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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6923

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 14 TOKYO 001966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/26/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Two ways to turn around economy - growth strategy: Overview of 
manifestos; LDP - increase wages through companies; DPJ - direct 
assistance for household budgets (Yomiuri) 
 
(2) Strategy needed for deadlocked Japan-DPRK relations (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Defense buildup against the "nuclear threat" (Yomiuri) 
 
(4) 2009 Lower House election: My views on foreign and security 
policies: The  Japan-U.S. alliance must be strengthened (Mainichi) 
 
(5) 2009 Lower House election: My views on foreign and security 
policies: Japan must keep appropriate distance from U.S. and China 
(Mainichi) 
 
(6) Symposium on "Obama administration and Japan-U.S. relations" 
(Asahi) 
 
(7) Japan asked U.S. to keep documents on nuclear-related secret 
pact classified in 1999 (Asahi) 
 
(8) Editorial: Political parties should keep in mind retreat of 
postal reforms will bring about major loss (Nikkei) 
 
(9) Four wise men behind Obama's Prague speech in April on "world 
without nuclear weapons" (Gaiko Forum) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Two ways to turn around economy - growth strategy: Overview of 
manifestos; LDP - increase wages through companies; DPJ - direct 
assistance for household budgets 
 
YOMIURI (Page 3) (Excerpts) 
August 26, 2009 
 
One focus of the Lower House election is what kind of growth 
strategy each political party is envisioning for the Japanese 
economy. Judging from the manifestos issued by the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 
differences between the two parties are clear - the LDP aims to 
expand the economy based on the premise that corporate business 
performance will pick up, and the DPJ intends to boost consumption 
through direct cash handouts for household budgets. 
 
Discussion on future burden of social security indispensable 
 
The challenge of efforts to put the Japanese economy on the 
full-fledged growth track is how to strike a balance between social 
benefit handouts and financial burden. Social security expenses 
continue to increase at the rate of 1 trillion yen a year. The 
proportion of the number of people aged 65 or older is expected to 
grow from about 20 percent in 2005 to about 30 percent by 2025 and 
about 40 percent by 2050. Payments of the basic portion of pensions 
to baby boomers will begin in 2012. Japan's sales tax rate of 5 
percent is lower than the levels of European countries, where such 
rates are around 20 percent. Japan is now a country with medium 
welfare and low burden in terms of welfare size and burden level. 
 
The outstanding balance of long-term debts combining those held by 
 
TOKYO 00001966  002 OF 014 
 
 
the central and local governments reached 816 trillion yen or 
approximately 170 percent against the GDP at the end of fiscal 2009. 
This is the highest level among industrialized countries. The amount 
of the issuance of new government bonds will likely exceed tax 
revenues in fiscal 2009. This is an abnormal situation caused by 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led administrations. 
 
The LDP incorporated a goal of achieving medium welfare and medium 
burden in its manifesto. It says that it will implement drastic 
reform of the tax code, including a hike in the sales tax, without 
delay after the economy turns around and necessary legal steps are 
taken by fiscal 2011. However, the manifesto does not mention the 
rate or timeframe for the hike. 
 
The DPJ calls for substantially improving social security by 
establishing such benefits as child allowances and a pension system 
that guarantees a minimum payout of 70,000 yen per month. In the 
meantime, the party has pledged that it will not raise the sales tax 
for the next four years. It has determined that in order to obtain 
understanding from the public, wasteful spending must be reduced 
first. 
 
Same goal 
 
Prime Minister Aso in a speech given in Sendai City on the 25th 
underscored that the GDP in the April-June quarter marked positive 
growth with an annualized growth rate of 3.7 percent in real terms 
for the first time in a year and three months. He proudly said that 
the economic decline, which kicked in last fall, has stopped due to 
economic stimulus measures costing roughly 132 trillion yen, 
including a boost to public works and financial assistance to small 
and medium-size businesses. 
 
DPJ President Hatoyama in a speech given on the 25th said, "We want 
to turn around the economy, by improving family budgets." He thus 
indicated his party's stance that directly stimulating household 
budgets by providing child allowances or making highways toll-free 
is a shortcut to shoring up the economy. 
 
