VZCZCXRO8251
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1104/01 2461915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031915Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5001
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4488
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9883
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8144
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, EEB/IFD/ODF, INR/IAA, INR/R/AA 
NSC FOR ROSSELLO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPAO PGOV SCUL ECON PREL BR
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE IN BRAZIL:  WAITING ON OBAMA 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
REF: (A) 7/28/09 WHA/PDA EMAIL 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  In a broad off-the-record discussion of 
U.S.-Brazil foreign policy issues hosted by the CDA as part of U/S 
McHale's Diplomatic Dialogue Initiative (ref A), the select group of 
invited Brazilian opinion leaders were unanimous in stressing that, 
although they have been pleased with the Obama Administration's more 
active interest in and collaborative approach to Latin America, they 
are beginning to fear that this will not be matched by actions. 
Contacts observed that the USG should be prepared for tension in the 
relationship as the Obama administration seeks to "re-occupy" the 
diplomatic space in South America ceded almost entirely to Brazil 
during the Bush administration.  To mitigate potential tension it is 
critical that the USG understand Brazilian interests and 
insecurities, expand dialogue and conversation with Brazil across 
the political, economic and military spectrum, and focus on concrete 
initiatives to encourage further cooperation.  Joint development 
projects in third countries in Latin America and Africa, drug 
trafficking, and mil-mil collaboration were cited as examples.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In response to U/S McHale's request (ref A) that Brazil 
participate in the launch of the Diplomatic Dialogue Initiative, PAS 
Brasilia organized a small gathering of notable Brazilian opinion 
leaders to discuss the Secretary's foreign policy speech at the 
Council of Foreign Relations.  POL, ECON and PA Counselors joined 
the CDA, who hosted the meeting. 
 
Brazilian participants: 
 
-- Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha: a Fulbrighter, professor of 
International Relations at the University of Brasilia (UnB) and an 
adviser at the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency 
of the Republic. 
-- Juliano Cortinhas: professor of International Relations at UnB 
and Catholic University; frequently called on to give interviews 
about U.S. foreign policy. 
-- Paulo Roberto Almeida: former Brazilian DCM in Washington, DC. 
He is Professor of Sociology and Law at UniCEUB, writer, and 
political analyst.  A diplomat, he is currently on leave from 
Itamaraty, so able to comment more freely on foreign policy matters. 
 
-- Marcelo Barroso Lacombe: A Legislative Analyst in the area of 
political science, he follows U.S. foreign policy very closely. 
-- Bernardo Estelita Lins: A Legislative Analyst in the area of 
economics, and member of a study group on the current economic 
crisis. 
-- Joco Paulo Machado Peixoto: A Professor in the departments of 
Political Science and Business Administration at UnB. A former 
Woodrow Wilson visiting scholar respected for his expertise on 
reform of the state and public policies. 
-- Srgio Leo: Columnist and senior reporter with business daily 
Valor Econtmico with extensive experience covering foreign affairs, 
including presidential trips abroad and international events such as 
UN, WTO and Mercosul summits. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
CHALLENGES IN RE-OCCUPYING THE POLITICAL SPACE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Brazilian participants were quick to stress that the Obama 
Administration should expect points of tension in the U.S.-Brazil 
relationship as it puts in place a new policy and re-engages in 
South America.  While acknowledging Bush Administration initiatives 
in the region, the group noted that the diplomatic space had been 
largely ceded to Brazil.  Brazil now thinks of itself as the leader 
in the region, one whose opinions and views should be respected and 
closely consulted by the Obama Administration as it re-engages on 
issues in the hemisphere.  As one participant observed, "the 
challenge [for the U.S.] is how to re-occupy the diplomatic space 
without conflicting with the Brazilian government, which thinks of 
itself as the leader in the region." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Participants observed that the Obama Administration will 
have to manage this transition carefully lest it run the risk of 
being viewed as imperialistic.  As one person noted:  "you can lead 
as long as you don't isolate us."  All recommended the Obama 
Administration share much more information with Brazil than before, 
and consult more frequently across the spectrum of the relationship. 
 When challenged on why Brazil does not contact the United States 
when an issue or question arises, the response was clear:  "Brazil 
 
BRASILIA 00001104  002 OF 003 
 
 
is waiting for a call from the United States." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Colombia was cited as an example where the absence of 
prior USG consultation with Brazil can increase tensions and create 
the perception that the United States is acting in an imperialistic 
manner within the region.  One observer noted, "as soon as the base 
issue came up everyone immediately forgot about the issue of the 
FARC in Venezuela."  When asked why, he responded that "Maybe one 
[issue] is not so important as the other.  Is it relevant to Brazil 
that Venezuela is selling weapons to the FARC when the FARC is so 
weakened or is it relevant that the U.S. has bases?" 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The group also stressed the need to distinguish between 
Brazil and the current Brazilian government, and that the United 
States should focus on the long-term with Brazil and not just on the 
current Brazilian government:  "You need to distinguish between the 
petty issues and the areas for cooperation." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
KEEP COOPERATION CONCENTRATED ON CONCRETE AREAS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Participants warned of the "dilemma" the U.S. faces in 
re-engaging the region stemming from the recent diplomatic 
isolationism:  "too broad a dialogue too quickly runs the risk of 
being perceived as interventionist."  Instead they recommended 
focusing cooperation with Brazil on joint projects in concrete 
areas.  One promising area mentioned in connection to the 
Secretary's speech was science and technology, particularly as 
related to technology transfer.  Another suggestion was development, 
specifically on joint development projects as a means to reduce 
security threats or in third countries such as Bolivia, which would 
be perceived as a gesture of goodwill.  Africa was described as a 
new frontier for Brazil, one that offered potential areas of 
cooperation with the United States to revitalize African economies 
and promote technical development.  The United States should also 
engage not only the GOB, but the private sector as well. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Others suggested U.S.-Brazil military cooperation in 
keeping the Southern Hemisphere stable and peaceful as a promising 
avenue to explore.  They noted the Brazilian military is generally 
less anti-American in outlook than the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) 
and shares many of the same interests with the USG; for example, 
"objectively Brazil has the same interest in containing Chavez as 
the United States."   According to one participant, though, while 
the military believes this, the government "mixes it up" by pursuing 
political support for Chavez but military containment. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Participants noted an opportunity to engage the region to 
address drug trafficking challenges -- and that Brazil could be 
helpful in setting up a regional drug strategy approach -- but 
stressed it must be based on a different approach, "one open to 
dialogue and not open to confrontation by Bolivia."  It was 
mentioned that one of the opportunities lost by the United States in 
"ceding the space in Latin America during the Bush Administration" 
was taking part in civilian-military cooperation in the region, and 
cooperation to address drug trafficking. 
 
