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OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHWR #0875/01 2401137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 281137Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8791
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000875 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/CE AND S/CPR; NSC PASS TO HOVENIER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS UP GM PL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO POLAND 
 
¶1. (SBU) Mission Poland warmly welcomes your upcoming visit 
to Poland to commemorate the outbreak of World War II 70 
years ago. Your trip comes at a key moment as Poland, 
Germany, Russia, and their neighbors work to put behind them 
controversial historical memories that have mired their 
relations for decades. The participation of leaders such as 
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Lech 
Kaczynski, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin, and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuliya 
Tymoshenko demonstrates a willingness to work through 
sometimes politically explosive historical issues that have 
frequently hindered cooperation on other fronts. Poland 
itself is a time-tested ally of America and has fought with 
our soldiers in World War II campaigns in Italy (Monte 
Cassino), Normandy (Falaise), and Operation Market Garden in 
the Netherlands.  More recently, Polish soldiers joined the 
coalition in Iraq for five years and maintain the 7th largest 
troop contingent in Afghanistan.  Poland has also supported 
our efforts to extend the zone of security and stability to 
the former Soviet space, and shares our faith in freedom and 
democracy.  As the event in Gdansk demonstrates, PM Tusk 
shares President Obama's vision of exercising soft power and 
reaching out to rivals, despite political risks at home. 
 
POLISH U.S.-RELATIONS STRONG, BUT IN A ROUGH PATCH 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S. has a strong, productive relationship with 
Poland, but bilateral ties are not keeping pace with Poland's 
deepening relationships with its European Union partners. 
Poland's continued exclusion from the U.S. visa waiver 
program and uncertainty about the level of U.S. engagement in 
the bilateral strategic partnership have affected the U.S. 
image.  Our late response (no official announcement as of the 
morning of Friday, August 28) in confirming U.S. 
participation in the September 1 commemoration ceremony in 
Gdansk reinforced concerns about U.S. commitment among the 
Poles, who count on the United States as Poland's key 
guarantor of security in the region and closely analyze every 
move we make.  As they waited for word on the presidential 
delegation, the major Polish dailies and television stations 
over the past few weeks have criticized the United States for 
"ignoring Poland," despite Poland's significant contributions 
to advancing Washington's global interests.  The Poles also 
cite the lack of high-level U.S. visitors, frequently 
pointing out that these officials have visited neighboring 
countries.  Three Polish statesmen were among the signatories 
of the July letter of Central European leaders to President 
Obama, which warned that the region's stability and 
Atlanticism should not be taken for granted in the face of 
allegedly waning U.S. interest. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The fate of Missile Defense remains first and 
foremost on the minds of Poland's government and public.  In 
August 2008, Prime Minister Tusk agreed to locate U.S. 
missile interceptors in Poland under the auspices of a 
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA).  He did so 
largely to accommodate a direct request from the United 
States, Poland's longtime ally. Poles are now waiting 
patiently for our decision on the future of European Missile 
Defense.  Polish media report almost daily that the U.S. will 
likely withdraw from its prior decisions.  Most Poles are not 
wedded to Missile Defense, but they strongly wish to avoid 
any perception that the U.S. is giving up on the program in 
order to reset relations with Russia. 
 
¶4. (SBU) You will hear that, regardless of the fate of MD, 
there is an expectation that we will move forward with the 
U.S. Patriot rotation.  We have been reassuring on this 
point--the President has confirmed that the U.S. will 
implement the bilateral Declaration on Strategic Cooperation 
that calls for the Patriot rotation.  The form that Patriot 
rotation will take continues to receive much attention. 
Earlier this year, headlines heralding the arrival of unarmed 
"Naked Patriots" reflected fears that the rotation of a 
Patriot battery from Germany may not meet their expectations 
of a combat-ready, fully operational system capable of 
integration with the Polish air defense system, at least in 
the initial rotation.  The USG interagency continues to work 
these issues, and is expected to inform the Poles of our 
decisions shortly after your visit.  The MD decision in 
particular is extremely sensitive, and current U.S. thinking 
is closely held. 
 