The pillar of the LDP's stimulus measures is company-driven growth 
measures based on the idea that backing corporate activities will 
raise wages, which will in turn boost personal consumption. The DPJ 
will aim to provide direct assistance by household budget-type 
measures, in other words, boosting consumption by directly 
increasing households' after-tax income with payouts of various 
allowances. The LDP and the DPJ share the same goal but their 
approaches to attain that goal are totally different. 
 
Sluggish growth 
 
The LDP's scenario is to materialize annualized 2 percent of growth 
by the second half of fiscal 2010, by continuing the stimulus 
package and put the economy on the full-fledged growth track with 
domestic and foreign demands starting in fiscal 2011.The party 
incorporated the goal of raising per-capita national income to the 
highest level in the world, by boosting each household's after-tax 
income by 1 million yen in 10 years. Its manifesto also incorporates 
such strategies as strengthening competitiveness using 
environment-related technology and bringing in Asian markets' 
vitality. However, they all lack details. 
 
Unknown effects 
 
TOKYO 00001966  003 OF 014 
 
 
 
The DPJ advocates that it will shift the Japanese economy to a 
domestic demand-led type by expanding consumption with a boosted 
disposal income in the household budget. It has also indicated 
readiness to assist the development and dissemination of 
state-of-the-art technologies, such as biotechnology or 
nanotechnology with President Hatoyama noting, "There is a 
sufficient possibility of finding industrial areas that can be 
developed into blue-chip industries worldwide. Such industrial 
sectors include agriculture, marine resources, development and the 
aerospace industry." 
 
However, to what extent assistance for the household budget will 
boost domestic demand is not known. The Daiichi Life Research 
Institute has estimated that the consumption-boosting effect of 
measures incorporated in the DPJ manifesto, such as the introduction 
of child allowances and the abolition of provisional tax rates, 
including the gas tax, will be no more than 0.4 percent in the next 
fiscal year. 
 
Japan's unemployment rate is on at its worst-ever level. Employment 
uncertainty and a decline in wages continue. The party has proposed 
raising the minimum wage to 1,000 yen with the aim of increasing 
after-tax income of workers. However, if workers' wages are raised, 
companies will just hold back on hiring more workers. Chief 
economist Toshihiro Nagahama takes this view: "As long as employment 
uncertainty remains, personal consumption will continue to be 
sluggish, because cash handouts in the form of child allowances, 
etc, will be channeled to savings." 
 
(2) Strategy needed for deadlocked Japan-DPRK relations 
 
Hitoshi Tanaka, former deputy minister of foreign affairs, senior 
fellow at Japan Center for International Exchange 
 
YOMIURI (Page 11) (Full) 
August 26, 2009 
 
The situation in North Korea presents a serious threat to Japan's 
security. It is a strange neighbor who would suddenly begins a 
dialogue right after it heightened tensions by conducting missile 
launches and nuclear tests. However, all the political parties have 
not presented any concrete policies toward North Korea in the 
election campaign and the point of contention has been unclear. What 
are the essential issues in North Korea policy? 
 
(Editorial staff member Ichiro Ue spoke with two experts - Hitoshi 
Tanaka and Hideshi Takesada - and summarized their comments. 
Tanaka's comments appear below; Takesada's are found in the 
following article.) 
 
North Korea fired ballistic missiles in April and conducted a 
nuclear test in May, but accepted a visit by former U.S. President 
Bill Clinton in early August and dispatched a delegation to the late 
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's funeral - doing a complex 
zigzag between a tough and soft stance. However, this is a 
calculated strategy on the part of the DPRK. Japan will need to 
respond accordingly. 
 
North Korea has long been carrying out two parallel policies. One is 
the vigorous development of nuclear weapons to acquire a military 
capability that will discourage any attack from foreign countries. 
 
