Latin America and expressed interest in looking for new 
ways to cooperate.  End summary. 
 
- - - Colombia Bases Dominate, with Venezuela Sub-Text - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) General Jones, joined by State U/S for Arms Control 
and International Security Ellen Tauscher, Defense U/S for 
Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter, and NSC 
Director for South America Luis Rosello, met with Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim, Presidential Foreign Policy Marco 
Aurelio Garcia, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, Casa Civil 
Minister (Chief of Staff) Dilma Rousseff, Mines and Energy 
Minister Edison Lobao, Petrobras CEO Sergio Gabrielli, 
Central Bank President Henrique Meirelles, and a number of 
other MRE, Defense, Energy, and Presidency officials, as well 
as senior opposition and business figures.  Ref B addressed 
energy issues discussed during the visit. 
 
¶3. (C) The Amorim, Garcia, Rousseff, and Jobim meetings all 
included lengthy discussions of the Colombia bases issue. 
Amorim ran through a series of questions that the news of the 
bases had raised, recalling alleged statements in the past by 
(unnamed) U.S. military officers suggesting that the 
Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay tri-border area might be a 
"legitimate U.S. target" if terrorist activity were 
discovered there, and that "U.S. Congressional reports" 
accusing Venezuela of supporting drug trafficking (a 
reference to a recent GAO report), combined with the stated 
counternarcotics mission of the bases, raised concern that 
they might be used to launch actions against Venezuela. 
Amorim said that what for the United States was "business as 
usual" was exacerbating tensions in a sensitive (and in 
Chavez's case, hypersensitive) region. 
 
¶4. (C) Garcia said he appreciated the frankness of the 
dialogue and expected that we would overcome the current 
"malaise."  He noted that President Lula would meet Colombian 
President Uribe later that week, and that Garcia had spoken 
with Venezuelan President Chavez about the issue; in his 
view, Chavez did not see it as a big problem, but the issue 
"smelled of Cold War" and was surprising to the GOB after the 
"very positive" overtures by the Administration and 
considering that, in his view, the FARC had never been so 
weak and the only security threat to the United States in 
Latin America comes from Mexico.  Garcia dismissed the 
discovery in FARC hands of Swedish anti-tank weapons that had 
been sold to the Venezuelan government as overblown noting 
that the weapons were old and that, in any case, they would 
be of limited value since "there are no tanks in insurgency 
conflicts." Garcia added that he did not believe the GOV was 
supporting the FARC because "the FARC is involved in drug 
trafficking, and everyone knows that involvement with the 
drug trade is destructive."  He noted that the current crisis 
is the continuation of a longstanding love-hate relationship 
between Colombia and Venezuela, and that this was the third 
 
BRASILIA 00001113  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Colombia-Venezuela crisis that he had had to deal with. 
Garcia stressed that Brazil's overriding interest is in 
ensuring a peaceful region that can live with the differences 
among countries, and cited this as the reason Brazil supports 
the Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. 
 
¶5. (C) Dilma Rousseff told Gen. Jones that the GOB finds it 
disconcerting to be faced with questions from the press 
regarding why the United States needs such bases.  According 
to Rousseff, issues such as this open the door for radicals 
who want to create problems in the region.  Gen. Jones 
emphasized Colombia's need for assistance in maintaining its 
security against drug traffickers and the FARC, and then 
recounted Uribe's concerns that his fight against the FARC 
was made more difficult because of FARC positions in other 
countries.  In all three meetings, Gen. Jones explained the 
nature of the agreement as largely formalizing the current 
relationship.  He said he was willing to send a team of USG 
civilian and military officials to provide additional 
information, but stressed that it was unfortunate that others 
were playing up this issue in the press since USG officials 
including himself were available to talk whenever GOB 
officials had concerns about USG actions. 
 
¶6. (C) Jobim told Gen. Jones that Brazil has great 
expectations of the Obama Administration, noting that 
transparency was a very important component of the U.S. 
relationship with South America.  He noted that issues like 
the Colombia bases become more difficult when the GOB learns 
of them through the press, but added that Brazil, too, is 
often surprised by the sensitivities of "Spanish America" 
regarding issues that would be considered innocuous 
elsewhere.  Gen. Jones encouraged Jobim to call if there were 
further doubts about U.S. intentions. 
 
¶7. (C) While insisting they did not want to engage in 
mediation between the USG and GOV, both Garcia and Amorim 
used the opportunity to encourage the United States to 
establish "a direct channel of communication with President 
Chavez."  Amorim suggested that a good USG-GOV dialogue would 
have an impact on the domestic situation in Venezuela, as 
well, because much of the opposition to Chavez has ties to 
the United States. 
 
