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UNCLAS BOGOTA 003045 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y - MISSING SECSTATE AS ADRESSEE 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR OVIP PREL PGOV PHUM PTER CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR KERLIKOWSKE 
 
Summary 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Bogota warmly welcomes the visit of R. Gil 
Kerlikowske, Director of the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy. Your visit comes as Colombia faces new challenges from 
narcotrafficking groups as well as some political uncertainty. The 
Colombian Congress has just approved a referendum that opens the 
door for a possible third term for President Alvaro Uribe. A 
regional debate over a U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(DCA) has heated up. The Government of Colombia (GOC) and the U.S. 
Embassy are working together to consolidate the successes of Plan 
Colombia through a new Embassy follow-on strategy -- the Colombia 
Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) -- which complements the 
GOC's National Consolidation Plan (PNC). 
 
¶2. (SBU) In ten years, Colombia has progressed from a near failed 
state and terrorist haven to an economic, political and social 
leader in Latin America. Colombia has made major progress in its 
fight against illegal armed groups and set records in the 
eradication and interdiction of drugs. Murder and kidnapping rates 
have dropped dramatically, while rule of law has strengthened 
through major judicial reforms. Improved security and economic 
reform has grown the economy, reduced poverty and attracted record 
levels of investment. The GOC has looked to leverage these 
successes beyond its borders by offering troops in Afghanistan and 
providing counterterrorism and counternarcotics training to 
Mexican, Panamanian and other law enforcement agencies in the 
region. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Significant challenges remain -- especially ongoing 
drug-fueled crime that has driven large numbers of rural poor from 
the land, as well as human rights abuses within the military. We 
hope you will be able to reiterate to the GOC the importance of 
providing citizen security and social services in marginalized 
areas, and the need for continued and significant progress on human 
rights cases. Drug trafficking organizations and illegal armed 
groups still operate in large parts of the country, including along 
the border. Colombia has over three million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). Inadequate state presence as well as historical 
social divides still prevent millions of citizens, especially in 
rural areas, from benefiting fully from security and economic 
gains. USG support is a critical stimulus to the GOC to confront 
these persistent challenges, even as we continue our dialogue on 
how best to transfer key counternarcotics tasks from the USG to the 
GOC. End Summary. 
 
Democratic Security Advances 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Colombia has achieved successes in its fight against the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation 
Army (ELN) and emerging criminal groups. The rescue of 15 
high-profile FARC hostages in July 2008, including three Americans, 
and the deaths of key FARC leaders highlight Colombia's progress in 
establishing security. Colombian security forces have captured or 
killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders and reduced the space in 
which terrorists can operate freely, undermining their ability to 
conduct large military operations. The establishment of a basic 
police presence in all of Colombia's municipalities has also 
undermined FARC logistics and organization. A record number of FARC 
members deserted in 2008 -- including mid- and high-level 
commanders. Total demobilizations of illegal armed groups reached 
3,461 in 2008 -- primarily from the FARC -- making it the highest 
level of demobilizations in Colombia's history. In the first 6 
months of 2009, there were a total of 1,371 demobilizations of 
illegal armed group members. 
 
¶5. (SBU) With USG help, in 2008, Colombia again set records in 
eradication and interdiction of drugs, while further reducing 
murder and kidnapping rates. Colombia extradited a record 208 
criminals, narcotraffickers and terrorists to the United States in 
2008, including 15 senior ex-paramilitary leaders. Colombia has 
already extradited more than 145 suspected criminals in 2009. The 
number of homicides fell for the sixth consecutive year, dropping 
to 16,140 (or 33 for every 100,000 habitants), 45 percent lower 
than 2002 levels. 
 