TOKYO 00001966  004 OF 014 
 
 
The other is economic reconstruction, because the development of 
nuclear arms alone will not be adequate to maintain the political 
regime and will cause increasing discontent among the people. 
However, the DPRK cannot accomplish economic reconstruction alone. 
It is talking a tough line as leverage to obtain cooperation from 
other countries. North Korea has formulated a policy for survival 
relying on the strategic manipulation of a tough stance and pursuit 
of dialogue. 
 
The change of administration in the United States is also a factor. 
The North Koreans have been thinking about where to start 
negotiations with the new administration. They have fired missiles 
and conducted a nuclear test before the Obama administration and its 
policies were consolidated. They probably intended to send the 
message "don't take us lightly." 
 
The DPRK has yet to complete development of a nuclear weapon. 
However, once it has developed a weapon, the country will not be 
easily persuaded to abandon it. This means that we do not have much 
time. But the same holds true for North Korea. If it fails to deal 
with its economic problems, the regime may collapse from within. 
 
President Clinton's visit to North Korea will probably become a 
turning point that will lead to dialogue, even if not immediately. 
Against this background, one thing needs to be borne in mind. The 
neighboring countries should be solidly united and continue to send 
the message that North Korea cannot obtain aid from the 
international community if it continues possess nuclear weapons. 
 
On the part of Japan, it needs to collaborate with other countries 
based on this principle and apply pressure on the DPRK while 
implementing the UN Security Council sanction resolution. At some 
point it will have to be prepared for the worst and plunge into 
negotiations that will produce results. 
 
Both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) are saying that North Korea's possession of nuclear arms 
is unacceptable, and they both pledge to work for a comprehensive 
solution to the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues. However, no 
concrete policies have been presented. They must bear in mind that 
talking only about pressure or dialogue but not producing any 
results is meaningless. 
 
The North Korea issue is a litmus test for Japan's foreign policy. 
Foreign countries see Japan as an important party in the North Korea 
issue. Yet, it has not played the role of a concerned party. The 
Japan-DPRK relationship has been at a stalemate since Koizumi's two 
visits to North Korea, which resulted in the return of five 
abductees and their families. North Korea will not be moved only by 
cries for the return of abduction victims. A strategy for a 
comprehensive solution to the abduction and security issues and the 
normalization of diplomatic relations are necessary. 
 
In order to break the deadlock, the political leadership needs to 
take the responsibility to design an unwavering negotiation 
strategy. It will need a framework and the determination to 
implement this strategy. For this purpose, a framework across 
ministerial boundaries, such as the national security council 
proposed by the LDP in its manifesto or the national strategy bureau 
the DPJ plans to create, is needed. 
 
North Korea is not a point of contention in the general election. 
 
TOKYO 00001966  005 OF 014 
 
 
Actually, it is undesirable to make this a point of contention 
without an adequate strategy, thus binding the hands of the new 
administration. In any case, whatever the composition of the new 
administration, this is an urgent issue that needs to be debated at 
an early date. 
 
(3) Defense buildup against the "nuclear threat" 
 
YOMIURI (Page 11) (Full) 
August 26, 2009 
 
Hideshi Takesada, chief researcher at the National Institute of 
Defense Studies 
 
North Korea's actions since this spring suggest a clear strategy. It 
is seeking bilateral talks with the United States by showing the 
international community that its development of nuclear weapons will 
become a threat in the near future. 
 
North Korea wants to interact with the U.S. on an equal footing as 
much as possible. For this purpose, it needs to complete the 
miniaturization of its nuclear warheads. On top of that, it is 
looking to sign a mutual non-aggression treaty or replace the 
armistice agreement for the Korean War with a peace agreement, 
building good relations with the U.S., and ultimately realizing the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. For this reason, it has 
no intention to give up its nuclear weapons. It is noteworthy that 
its goal is to possess nuclear missiles that can reach New York or 
Washington to prevent U.S. intervention if a military conflict for 
the unification of the two Koreas, like the Korean War of 1950, 
occurs in the future. 
 
The DPRK has declared that it will not return to the Six Party Talks 
in order to concentrate on U.S.-DPRK dialogue. It has eliminated 
other venues for negotiating the nuclear issue and is focusing on 
the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. 
 
