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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1112, BRAZIL MORE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. ARAB-ISRAELI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1112 2009-09-04 20:38 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO9317
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1112/01 2472038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 042038Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5015
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0404
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0090
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0180
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0031
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9888
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8149
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4499
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN EAID KWBG OPDC IS
SUBJECT: BRAZIL MORE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. ARAB-ISRAELI 
NEGOTIATIONS APPROACH BUT NO AID COMMITMENTS YET 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 80039 
     B. BRASILIA 391 
     C. BRASILIA 322 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
1. (C) Summary. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MRE or Itamaraty) has no immediate response to our request 
in ref A to provide $10 million in direct budget support to 
the Palestinian Authority (PA).  The relevant MRE department 
heads were receptive to the idea of a further Brazilian 
contribution but noted that the Brazilian Congress still has 
not approved the $10 million that Itamaraty promised the PA 
for Gaza reconstruction in March.  MRE officials who have 
previously criticized the U.S. approach to Arab-Israeli 
negotiations offered praise for our current strategy, 
especially increased discussions with Syria and pressure on 
Israel to halt construction of settlements.  Brasilia wants 
to raise its profile on Israel-Palestine issues generally, 
and intends to host separate visits from Israeli President 
Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, both in 
November.  September 4 newspaper reports also suggested that 
a long-planned visit by Iranian President Ahmadinejad might 
be scheduled for December.  MRE also asked for our help in 
setting up a a meeting between between Special Envoy Mitchell 
and Brazil's top envoy on Middle East issues, Ambassador 
Affonso Ouro Preto.  End summary. 
 
Enthusiastic but Non-Committal 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) In a September 3 meeting with poloff at Itamaraty, 
Middle East division directors Claudio Nascimento 
(Israel-Palestine, Turkey, Syria) and Roberto Abdalla (Iran, 
Iraq, Gulf States), discussed at length Arab-Israeli 
relations and their desire for Brasil to have a larger role 
-- but could not give an immediate answer to the question in 
reftel A.  (They said that the Minister had received reftel 
letter in early August, but that their section had not become 
aware of it until recently.)  While Nascimento in particular 
sounded enthusiastic about the concept of providing funding 
for the PA in advance of peace negotiations, they 
acknowledged that an earlier $10 million promised for Gaza 
reconstruction (ref B) by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim in 
advance of the March 31 Arab-South American summit still had 
not been authorized by Congress.  No one in either division 
knew anything about the status of the $10 million in 
Congress.  Later in the day, poloff called the Senate Foreign 
Affairs and National Defense Committee and learned from staff 
that the legislation still has not been assigned a lead 
sponsor ("relator") -- meaning that it would take weeks at a 
minimum before the funding could be approved and released. 
 
Supportive of New Direction 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) In contrast to previous meetings with the Embassy, in 
which Itamaraty has generally criticized U.S. policy in the 
Middle East (refs B, C), feedback for the overall U.S. 
approach to Israel-Palestine issues was quite positive.  They 
specifically praised President Obama and Special Advisor 
Mitchell for taking a different and hands-on approach. 
Nascimento, who has emphasized in previous meetings the 
importance of better U.S. relations with Syria as part of 
Arab-Israeli negotiations, noted the increased level of 
outreach to Damascus in recent months.  MRE hoped to learn 
more about the specifics of our policy toward Syria. (Note: 
Brazil's Arab community is largely of Christian Syrian and 
Lebanese origin. End Note.)  Nascimento also cited our 
emphasis on asking Israel to halt construction of settlements 
"as a really noticeable and positive change."  The directors 
also latched on to Hamas chief Khalad Meshal's statement last 
month that it could accept a Palestinian state based on 1967 
borders as a hopeful sign for future talks. 
 
Raising the Brazilian Profile 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) While non-committal about PA funding, Nascimento 
mentioned ways in which Brazil is trying to raise its profile 
on Arab-Israeli issues.  In addition to a projected visit by 
Peres on November 11, MRE is also in the process of 
organizing a visit by Abbas two weeks later.  Ambassador Ouro 
Preto, Brazil's top envoy to the Middle East, is attempting 
 
BRASILIA 00001112  002 OF 002 
 
 
to meet with both men before the prospective visits.  The 
original idea was to meet with Peres and Abbas at a planned 
Moscow conference but, since Itamaraty is not sanguine about 
propects for that conference happening anytime soon, Ouro 
Preto plans to visit them in their respective offices.  There 
are no plans on the immediate horizon for President Lula to 
reschedule his trip to Israel-Palestine, which was canceled 
earlier this year for security reasons. 
 
5.  (C) Nascimento also requested assistance in setting up a 
meeting between Ambassador Ouro Preto and Special Envoy 
Mitchell.  He said that DAS Kelly's office had reached out to 
the Brazilian Embassy in Washington about setting up a 
meeting but that no further contact has been made recently. 
Such a meeting could be held on the margins of the UN General 
Assembly in late September, he said.  No specific subject 
matter for the meeting was mentioned. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) The guarded enthusiasm expressed by Itamaraty about 
the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli peace process represents a 
welcome change of pace, but it will be difficult to convert 
this into immediate deliverables from the GOB.  The delay in 
approving the $10 million for the PA promised in March does 
not preclude additional Itamaraty commitments for additional 
budget assistance but the March commitment is already an 
extremely large contribution for Brazil and any new 
contribution will also have to be cleared by Congress. 
Brazil is determined to play a larger role, however, and 
additional contact with the GOB on this issue would be 
helpful both to inform and influence what is still a 
relatively unrefined policy toward the region and the 
Israel-Palestine peace process in particular.  End Comment. 
 
KUBISKE