Serious Challenges Ahead 
-------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) Despite advances in security and development, challenges 
related to violence, narcotrafficking, displacement, human rights, 
labor rights, and minority groups remain. We estimate the FARC 
still has some 9,000 fighters in the field, using new tactics that 
include sniper attacks and mines, and organized narcotrafficking 
groups continue to generate violence. Internal displacement due to 
the armed conflict remains serious, with more than three million 
displaced since 1995. Deep historical social divides make it 
difficult for millions from the Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
populations to benefit fully from security and economic gains. 
These minority groups suffer from limited education, health care, 
employment opportunities, and disproportionate forced displacement 
in the mostly isolated rural areas where they reside. 
 
¶7. (U) Colombia has taken significant steps to improve its human 
rights performance, but problems still remain.  We hope you will be 
able to reinforce the human rights message with the GOC leadership. 
U.S. concerns include extrajudicial executions (murders falsely 
reported as military combat kills), threats against human rights 
defenders, and illegal surveillance of the government's political 
opponents, including Supreme Court magistrates, politicians, and 
NGOs. Fifty-one members of the Colombian military were dismissed in 
2008 due to alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings, but 
impunity for such abuses remains a serious problem. We are working 
with the Ministry of Defense to improve rules of engagement, and 
make sure that soldiers accused of human rights abuses are 
investigated by civilian prosecutors. Homicides of labor unionists 
declined 76% between 2001-2008, yet in 2008 the number of labor 
homicides (for all causes) increased from 39 to 46. Still, the 
murder rate for unionists is well below the national homicide rate. 
As of August 2009, 24 murders of unionists have been reported this 
year by union sources. In 2008, the GOC reestablished a government 
presence in all 1,098 municipalities and all the country's mayors 
once again resided within their municipalities. 
 
Regional Tensions Flare 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) A Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between the United 
States and Colombia is almost ready for signature and would provide 
U.S. access to seven Colombian military installations to facilitate 
cooperation to combat narcotrafficking and other transnational 
crimes within Colombia. The DCA updates existing agreements that 
date back to 1952, and would not increase the U.S. military 
footprint in Colombia. Nevertheless, Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez, joined by leaders from Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, 
reacted to news of the negotiations with harsh complaints over an 
increased U.S. military presence in the region. President Uribe 
traveled to seven South American nations and explained to 
counterparts that the DCA would benefit the region as it addresses 
narcotrafficking. A special summit of the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) convened in Argentina on August 28 to address the 
controversy -- yielding mixed results. While President Uribe was 
able to prevent the group from condemning the DCA, many South 
American presidents expressed reservations about the regional 
implications of the agreement. UNASUR ministers of defense and 
foreign affairs met September 15 in Quito to again address regional 
tensions. Some aspects of the DCA are sensitive with the Colombian 
public, such as the treatment of immunities for defense 
contractors. 
 
Uribe Third Term 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Your visit comes as the Constitutional Court analyzes a 
recent law that would authorize a referendum on whether the 
Constitution should be amended to allow President Uribe to run for 
a third term in the May 2010 elections. His possible re-election 
has become the touchstone of all Colombian politics this year. 
Indeed, you will find that your interlocutors are focused on the 
short timeframe remaining in the second term given the uncertainty 
over the third. If the referendum goes forward, at least 25 percent 
of registered voters, or 7.3 million Colombians, must participate 
and a majority of them must vote favorably. President Obama told 
President Uribe on June 29 that, in the United States' experience, 
two terms is enough for any leader, though he emphasized that the 
final decision belongs to the Colombian people. 
 
Congressional Elections and Political Reform 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶10. (U) Congressional elections will also occur next March, two 
months ahead of the presidential election. The 2006-10 Congress has 
been rocked by a parapolitical scandal in which 86 legislators were 
investigated for links to paramilitaries. In response, Congress 
passed a political reform this year that seeks to punish 
politicians and political parties for collaboration with 
narcotraffickers and illegally armed groups. The reform expressly 
bans anyone who has been condemned of crimes relating to 
narcotrafficking, illegally armed groups, or crimes against 
humanity from holding office. It also creates sanctions and fines 
for political parties who have such candidates.  Most importantly, 
political parties will now lose the seat held by the offending 
politician -- previously, the party simply replaced the offender 
with another candidate from the party's candidate list. 
 