Japan's relations with North Korea are in a stalemate under such 
circumstances not because there was any problem on the Japanese side 
or that it has made any diplomatic mistakes. This is the consequence 
of North Korea's strategy for U.S.-DPRK talks, and Japan's only 
option is to watch closely developments in these bilateral talks. 
 
However, as long as Japan is exposed to the threat of North Korean 
missiles, how it deals with the DPRK is very important. In terms of 
equipment, missiles capable of interception at high altitude and 
Japan's own early warning satellites with improved capability to 
detect the launching of ballistic missiles instantly with ultrared 
rays are needed for missile defense. The Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) has discussed this issue repeatedly at its subcommittee on 
defense policy and formulated a policy direction, while the thinking 
of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) on foreign and defense 
policies remains unclear. 
 
The DPJ talks about playing a role in East Asia or Asia and the 
Pacific and a close and equal relationship with the U.S., but it has 
no concrete policies. This is probably due to the constraint of the 
plan to form a coalition with the Social Democratic Party and other 
parties after the election. A concrete strategy is indispensable for 
strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance from an independent standpoint 
and for Japan to become a respected country in East Asia. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001966  006 OF 014 
 
 
Along with equipment, various legislative measures for defense will 
be important. Will Japan be able to intercept North Korean missiles 
apparently targeting the U.S.? Whether the LDP or the DPJ (is in 
power), strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance will require tackling 
the legal issues in order not to lose the United States' trust. The 
question is how to deal with the government's current negative 
interpretation of the right of collective self-defense, which is 
related to this issue. Concrete and thoroughgoing discussions are 
necessary. 
 
The abduction of Japanese citizens by the DPRK is an important issue 
bearing on human rights and the people's safety. Although the LDP 
talks about "staking the national prestige on realizing the return 
of all abductees," while the DPJ says it will "make every effort for 
a solution to this issue," they are not even sure how many people 
have been abducted or how many of them are still alive. 
 
While it will be a very tall order, the new administration formed 
after the election needs to have the determination and the wisdom to 
realize the start of a joint investigative body of the Japanese and 
DPRK governments. It needs to be prepared to go to Pyongyang to 
negotiate directly if needed. 
 
(4) 2009 Lower House election: My views on foreign and security 
policies: The  Japan-U.S. alliance must be strengthened 
 
Satoshi Morimoto 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
August 25, 2009 
 
Japan's foreign and security policies based on the Japan-U.S. 
alliance have been called into question. Growing tensions in East 
Asia because of North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and the 
rise of newly industrializing countries, such as China, are likely 
to shake Japan's position in the international community. 
 
With next year marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the 
revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, there are strong calls for a 
revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which 
covers the handling of U.S. service members in Japan, centering on 
Okinawa. What foreign and security policies should Japan, which take 
has been enjoying prosperity under America's nuclear umbrella, 
pursue? 
 
(The Mainichi posed this question to two experts on defense and 
security issues, Satoshi Morimoto, a professor at Takushoku 
University Graduate School, and Jitsuro Terashima, honorary chairman 
of Japan Research Institute. Morimoto's comments appear below; 
Terashima's are found in the following article) 
 
The future of East Asia is opaque. North Korea is saddled with the 
question of a possible change of its leader as well as nuclear and 
missile issues. China's hegemonic tendency could potentially 
undermine the stability of the region. The Japan-U.S. alliance must 
be strengthened to play a greater role for the stability of Asia and 
the international community. 
 
The new administration to be launched after the House of 
Representatives election need not dwell on precedent. Much can be 
expected from policy debate from a fresh perspective 
 
 
TOKYO 00001966  007 OF 014 
 
 
But if it formulates a policy that damages the credibility of the 
bilateral alliance, the overall Japan-U.S. relationship will suffer. 
As for the question of revising the SOFA, I think the United States 
will respond to Japan's call for frank talks about the agreement 
following reexamination of problems associated with it. I do not 
think the United States will agree to negotiations if Japan simply 
asks for revision of the agreement. In an "equal relationship" one 
side should not make complaints. Foregoing complaining will help 
forge a sound bilateral relationship. 
 