- - - Other Regional Issues on Brazil,s Mind - - - 
 
¶8. (C) With regard to Honduras, Amorim said that Chavez had 
wanted to make President Zelaya "a martyr," but the GOB had 
convinced him that "only the United States can influence what 
happens in Honduras" and needed to be consulted.  Amorim said 
he had declined OAS SYG Insulza's request to participate in a 
foreign ministers' group, saying that the prospects had 
"slipped" since the Arias initiative had begun.  He felt that 
the possibility of the de facto government rejecting yet 
another initiative made it too risky.  Amorim described USG 
actions against the de facto government as "surface 
scratches" that were not deep enough to do damage.  There had 
been enough concessions to Micheletti, he said.  The United 
States needs to tell him in clear terms that he must allow 
Zelaya back.  The situation in Honduras needs a resolution 
that is "both quick and peaceful," Amorim said, although he 
recognized the difficulty of achieving both.  For his part, 
Garcia noted that President Zelaya would be coming to Brazil 
shortly, and encouraged the USG to apply stronger pressure on 
the de facto government to allow Zelaya to be restored to 
power quickly*he suggested revoking more visas.  Garcia 
stressed that Zelaya "is not a dangerous revolutionary," that 
returning him to power to run the elections "will not lead to 
significant changes," and that the de facto government cannot 
be allowed to run elections. 
 
¶9. (C) Garcia said that Brazil is seeking to increase its 
investment in Bolivia, and particularly to compensate for 
Bolivia's lost ATPDEA benefits.  Amorim called removal of 
ATPDEA benefits "a mistake."  Garcia said that there no 
longer appeared to be grave problems in Bolivia, but stressed 
that it was important for the USG to build a positive agenda 
with Bolivia. 
 
¶10.   (C) Garcia said that the USG "embargo" (sic) on 
Brazilian sales of Super Tucano aircraft in the region was 
"very negative" and raised serious questions in Brazil 
regarding defense cooperation with the United States.  If the 
 
BRASILIA 00001113  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
United States is going to place limits on what Brazil can do, 
then partnership "is no good" for Brazil.  Tauscher and 
Carter explained to Garcia, as well as to Amorim and 
Rousseff, that the Administration recognized the need to 
overhaul the procedure for protecting technology.    Tauscher 
stressed that there is no embargo and that, going forward, 
such decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis taking 
into account the impact they might have on Brazil. 
 
¶11. (C) Jobim stressed the importance of regional stability 
for Brazil, but cautioned that Brazil resists being labeled 
the regional leader because they do not see it as helpful in 
resolving problems.  Brazil's concessions to Paraguay on the 
Itaipu dam were an example of Brazil putting stability 
interests over commercial interests, an approach that many in 
Brazil criticized. 
 
¶12. (C) Discussing Cuba, Garcia and his deputy, Amb. Marcel 
Biato, laid out their view that Raul Castro is more pragmatic 
and less ideological than Fidel, with a focus on getting 
short-term economic results.  They see Cuba as taking a path 
similar to that of Vietnam under Raul, whom they acknowledged 
was a transitional leader.  Given that the United States has 
a relationship with Vietnam, Garcia said, there is no reason 
the United States can't have a similar relationship with 
Cuba.  In their view, Brazilian support for Cuba and efforts 
to "create a new niche" for Cuba in the hemisphere open 
additional space that Raul needs to engage the United States. 
 They noted that their plans to help Cuba construct a 
deep-water port at Mariel only make sense on the assumption 
that Cuba and the United States will eventually develop a 
trading relationship. 
 
- - - Middle East, Iran, Non-Proliferation - - - 
 
¶13. (C) FM Amorim and MRE Under Secretary for the Political 
Affairs II Roberto Jaguaribe told Gen. Jones that they had 
heard from the Palestinians how pleased they were with his 
appointment and listened keenly to his assessment of the 
situation following his trip to the region the previous week. 
 Jaguaribe said it is the GOB's view that the 
Israel-Palestine conflict is the key to resolving most 
questions in the Middle East.  He stressed that Brazil was 
pleased with the Annapolis process, but acknowledged that 
neither Israel nor the Arabs seemed to want it to continue. 
Referring to his trip to the Middle East in 2008, Amorim 
highlighted the importance of engaging Syria in the process. 
 
