VZCZCXRO4718
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #1112/01 2681735
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251733Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0250
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001112 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE (P. PETERSON) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: UPDATE ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY ISSUES 
 
REF: BELGRADE 841; BELGRADE 765 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) As the Serbian government begins its second year in office, 
it is inching closer to NATO at an almost imperceptible rate - naming 
an ambassador after months of delay and slowly implementing the 
Security Agreement - while searching for ways to increase its 
involvement in regional groupings.  The military-to-military 
relationship with the United States remains Serbia's most dynamic 
bilateral partnership, both on the national level and with the Ohio 
National Guard.  Serbia is also working closely with the State 
Department and DOE to address the threats posed by landmines, 
MANPADS, and nuclear materials.  End Summary. 
 
 
Approach to NATO 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Although relations with NATO remain a politically sensitive 
issue with the Serbian public, with support for eventual Serbian 
membership hovering around 30%, the Serbian government is taking a 
series of steps to gradually broaden its relationship with the 
Alliance.  Foreign Minister Jeremic formally nominated Branislav 
Milenkovic, currently the special representative in Brussels, as 
Serbia's ambassador to NATO in a September 22 letter to NATO 
Secretary General Rasmussen.  Presidential foreign policy advisor 
Jovan Ratkovic told us on September 14 that President Tadic planned 
to open Serbia's mission to NATO before the end of the year. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Before the mission can open, however, Serbia must implement 
the Security Agreement with NATO.  MFA NATO Directorate officials 
confirmed to us on September 24 that they had resolved a dispute with 
the MOD over control of classified information that had been blocking 
implementation of the agreement.  The government recently created an 
Office of the National Security Council to serve as the primary 
registry, and appointed Major Goran Matic as its director.  Serbia 
now has a roadmap in place to complete the remaining implementation 
steps, including the creation of sub-registers at MOD and MFA. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Serbia is now working on its second Individual Partnership 
Plan (IPP) with NATO.  According to the MFA, because the first IPP 
was only 20% fulfilled, the Serbian government will be more selective 
in drafting the next iteration.  The Ministry of Defense is currently 
completing the annual PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) 
questionnaire.  The MFA reports that Serbia will soon initiate an 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) as the "next logical step" 
with NATO, building on recent successes such as the MEDCEUR exercise, 
and may also initiate discussion of a NATO SOFA at the same time. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Head of the MFA's NATO Directorate Milutin Stanojevic told 
us on September 24 that the GOS was finalizing a letter to NATO 
Secretary General Rasmussen proposing modifications to the 
Military-Technical Agreement signed at the end of Kosovo hostilities 
in 1999 (aka the Kumanovo Agreement).  Stanojevic stressed that 
Serbia would ask for changes to the agreement to reflect the changed 
security circumstances and its growing partnership with NATO, not the 
abolition of the agreement.  He indicated it might be possible to 
re-establish contact between the Serbian CHOD and COMKFOR once the 
proposal has been forwarded. 
 
Regional Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Serbian government continues to view KFOR as an 
important guarantor of regional stability, and is concerned about the 
draw-down process now underway.  Stanojevic pressed the issue again 
on September 24, urging that partners should consider every step 
carefully and factor in the broader regional context.  Despite 
displeasure that NATO had chosen to involve KFOR in standing up the 
Kosovo Security Force (KSF), Serbia wants KFOR to stay in Kosovo for 
the foreseeable future. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In anticipation of eventual EU membership, Serbia is 
modernizing its bureaucracy to begin focusing on European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP).  Dejan Hinic, formerly the head of the 
MFA's Americas Directorate, will soon become the head of an ESDP 
division within a reorganized "Security Policy Directorate" in the 
MFA.  (The directorate will have three divisions:  NATO-PfP, ESDP and 
PKOs, and arms control.  The changes are part of a larger MFA 
reorganization that must be approved by the Government.)  Hinic told 
us on September 24 that the new focus on ESDP will make additional 
 
BELGRADE 00001112  002 OF 002 
 
 
contributions to PKOs possible; Serbia will soon propose signing a 
security agreement with the EU to this end. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Serbian government is also eager to participate more 
actively in regional groupings such as the Southeast Europe Defense 
Ministerial (SEDM) and the Adriatic Charter, according to our MFA and 
MOD contacts.  The Serbian government is interested in participating 
fully in SEDM, but U.S. policy has prevented their membership until 
there is a clear policy from the Serbian government that would not 
prevent future Kosovo membership in SEDM. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The primary obstacle to joining the Adriatic Charter is 
language in the founding document which links membership to eventual 
NATO membership; the MFA has wondered aloud on several occasions as 
to whether the USG and other AC members would accept a statement or 
note by Serbia indicating that joining the group would not commit the 
government to eventual NATO membership.  (The MFA casts this as a 
legal rather than political issue, referring to the neutrality 
provision of a 2007 parliamentary resolution.  While legal experts 
tell us that such a resolution is not in fact legally binding, the 
political dilemma nevertheless exists.) 
 
Bilateral Military-to-Military Relations 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Although Serbia's foreign policy is based on four pillars - 
the EU, the U.S., Russia, and China - its military relationships are 
almost exclusively with the U.S. and NATO.  EUCOM's August 
31-September 14 MEDCEUR military medical exercise, hosted by the 
Serbs in Nis and conducted in the "spirit of PfP," was the latest 
example of cooperation; it brought in 443 participants from 15 
countries.  EUCOM officials are in frequent contact with their 
Serbian counterparts, and PDASD Joseph McMillan led a 14-person 
delegation to Bilateral Defense Consultations in July in Belgrade. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Ohio National Guard's State Partnership Program is the 
most visible part of the bilateral mil-mil relationship.  ONG members 
conducted a series of humanitarian assistance programs in rural areas 
of Serbia over the summer that garnered enormous amounts of positive 
press coverage and goodwill. 
 
Demining, MANPADS, Non-Proliferation 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Serbia continues to work quietly but steadily with us on a 
series of projects designed to decrease the risk posed by landmines, 
MANPADS, and nuclear materials.  The U.S. has contributed to 
humanitarian demining in Serbia since 2002 and is the largest donor. 
Using $870,000 in 2008 funding and an additional $1 million in 2009 
funds from the State Department, the International Trust Fund (ITF) 
for Humanitarian Demining is carrying out several projects to demine 
border areas the Milosevic regime mined during the wars of the 1990s. 
 Following completion of three projects currently underway, Serbia 
will be officially mine free. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Under agreements signed in 2005 and 2008, Serbia agreed to 
destroy almost 9,000 MANPADS.  The first tranche has been destroyed, 
as has approximately half of the second tranche.  Under the second 
agreement, Serbia will receive $7.528 million from the State 
Department for the destruction of 3764 SA-7's, doubling of the 
capacity for large caliber artillery ammunition demilitarization, and 
physical security upgrades at storage facilities. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The Department of Energy is currently working with the 
Vinca Nuclear Research Institute on a reactor decommissioning 
project, which involves the return of spent fuel to Russia with IAEA 
assistance. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Although there have been no dramatic breakthroughs there 
is a new sense of optimism in the defense and security relationship 
with Serbia, attributable largely to Vice President Biden's meeting 
with Defense Minister Dragan Sutanovac during his May visit to 
Belgrade (Ref B).  The meeting highlighted the central role of our 
strong military-to-military relationship, while providing political 
cover to those within the Serbian government who seek Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  One area where we will continue to probe the Serbian 
government is to find a Modus Vivendi where Serbia can join regional 
organizations like SEDM and the Adriatic Charter while assuring 
future Kosovo participation in the same organizations.  End Comment. 
BRUSH