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UNCLAS BOGOTA 002925 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM MOPS MCAP MASS ASEC PREF ECON
CO 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE PAUL STOCKTON (SEPTEMBER 20-23) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) We welcome the visit of Paul Stockton, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere.  Your visit 
comes as a regional debate over a U.S.-Colombia Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) has heated up and amidst 
significant political developments.  The Government of 
Colombia (GOC) and the U.S. Embassy are working together to 
consolidate the successes of Plan Colombia through a new 
Embassy follow-on strategy called the Colombia Strategic 
Development Initiative (CSDI), which complements the GOC's 
recently completed National Consolidation Plan (PCN). 
 
¶2. (SBU) In ten years, Colombia has progressed from a near 
failed state and terrorist haven to an economic, political 
and social leader in Latin America.  Colombia has made major 
progress in its fight against illegal armed groups and set 
records in the eradication and interdiction of drugs.  Murder 
and kidnapping rates have dropped dramatically, while rule of 
law has strengthened through major judicial reforms. 
Improved security and economic reform has grown the economy, 
reduced poverty and attracted record levels of investment. 
The GOC has looked to leverage these successes beyond its 
borders by offering troops in Afghanistan and providing 
counterterrorism and counternarcotics training to Mexican, 
Panamanian and other law enforcement agencies in the region. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Significant challenges remain--especially related to 
human rights abuses within the military.  Drug trafficking 
organizations and illegal armed groups continue to operate in 
large parts of the country, including border areas.  Colombia 
has over three million internally displaced persons, and deep 
social divides still prevent millions of citizens, especially 
in rural areas, from benefiting fully from security and 
economic gains.  Despite progress on human rights, some 
elements of the security forces continue to violate human 
rights, and the military has been accused of numerous 
extrajudicial killings of innocents.  We hope you will be 
able to reiterate to the military leadership the importance 
of human rights and the need for continued and significant 
progress on these cases.  Violence against trade unionists 
continues even as the GOC has stepped up prosecutions and 
boosted its protection programs for unionists, human rights 
activists and other vulnerable individuals.  USG support is 
critical to help the GOC confront these persistent 
challenges, even as we continue our dialogue on how best to 
transfer key security tasks from the USG to the GOC. End 
Summary. 
 
Democratic Security Advances 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Colombia has achieved successes in its fight against 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National 
Liberation Army (ELN) and emerging criminal groups.  The 
rescue of 15 high-profile FARC hostages in July 2008, 
including three Americans, and the deaths of key FARC leaders 
highlight Colombia's progress in security.  Colombian 
security forces have captured or killed a number of mid-level 
FARC leaders, and reduced the space in which terrorists can 
operate freely.  A record number of FARC members deserted in 
2008--including mid- and high-level commanders.  Total 
demobilizations of illegal armed groups reached 3,461 in 
2008--primarily from the FARC-- making it the highest level 
of demobilizations in Colombia's history.  In the first 6 
months of 2009, there were a total of 1,371 demobilizations 
of illegal armed group members. 
 
¶5. (SBU) With USG help, in 2008, Colombia again set records 
in eradication and interdiction of drugs, while further 
reducing murder and kidnapping rates.  Colombia extradited a 
record 208 criminals, narcotraffickers and terrorists to the 
United States in 2008, including 15 senior ex-paramilitary 
leaders.  Colombia has already extradited more than 132 
suspected criminals in 2009.  The number of homicides fell 
for the sixth consecutive year, dropping to 16,140 (or 33 for 
every 100,000 habitants), 45% lower than 2002 levels. 
 
Serious Challenges Ahead 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite advances in security and development, 
challenges related to violence, narcotrafficking, 
displacement, human rights, labor rights, and minority groups 
remain.  We estimate the FARC has some 9,000 fighters in the 
field, and organized narcotrafficking groups continue to 
cause violence.  Internal displacement due to the armed 
conflict remains serious, with more than three million 
displaced by violence since 1995.  Deep historical social 
divides make it difficult for millions from the 
Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations to benefit fully 
from security and economic gains.  These minority groups 
suffer from limited education, health care, employment 
opportunities, and disproportionate forced displacement in 
the mostly isolated rural areas where they reside. 
 