RUSSIA IN THE EAST . . . 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) For historical reasons, Russia casts a long shadow 
in Poland, but the Tusk government has tamped down the 
 
WARSAW 00000875  002 OF 002 
 
 
rhetoric directed against Russia, instead choosing to engage 
in a pragmatic bilateral dialogue.  The government also has 
endeavored to keep thorny historical issues such as the 
massacre of Polish soldiers at Katyn from impeding progress 
in other areas like bilateral trade.  While Polish officials 
repeatedly have declared they do not expect major 
breakthroughs in relations with Russia in the near future, 
their pragmatic policy has already paid dividends.  A year 
ago, Warsaw won the lifting of the Russian embargo on Polish 
meat exports, and on September 1, Poland is expected to sign 
an agreement on navigation in the Vistula Bay, reopening 
commercial shipping between the Polish port of Elblag and the 
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad for the first time since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union.  The GoP views Putin's 
participation in the Gdansk ceremony as an important step in 
Warsaw's own "reset" process with Russia.  Despite these 
modest successes, the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party 
has frequently criticized the Tusk government for failing 
rigorously to defend Poland's interests in the wake of a 
resurgent Russia, and for relegating Poland to a subordinate 
role in EU-Russia relations.  At the commemoration, Prime 
Minister Tusk is expected to express tactfully the Polish 
view of the origins of World War II, countering suggestions 
in a recent Russian documentary that Poland collaborated with 
Germany in the 1930s.  President Kaczynski will say something 
similar, likely in blunter terms. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Warsaw's efforts to develop a pragmatic approach 
towards Moscow are balanced by its anxiety about Russia's 
role as a regional power, particularly after the August 2008 
conflict in Georgia. Poles sometimes feel hostage to the 
whims of larger powers, and they monitor closely the revived 
U.S.-Russia dialogue. They do not object to improved 
U.S.-Russian relations, as long as key decisions are not made 
over Poland's head. 
 
. . . AND GERMANY IN THE WEST 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Tusk government has also pursued pragmatic 
relations with Germany, resulting in a significantly warmer 
tone in the bilateral relationship.  Today, there is less 
acrimony surrounding the proposed German-Russian Nordstream 
gas pipeline that would bypass Poland--a project that some 
Polish politicians previously likened to the 
Molotov-Ribbenthrop pact.  Merkel's appearance at the Gdansk 
commemoration can be attributed in part to her constructive 
interactions with Tusk, a stark contrast to her rocky 
relationship with Tusk's predecessor, Jaroslaw Kaczysnki. 
However, issues such as the historical interpretation of the 
plight of German expellees from Poland and German media 
comments about the extent of Polish collaboration with the 
Nazis during the Holocaust continue to complicate the 
relationship. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Poland and Germany are gradually increasing 
coordination on issues related to Poland's Eastern neighbors, 
particularly Ukraine.  Germany supported the $600 million 
Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative, which the EU 
launched in May in an effort to bring countries, such as 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, closer to European 
institutions.  Polish FM Sikorski and German FM Steinmeier 
also traveled together to Ukraine in June to encourage the 
government to pursue reforms necessary for Euro-Atlantic 
integration. 
 
PROPERTY RESTITUTION LEGISLATION STALLED 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Poland is one of the last countries in Central 
Europe that have not made legislative provisions for an 
expedited, administrative (rather than judicial) mechanism 
for resolving private property restitution claims, an issue 
closely tracked by the American Jewish community.  Private 
property compensation to owners and heirs -- including 
Holocaust survivors -- remains politically unpopular in 
Poland, even though the great majority of those compensated 
would be Poles living in Poland.  The Polish government 
recently claimed that Polish compensation legislation would 
risk bolstering pending legal claims by German nationals, 
even though the German government has called the claims 
invalid. Polish officials also argue that the economic crisis 
is complicating a multi-billion dollar payment program. 
 
ASHE