VZCZCXRO9522
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2394/01 2481458
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051458Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4600
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002394 
 
AIDAC 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: GOI PROPOSAL FOR NEW ASSISTANCE COORDINATION 
MECHANISM 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 2336 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 1221 
 
(This message is sensitive but unclassified; please protect 
accordingly.) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  At an August 26 Iraq Partners Forum (IPF) 
meeting, Ministry of Planning Director General for 
International Cooperation Huda Malik proposed to move Iraq,s 
assistance coordination function from her ministry to a 
higher body, such as the Prime Minister's Office.  She said 
the new entity should deal with strategic issues and 
establish aid policy within the GOI.  Malik also called for 
the international donor community to harmonize its efforts 
with this proposed GOI entity.  She commented that it may be 
difficult to get the GOI to take formal action on any new 
plan before the January national election, but encouraged the 
donor community to engage with GOI technocrats so that the 
next government would be ready to take action.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) At a well-attended August 26 Iraq Partners Forum 
(IPF) meeting (Ref A), the Ministry of Planning and 
Development Cooperation (MoPDC) Director General for 
International Cooperation, Huda Malik, presented her proposal 
for a new GOI assistance coordination mechanism.  Ms. Malik 
previously told us in private that she was working on this 
plan (Ref B), but this was her first formal presentation 
outside of the GOI.  She prefaced her remarks with a thorough 
description of previous assistance coordination efforts in 
Iraq since 2003. 
 
---------------------------- 
Six Years of Lessons Learned 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Malik said that the most important lesson learned 
in the last six years of reconstruction efforts was that 
political stability leads to security which allows for 
reconstruction.  Other problems or lessons learned identified 
by Malik included: 
 
-- The failure of past donor and assistance coordination 
efforts were due more to political instability than failures 
in process.  With a fragile immature political system, 
institutions remained weak and there was no neutral space for 
a reconstruction dialogue. 
 
-- Past efforts at institution building focused on training 
of personnel and not capacity development of the institution. 
 
 
-- Previous attempts at assistance coordination, under the 
National Development Strategy (NDS) or International Compact 
with Iraq (ICI), did not properly prioritize goals. 
 
-- The only official GOI point of contact for assistance 
coordination since 2003 has been the Iraq Strategic Review 
Board (ISRB).  This Board, on which Malik serves as the 
Executive Secretary, was supposed to give strategic guidance 
to the donor community but ended up just reviewing individual 
projects.  Because the USG exempted itself from submitting 
projects for review to this Board in 2003, the Board was 
hobbled from the start. 
 
-- Parallel mechanisms such as the ICI created confusion over 
who had the lead for assistance coordination, and confusion 
still exists between the national and provincial levels. 
 
-- Because there is no unified Iraqi entity that deals with 
the international community on assistance 
coordination, donors have taken the lead on assistance 
priorities without GOI involvement.  The only exception was 
the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq 
(IRFFI), with Iraqi participation throughout the process, but 
the amount provided under this mechanism was only a small 
portion of the total assistance. 
 
-- The donor community did not provide enough information to 
the GOI on the monetary value of its assistance, which would 
have allowed the GOI to track donor assistance along with its 
Qhave allowed the GOI to track donor assistance along with its 
own revenues and expenditures. 
 
------------------------------- 
The Way Forward: 
Start with Paris Declaration... 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Malik said that any new way forward on assistance 
coordination must use the Paris Declaration on Aid 
 
BAGHDAD 00002394  002 OF 002 
 
 
Effectiveness as a starting point.  The GOI must take the 
lead on reconstruction programs, she said, which will entail 
GOI political will and commitment.  This will help ensure the 
success of the international donor community's assistance 
efforts. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
...And Create a New Entity in PM's Office 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Giving aid management to a single ministry is not a 
good idea in Iraq at this time, Malik said, adding that too 
many sensitive issues between ministries and other GOI bodies 
persist.  She proposed creating a new entity that belongs to 
the Prime Minister's office, to ensure that instructions on 
assistance coordination are carried out.  She said that, 
under her plan, this entity would deal primarily with 
strategic, not technical, issues on assistance coordination. 
This entity would establish aid policy for Iraq by reviewing 
all of the various strategies and the international donors, 
engagement with Iraq. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Under this entity in the Prime Minister's office, 
Malik recognized the need for a technical entity, or sub- and 
ad-hoc committees to focus on specific sectoral issues in 
assistance coordination.  Additionally, Malik called for the 
international community to harmonize its efforts and 
synchronize with this proposed GOI entity.  She noted that 
there could still be a need for various strategies such as 
the ICI and National Development Plan (NDP), but said the GOI 
needs to have one coordination mechanism for all incoming 
assistance. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Malik said she has circulated the Arabic version 
of her proposal within the GOI, and that an English 
translation would be circulated shortly among the 
international community.  She conceded that it may be 
difficult to get the GOI to take formal action on any plan 
before the election, but encouraged the donor community to 
engage with the technocrats in the GOI so that the incoming 
government would be ready to take action. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment:  Malik's proposal, and her willingness to 
actually suggest removing a politically powerful function 
from her own ministry, is a welcome breath of fresh air.  If 
the GOI accepts her proposal, the international community may 
be able to better coordinate its assistance efforts with the 
government and better target priority areas.  With little 
appetite for any new initiatives in the run-up to the 
elections, however, it remains to be seen whether her 
proposal will catch any traction with the current government. 
 We will continue to track the development and progress of 
her proposal and urge the GOI to plan for continuity and 
transparency in any assistance coordination mechanisms in 
this administration and the next. 
HILL