At the same time, the continuation of the present foreign policy 
will not strengthen the alliance. Japan is risk averse, for which 
reason it does not amend the Constitution such that it could make 
genuine contributions to the international community. 
 
In the run-up to Lower House election, debate has centered on such 
livelihood issues as pensions, nursing care, and roads. The people 
must not choose a party to take the reins of government without 
conducting serious discussions on how Japan should deal with the 
North Korean nuclear issue and China. Discussion of bread-and-butter 
issues is entirely different from discussion of the fate of the 
state. A state cannot be saved by that discussion alone. 
 
(5) 2009 Lower House election: My views on foreign and security 
policies: Japan must keep appropriate distance from U.S. and China 
 
Jitsuro Terashima 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
August 25, 2009 
 
It goes without saying that the Japan-U.S. alliance is the 
foundation of Japan's foreign policy. 
 
But current Japan-U.S. relations are excessively skewed toward 
military affairs. The new administration to be launched after the 
(Aug. 30) House of Representatives election is obliged to redesign 
the Japan-U.S. relationship, the foundation of Japan's foreign 
policy, according to the international situation of 
multi-polarization and non-polarization at the beginning of the 21st 
century. 
 
Because domestic politics became unstable in the 1990s, Japan was 
not able to redesign its relationship with U.S. before the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the United States and the rise of China. Japan 
opted for a policy of reinforcing its military ties with the United 
States and confronting China. Its rationale was that there was no 
other option than follow the U.S. lead. The country still adheres to 
this policy. 
 
The United States is now oriented toward "constructive involvement" 
rather than "confrontation" with China. Therefore, in dealing with 
the United States, it is essential for Japan to win the trust of 
other Asian countries including China. 
 
Rather than enhance the defense relationship Japan should keep an 
appropriate distance from both the United States and China while 
clearly asserting its position. That requires Japan to present a 
framework for the gradual reduction of U.S. bases in Japan and to 
revise the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement while not creating 
a military vacuum in Northeast Asia. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001966  008 OF 014 
 
 
The Cold War structure has collapsed, and 64 years have elapsed 
since the end of WWII. We must return to the common-sense view that 
the continued stationing of foreign troops in Japan is an abnormal 
situation. 
 
(6) Symposium on "Obama administration and Japan-U.S. relations" 
 
ASAHI (Page 37) (Full) 
August 26, 2009 
 
Following the appointments of high-level officials in the state and 
defense ministries in charge of Asian affairs, new U.S. Ambassador 
to Japan John Roos has arrived at his post. With Roos's arrival in 
his post, the lineup of the Obama administration's Japan policy team 
has now been formed. President Barack Obama is expected to visit 
Japan in November. In order to look ahead in the Japan-U.S. 
relationship, the Asahi Shimbun will invite to a symposium Daniel 
Okimoto, expert in Japanese politics and economy and a professor 
emeritus at Stanford University, who has close ties to Roos. 
 
Date and time: Sept. 17 (Thursday) 14:00 - 17:00 
Place:  Hamarikyu Asahi Hall in Tsukiji, Tokyo 
Host:   Yoichi Funabashi, chief editor of Asahi Shimbun 
Application:  Asahi com symposium page 
(http://www.asahi.com/sympo/) 
Free of charge 
Maximum capacity: 200 
Closing day: Sept. 4 
If there are a larger number of applicants than the application 
spot, a lottery will be drawn. The result of the lottery will be 
informed by mail. 
 
(7) Japan asked U.S. to keep documents on nuclear-related secret 
pact classified in 1999 
 
ASAHI (Top play) (Abridged slightly) 
August 26, 2009 
 
Nanae Kurashige 
 
In 1999 the United States declassified documents pertaining to the 
fundamental part of a "secret nuclear pact" with Japan, and Tokyo 
subsequently asked Washington to retract the declassification. The 
documents indicate that the two countries confirmed that Japan had 
agreed to allow U.S. warships and aircrafts carrying nuclear weapons 
to stop over in Japan without prior consultations. The U.S. 
Department of State relabeled the documents as classified soon after 
receiving the request from Japan. 
 