¶7. (U) Colombia has publicly committed to improving its human 
rights performance, and we hope you will be able to reinforce 
the human rights message with the GOC leadership.  Fifty-one 
members of the Colombian military were dismissed in 2008 due 
to alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings, but 
impunity for such abuses remains a serious problem.  We are 
working with the Ministry of Defense to improve rules of 
engagement, and make sure that soldiers accused of human 
rights abuses are investigated by civilian prosecutors. 
Labor unionists and homicides declined 76% between 2001-2008, 
yet in 2008 the number of labor homicides (for all causes) 
increased from 39 to 46.  Still, the murder rate for 
unionists is well below the national homicide rate.  As of 
August 2009, 24 murders of unionists have been reported this 
year by union sources.  In 2008, the GOC reestablished a 
government presence in all 1,098 municipalities and all the 
country's mayors once again resided within their 
municipalities. 
 
¶8. (U) Through the Center for Coordinated and Integrated 
Action (CCAI), the GOC is recovering a key stronghold 
previously held by the FARC --La Macarena, in Meta 
Department.  During your visit there, you will witness GOC 
efforts to establish a permanent military, police and 
civilian presence in an area that has never seen a viable GOC 
presence.  Challenges remain, as resource, security and 
staffing shortfalls continue to limit the initiative.  The 
United States, through USAID, MILGRP and NAS, provides 
assistance to CCAI and is working to expand this concept via 
the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) (see 
paragraphs 18 and 19). 
 
Regional Tensions Flare 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The rifts between Colombia and neighboring Venezuela 
and Ecuador have widened over a March 1, 2008, Colombian 
airstrike in Ecuadorian territory that killed the second in 
command of the FARC, alias "Raul Reyes."  After the raid, 
Colombian forces recovered several hard drives that suggested 
the terrorist group had received varying levels of assistance 
from the Governments of Venezuela and Ecuador.  The ensuing 
diplomatic imbroglio resulted in a break in relations with 
Ecuador, which persists to this day, and a temporary break in 
relations with Venezuela.  President Chavez again temporarily 
recalled his ambassador to Colombia following press 
revelations in July that Swedish-made anti-tank 
missiles--originally sold to the Venezuelan military--were 
discovered in FARC hands.  The GOC has remained calm in the 
face of Chavez's provocative rhetoric, which included threats 
to deploy forces to the border, suspend trade ties and 
nationalize Colombian owned businesses in Venezuela. 
 
¶10. (SBU) A Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that is 
almost ready for signature with Colombia would provide U.S. 
access to seven Colombian military installations to 
facilitate cooperation to combat narcotics trafficking and 
other transnational crime within Colombia.  The DCA updates 
existing agreements that date back to 1952, and would not 
increase the U.S. military footprint in Colombia. 
Nevertheless, Venezuelan President Chavez, joined by leaders 
from Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, reacted to news of the 
negotiations with harsh complaints over an increased U.S. 
military presence in the region.  Chavez expressed fears of 
an American invasion of Venezuela and said he felt the "winds 
of war blowing in the continent."  Even moderate governments, 
like Brazil and Chile, demanded an explanation. 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) A special summit of the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) in Argentina on August 28--convened to 
address the controversy--yielded mixed results.  While 
President Uribe was able to prevent the group from condemning 
the DCA, many South American Presidents expressed 
reservations about the regional implications of the 
agreement, and the final UNASUR declaration included language 
that foreign military forces cannot "threaten the sovereignty 
or integrity of any South American nation and the peace and 
security of the region."  President Chavez also described the 
"White Paper Air Mobility Command Global En Route Strategy" 
as proof of the USG's hegemonic plans for the region.  The 
UNASUR leaders also directed their ministers of defense and 
foreign affairs to study the impact of the agreement on the 
region; that meeting is scheduled to take place on September 
15 in Quito. 
 
Uribe Third Term 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Your visit comes as the Constitutional Court 
analyzes a law that would authorize a referendum on whether 
the Constitution should be amended to allow President Uribe 
to run for a third term in the May 2010 elections.  His 
possible re-election has become the touchstone of all 
Colombian politics this year.  Indeed, you will find that 
your interlocutors are focused on the short timeframe 
remaining in the second term given the uncertainty over the 
third.  If the referendum goes forward, at least 25% of 
registered voters, or 7.3 million Colombians, must 
participate and a majority of them must vote favorably. 
President Obama told President Uribe on June 29 that, in the 
United States' experience, two terms is enough for any 
leader, though he emphasized that the final decision belongs 
to the Colombian people. 
 