¶14. (C) Amorim praised the "excellent" opening to Iran made 
by President Obama--"If they don't respond," he asked, "then 
what do they want?"  Amorim described the Brazil-Iran 
relationship as "not deep, but pragmatic" and dominated by 
commercial concerns.  He said the nature of the relationship 
should not be "overvalued"--"we are not buddies"--but that 
there is a channel between them, and Brazil was willing to 
help if it can, although "not just to pressure" Iran. 
Petrobras CEO Gabrielli told Gen. Jones that Petrobras is 
terminating exploratory activity in Iran, although a small 
office will be left open.  Amorim and other officials 
expressed concern that there might be an effort to prevent 
Iran from pursuing enrichment even for peaceful purposes, and 
Amorim said, in particular, that the "zero-for-zero" approach 
"did not sound right."  Gen. Jones told both Garcia and 
Amorim that we would be pleased to share our views on Iran as 
the process moves forward. 
 
¶15. (C) All GOB interlocutors stressed the importance of the 
President's initiative on disarmament, which Amorim 
characterized as "the best argument for non-proliferation." 
U/S Tauscher noted the importance of Brazil in the 2010 
review conference on the NPT and asked for Brazil's 
assistance in making it productive.  (Note:  See also ref A 
on State/NSC discussions with GOB officials on 
non-proliferation.  End note.) 
 
- - - Prospects for Defense Partnership - - - 
 
¶16.   (C) Jobim highlighted the fact that Brazil's new 
National Defense Strategy was crafted to ensure the defense 
sector would be an "enabler of development."  Brazil is no 
longer an "off the shelf" buyer of defense equipment. 
Rather, it wants to be a partner in joint ventures with 
countries that want to sell equipment.  Jobim said that, as a 
 
BRASILIA 00001113  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
lawyer and judge, he is inclined to look at precedents when 
considering the possibilities for technology transfer.  The 
U.S. precedents "are not very encouraging."  Tauscher and 
Carter acknowledged the complexity and history attached to 
the relationship, suggesting we focus on the way forward: a 
relationship of full partnership that allows both parties to 
prosper. (See ref C for additional reporting on their 
meetings.) 
 
- - - A Dissenting View - - - 
 
¶17. (C) Former Brazilian ambassador to London and Paris and 
communications minister Sergio Amaral and former agricultural 
minister Roberto Rodrigues criticized GOB foreign policy for 
being too ideological.  Arguing that foreign policy had 
become politicized under Lula to compensate for his orthodox 
economic policies, Amaral described it as too lenient with 
South American neighbors, favoring leftist governments in the 
region rather than remaining in a position to resolve 
disputes, and focused too heavily on South-South relations 
and too little on relations with the United States. 
Rodrigues criticized Brazil's rejection of the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), saying it had hurt the Brazilian 
economy. 
 
- - - Trade and Finance - - - 
 
¶18. (SBU) Noting the excellent relations President Lula had 
with President Bush, Garcia stressed the "enormous 
expectations" that Brazil has for President Obama, adding 
that he saw "extraordinary possibilities" for the United 
States coming out of the current economic crisis. 
 
¶19. (C) Amorim commented that countries had gone a long way 
toward concluding the Doha trade round, but criticized the 
current U.S. position, saying it seemed to be identical to 
that of the last Administration.  Gen. Jones stressed that 
the United States wants to see a "balanced and ambitious" 
Doha agreement, and U/S Tauscher noted the difficulty the 
President faced in recasting the trade agenda to the American 
people in the midst of a recession.  Amorim said he believed 
the last Administration had "lost sight of the big picture," 
and encouraged greater political-level involvement from the 
USG, saying that "trade negotiations cannot be left to the 
trade negotiators." 
 
¶20. (SBU) Brazilian Central Bank Governor Henrique Meirelles 
told Gen. Jones he anticipated the September G20 meeting 
would focus on regulation of the global financial system, and 
confirmed that although Brazil had not yet made its USD 10 
billion disbursement to the IMF, "it will happen." Regarding 
the global financial crisis, Meirelles credited Brazil's 
relatively strong position in part to strong domestic demand. 
 He also pointed to the fiscal austerity law, passed 
following the financial crisis of the 1990s, which brought 
down domestic debt and allowed Brazil to become a net foreign 
exchange creditor.  He indicated that the bigger surprise was 
that Brazil had been affected as much as it was; a fact he 
attributed to Brazilian reliance on foreign commercial credit 
for financing.  This problem however, had been mitigated by 
the low level of credit in Brazilian society, previously as 
low as 22 percent of GDP, now at 43 percent, compared to over 
200 percent in the United States. 
 
¶21. (C) In response to a question from Ambassador Sobel 
regarding the increasing discussion around countries 
abandoning the dollar in favor of local currencies in 
bilateral trade transactions, Meirelles commented that "it is 
happening and is operationally positive."  Meirelles noted 
that, due to the large number of goods traded internationally 
that are priced in dollars, the volume of goods traded in 
local currency is never going to be too high. 
KUBISKE