DAS to be Dismantled 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) President Uribe announced on September 17 that he favored 
dismantling the wiretapping scandal-ridden Administrative 
Department of Security (DAS), the civilian security service. In a 
much-anticipated move, Uribe proposed a much smaller, new entity 
that would focus on intelligence and immigration services. The DAS' 
other functions would be transferred to other existing agencies. 
DAS scandals have included their wiretapping of Supreme Court 
Magistrates, opposition politicians, and non-governmental 
organizations. The Colombian Congress is expected to pass a law 
authorizing Uribe to re-organize the DAS. 
 
Economic Limitations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Reacting to the economic slowdown in 2009, the GOC cut 
the national budget by $1.4 billion, including a $190 million 
reduction to the defense budget. The proposal would likely reduce 
future expenditures on ammunition, rifles, communications 
equipment, infrastructure projects, fuel, food, and uniforms. The 
cuts would not directly affect defense expenditures funded by the 
wealth tax, which is expected to raise approximately $3.7 billion 
between 2007-2011. Still, the GOC's ability to sustain current 
levels of defense spending after 2011 could be in jeopardy if the 
wealth tax is left to expire at the end of 2010. The Colombian 
Congress is presently deliberating on a bill to extend the wealth 
tax through 2013. Funding for social programs, critical to 
addressing many of the catalysts for the conflict, will be 
sustained, according to President Uribe. Proposed increases for 
social programs, however, will be put on hold until government 
revenues increase. 
 
Post-Plan Colombia Initiatives 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) To consolidate the gains of Plan Colombia and to address 
the linked challenges of inadequate state presence and lack of 
development in drug production areas, the Embassy developed the 
multi-agency Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), 
which supports Colombia's own National Consolidation Plan (PNC). 
The CSDI team is initially focusing on three priority areas of 
on-going conflict, drug trafficking and social marginalization in 
order to help establish state presence in these strategic, 
under-governed parts of the country.  The plan is centered on 
increasing the government's territorial control to provide security 
for communities; to achieve permanent eradication; to transfer 
public order and protection responsibilities to the police; and to 
provide a wide range of socio-economic services.  CSDI's core 
assumption is that security is the precondition for development, 
which gives communities a stake in the long term future of their 
region -- the surest way to sustaining security among marginalized 
rural and vulnerable populations. 
 
Tumaco, Key Consolidation Zone 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) You will be visiting Tumaco, Narino, one of the three 
CSDI priority zones and an area critical to USG counternarcotics 
efforts. In recent decades, the municipality of Tumaco has been a 
battleground between the FARC, paramilitaries and GOC forces. 
Today, organized criminal bands (BACRIMs) are fighting to control 
lucrative drug routes to Mexico. The area's long, inaccessible 
coastline is ideal for trafficking, and the largely uncontrolled 
land border with Ecuador is a transit region for drugs and 
precursor chemicals. The main cash crop in the region has been coca 
and the main industry the production of cocaine. According to UN 
figures, the municipality has by far the highest coca cultivation 
in the country at 5,865 hectares. The Narcotics Affairs Section 
(NAS) has sprayed an average of 50,000 hectares of coca annually in 
Narino since 2004. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Widespread violence in the countryside is driving 
internally displaced persons to the port city of Tumaco, which has 
one of the highest murder rates in the country -- over 80 killings 
were reported in the first three months of this year, mostly 
drug-related. Municipal and community leaders have been threatened 
and some murdered. USAID has been working with semi-autonomous 
Community Councils in Tumaco and NAS coordinates eradication 
operations with the ADAM alternative development programs. 
Establishing civilian security is key to permitting social and 
economic development. The CSDI team is coordinating with the Army, 
Navy and Police with the goal of transitioning responsibilities 
from military to police -- a challenge because of limited police 
resources and numbers. NAS is providing scholarships for 
underrepresented populations to attend the state police academy, 
improve the image of the police, and allow more access to insecure 
areas. 
 