Economic Limitations 
-------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Reacting to the economic slowdown in 2009, the GOC 
cut the national budget by $1.4 billion, including a $190 
million reduction to the defense budget.  The proposal would 
likely reduce future expenditures on ammunition, rifles, 
communications equipment, infrastructure projects, fuel, 
food, and uniforms.  The cuts would not directly affect 
defense expenditures funded by the wealth tax, which is 
expected to raise approximately $3.7 billion between 
2007-2011.  Still, the GOC's ability to sustain current 
levels of defense spending after 2011 could be in jeopardy if 
the wealth tax is left to expire at the end of 2010.  The 
Colombian Congress is presently deliberating on a bill to 
extend the wealth tax through 2013.  Funding for social 
programs, critical to addressing many of the catalysts for 
the conflict, will be sustained, according to President 
Uribe.  Proposed increases for social programs, however, will 
be put on hold until government revenues increase. 
 
Eradicating, Training, Nationalizing 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (U) The USG and GOC made real strides in battling 
narcoterrorism in Colombia in 2008.  The most recent U.S. 
figures for cocaine production in Colombia show a 24% 
reduction in production since the peak year 2001.  In 2008, 
Colombian security forces seized 245 metric tons of cocaine 
and coca paste, eradicated 230,000 hectares of coca and 
destroyed 3,667 drug labs.  We kept hundreds of metric tons 
out of the United States.  We have reduced the funds 
available to the FARC and other criminal groups for the 
purchase of weapons and explosives, corruption of public 
officials and coercion of local populations. 
 
¶15. (U) The USG (through the Narcotics Affairs Section) and 
GOC have made progress in eradication, as evidenced by a 25% 
decrease in potential cocaine productivity since the peak in 
¶2001.  Increased coordination between manual and aerial 
eradication improves our ability to deal with replanting. 
Much of the success in battling narcotrafficking and 
terrorism is due to air mobility capabilities provided by the 
United States.  Without helicopters, the GOC could not 
project force or provide government presence in a country the 
size of Texas and California combined.  Colombia is 
nationalizing our aviation assets, but still needs some U.S. 
support.  In the last two years, more than 50 aircraft have 
been turned over to the GOC to fund, maintain and control. 
Colombia's ability to confront narcotics and terrorism 
depends in large part on its air mobility. 
 
Aiming for Irreversibility 
-------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) Our support to the Colombian military is based upon a 
three-phased approach.  The first phase focused on building 
Colombian military forces, projecting those forces into 
ungoverned spaces and securing those spaces.  It also 
supported offensive operations against illegal armed groups 
on an unprecedented scale.  The second phase, currently being 
executed, focuses on securing, consolidating and sustaining 
those gains, increasing offensive operations against illegal 
armed groups, and ensuring the irreversibility of those 
gains.  The third phase, to be initiated in 2011, will 
promote a strategic partnership to sustain key Colombian 
military capabilities. 
 
¶17. (SBU) The MILGRP currently supports eight program areas: 
joint rotary wing, ground operations, riverine operations, 
governability, airpower, maritime interdiction, joint 
intelligence and communications, and joint force initiatives. 
 Support to these programs is vital in both the short and 
long-terms.  In the short-term, we will assist Colombia in 
controlling illegal armed groups and bringing peace and rule 
of law to the Colombian population.  In the long-term, we 
will focus on building a strategic partnership with Colombia 
and developing key Colombian military capabilities that can 
support U.S. national security objectives worldwide. 
 
Post-Plan Colombia Initiatives 
------------------------------ 
 
¶18. (U) To consolidate the gains of Plan Colombia, we have 
developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative 
(CSDI), which meshes with Colombia's own National 
Consolidation Plan (PNC).  Our efforts initially focus on 
three priority areas of on-going conflict, drug trafficking 
and social marginalization.  PNC/CSDI has prioritized 
addressing the lack of state presence that enables coca 
production and illegally armed groups, and seeks to establish 
state presence in strategic, under-governed parts of the 
country.  The plan is centered on increasing territorial 
control in these areas to provide security for communities; 
to achieve permanent eradication; to transfer security 
responsibility to the police; and to provide a wide range of 
socio-economic services.  CSDI's core assumption is that 
security is the precondition for development, which gives 
communities a stake in the long term future of their region, 
which is in turn the surest way to long-term security in 
traditionally marginalized rural and vulnerable populations. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The civilian lead of the PNC has yet to take full 
charge of consolidation efforts, leaving the Ministry of 
Defense organizationally in front.  This leadership vacuum 
means that the USG is both partner and catalyst in this 
effort, supplying planning and flexible funding to get 
consolidation from concept to implementation.  Other 
obstacles include the need for a comprehensive GOC security 
strategy to transition from military to police in 
"consolidated" territories; more clarity on a 
post-eradication strategy; stronger presence of the justice 
sector in CSDI areas; and increased funding support for PNC 
ministries in the GOC budget. 
Nichols