------------------------------ 
FX2:  USG ENTERED THE GAME LATE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Mention of technology transfer led to discussion of the 
FX2 sale, and highlighted a continuing lack of trust in USG motives, 
despite CDA assurances that both the Secretaries of State and 
Defense had signed letters assuring the transfer.  Many cited the 
need to take into account the U.S. historical record, with one 
noting that "this could be one more attempt to avoid technology 
transfer."  Another warned that "the United States lost a good 
opportunity" by not backing Boeing's bid in a serious way until very 
late in the game, noting that it may be too late to roll back the 
process as decision making was already well advanced. 
 
--------------------- 
AMAZON MYTH REVISITED 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Guaranteeing Brazilian sovereignty of the Amazon remains 
an underlying concern which emerged during discussions.  The CDA's 
reassurance that the United States has absolutely no interest in 
taking over the Amazon prompted further elaboration from the group 
as to the true source of this concern.  As one participant 
explained, its origin lies more in historic European attempts to 
challenge Brazilian sovereignty of the region than specific USG 
actions, though as the United States gained power the focus shifted 
to U.S. intentions.  As one person stressed, "the problem is not 
Americans but other countries, and what the United States does to 
 
BRASILIA 00001104  003 OF 003 
 
 
empower [Brazil's] neighbors."  However, the group also admitted 
that this insecurity was often exploited by the military as a means 
to gain more resources.  They explained that the real concern over 
"internationalization of the Amazon" stems from the fact that there 
are 11 indigenous tribes amalgamated across the borders of the 
Amazon and the GOB's fear (based in part on independence movements 
elsewhere and NGO/international activities in the Amazon) that 
outside elements will encourage these groups to declare their 
independence or autonomy from Brazil. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ENGAGE, ENGAGE, ENGAGE -- BUT RESPECT DIFFERENT APROACHES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Participants repeatedly stressed the need for more 
conversation now.  As one pointed out, "consultation on the 
[Colombia] bases is mandatory if you think Brazil is an important 
leader."  Several expressed the perception that the United States 
only looks to Brazil if there is a threat or interest where Brazil 
can be helpful.  Others noted the need to work as well with other 
actors outside government, particularly in the business community. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The group sought to explain the difference between the 
U.S. and Brazilian perspective, noting that Brazil is acting 
globally on economic issues in particular, but does not have the 
same global military presence or projection as the United States and 
so will not think in the same terms regarding global military 
security issues.  As one person stressed, "we are strongly defensive 
when we look at military issues, so the way we think and act is very 
different from you." 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Others underscored that the U.S. needs to understand 
Brazil is unique from other Latin American countries and other BRICs 
-- with different interests -- and thus the U.S. needs to take care 
not to mix Brazil's interests with others like China or Venezuela. 
Lingering insecurities over a historic imbalance --now outgrown -- 
remain.  "We have a different vision of the United States than other 
Latin American countries.  Our economic relationship is much 
different.  We still have a view of the United States as an economic 
hegemonist selling junk."  While Brazil has for the most part grown 
out of a subservient relationship, these sentiments still linger, 
and insecurities will manifest themselves most in areas where 
balance in the relationship is more lopsided in favor of the United 
States. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
COMMENT:  NEED FOR MORE ENGAGEMENT TO DEMONSTRATE RESPECT FOR 
BRAZIL'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SOUTH AMERICA 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) COMMENT:  These Brazilian opinion leaders plainly favor 
increased engagement with the United States, though cautiously, 
specifically targeted on concrete areas, and on Brazil's terms as 
well as ours.  The message is clear, however, that the Obama 
Administration should recognize -- and respect -- Brazil as an equal 
actor in South America, one deserving of the consideration due a 
regional leader whose interests are not always in lockstep with 
ours.  As we re-engage diplomatically in South America, we should be 
prepared for sometimes contentious, tense relations with a Brazil 
that  sees itself as a regional leader.  We need to understand that 
Brazilians do not fully trust U.S. intentions in the region.  And we 
will need to be sensitive to, avoid being dismissive of, and seek to 
work around the continuing insecurities that affect Brazil's 
approach to our bilateral relationship.  The best way to mitigate 
tension and engage Brazil as a cooperative partner lies in increased 
and expanded dialogue across all spectrums of the relationship, and 
a focus on joint projects in defined areas.  END COMMENT. 
 
KUBISKE