Eradicating, Training, Nationalizing 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (U) The USG and GOC are making significant inroads in 
confronting narcoterrorism in Colombia. The most recent U.S. 
figures for cocaine production in Colombia show a 24 percent 
reduction in production since the peak year 2001. In 2008, 
Colombian security forces set new records for interdiction and 
eradication, seizing 245 metric tons of cocaine and coca paste, 
eradicating 230,000 hectares of coca and destroying 3,667 drug 
labs. This joint effort kept hundreds of metric tons of drugs out 
of the United States. We have reduced the funds available to the 
FARC and other criminal groups to purchase of weapons and 
explosives, corrupt public officials and coerce local populations. 
 
¶17. (U) The USG and GOC have made progress in eradication, as 
evidenced by a 25 percent decrease in potential cocaine 
productivity since the peak in 2001. Much of the success in 
confronting narcotrafficking and terrorism is due to air mobility 
capabilities provided by the United States. Without helicopters, 
the GOC could not project force or provide government presence in a 
country the size of Texas and California combined. Colombia is 
nationalizing our aviation assets, but still needs some U.S. 
support. In the last two years, more than 50 aircraft have been 
turned over to the GOC to fund, maintain and control. Colombia's 
ability to confront narcotics and terrorism depends in large part 
on its air mobility. 
 
Aiming for Irreversibility 
------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (U) Our support to the Colombian military is based upon a 
three-phased approach. The first phase focused on building 
Colombian military forces, projecting those forces into ungoverned 
spaces and securing those spaces. It also supported offensive 
operations against illegal armed groups on an unprecedented scale. 
The second phase, currently being executed, focuses on securing, 
consolidating and sustaining those gains, increasing offensive 
operations against illegal armed groups, and ensuring the 
irreversibility of those gains. The third phase, to be initiated in 
2011, will promote a strategic partnership to sustain key Colombian 
military capabilities. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The MILGRP currently supports eight program areas: joint 
rotary wing, ground operations, riverine operations, governability, 
airpower, maritime interdiction, joint intelligence and 
communications, and joint force initiatives. Support to these 
programs is vital in both the short and long-terms. In the 
short-term, we will assist Colombia in controlling illegal armed 
groups and bringing peace and rule of law to the Colombian 
population. In the long-term, we will focus on building a strategic 
partnership with Colombia and developing key Colombian military 
capabilities that can support U.S. national security objectives 
worldwide. 
 
Aiding Communities At Risk 
------------------------------------ 
¶20. (U) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more than $950 
million in economic and social assistance via USAID. USAID's 
initiatives have delivered legal jobs, social services, and 
development in narcotrafficking and conflict zones. We are 
reintegrating thousands of Colombians who have demobilized, abating 
child recruitment into armed groups, and increasing social services 
for victims of conflict. We are restoring citizen confidence in 
governance, improving the criminal justice system and institutions, 
increasing the poor's access to justice, and promoting human rights 
through investigation and prosecution of human rights and 
labor-related cases. These programs focus on communities at 
high-risk of violence, provide legal and psycho-social assistance, 
and strengthen key government oversight and judicial institutions. 
 
¶21. (U) USAID's alternative development program is a key component 
of our counternarcotics efforts. It promotes sustainable economic 
opportunities in regions vulnerable to drug production and 
conflict. These programs create jobs and economic opportunities in 
areas recently retaken from illegal armed groups and build the 
social infrastructure to mitigate future conflict. USAID is 
expanding social and economic opportunities and improving 
livelihoods for Afro-Colombians and indigenous communities 
disproportionately affected by conflict. These programs provide 
jobs, education, health care, housing, and social services for 
these vulnerable populations. 
BROWNFIELD