A source connected with the government at the time spoke of the 
sequence of events on the condition of anonymity. The fact that 
Japan asked the U.S. to keep the declassified documents under cover 
shows that Tokyo tried to keep the existence of the covert agreement 
a secret from the general public. From the perspective of 
information disclosure, it is certain that the government's 
consistent explanation that the secret nuclear pact does not exist 
will collapse and draw criticism. 
 
Included in the documents were "records of discussions on the 
Security Treaty" from 1959 in which Japan and the United States 
confirmed that Japan would continue to allow U.S. warships and 
aircrafts carrying nuclear weapons to stop over in and pass through 
 
TOKYO 00001966  009 OF 014 
 
 
Japan as before ahead of the conclusion of the revised U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty in 1960. These records were included in the 
documents that were prepared in June 1960 by the State Department 
Northeast Asian affairs department for the purpose of briefing 
Congress. They were believed to be prepared for then Secretary of 
State Christian Herter to use in answering questions when asking 
Congress for approval of the ratification of the revised security 
treaty. 
 
In principle, official U.S. documents must be declassified after 25 
years. The "set of documents" was declassified and their full text 
was open to the public until the fall of 1999. But on Dec. 13, 1999, 
only the secret pact-related part, including the "records on 
discussions," was re-categorized as classified supposedly because 
confidential security information was included in it. 
 
"As soon as (the government) became aware of the declassification of 
the documents, it asked the United States to retract it," the source 
connected with the government at the time said. He also said that 
the United States' decision to make documents public was lax, 
indicating that the circumstances in Japan were not taken into 
consideration in disclosing the documents. The request was made via 
diplomatic channels, according to the source. 
 
Meanwhile, a research fellow of the National Security Archive, an 
American independent non-governmental research institute pursuing 
information disclosure, made copies of the documents at the U.S. 
National Archives and Records Administration in November 1999, 
shortly before the documents were removed from the public disclosure 
records. The Asahi Shimbun obtained them and reported on the whole 
picture in August 2000. If it had not been for the copies, the 
contents of the documents would still have been in concealment 
today. 
 
"I am not in a position to comment," Yutaka Kawashima, grand 
chamberlain of Japan, said about the secret pact in an interview 
with the Asahi Shimbun last month. Kawashima was serving as 
administrative vice-foreign minister under Foreign Minister Yohei 
Kono in the Obuchi cabinet in December 1999. 
 
Comment by Masaaki Gabe, professor at the University of the Ryukyus: 
It is rare for diplomatic documents that were opened to the public 
in accordance with the State Department's proper procedures to be 
re-categorized as classified. Reports on the involvement of the 
Japanese government did not surprise me. Records on talks in 1963 
between then Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and U.S. Ambassador to 
Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, too, were moved out of the public eye 
after being declassified temporarily. There are other cases in which 
the Japanese government's involvement is also suspected. 
 
In principle, the United States discloses all official documents, 
whereas Japan selectively makes government documents public. Vital 
parts of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Okinawa 
Reversion Agreement, and Japan-U.S. defense cooperation have not 
been disclosed. As researchers, we can learn about what took place 
during U.S.-Japan talks through documents that were disclosed in the 
United States. What has been preventing Japan from disclosing (the 
secret pact) all this time? If the government is going to continue 
denying the existence of the pact, why does that part not exist in 
Japan? The government must demonstrate its accountability. 
 
(8) Editorial: Political parties should keep in mind retreat of 
 
TOKYO 00001966  010 OF 014 
 
 
postal reforms will bring about major loss 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
August 26, 2009 
 
The government's postal reform plans, which obtained public support 
in the House of Representatives election four years ago, are likely 
to be revised significantly after the upcoming Lower House election. 
If the reform momentum wanes and if the bureaucracy-controlled 
financial system is preserved, Japan will find it more difficult to 
improve the conditions of its economy, now faced with such issues as 
the rapidly aging society and intense global competition. 
 
In the previous postal-reform-centered Lower House election, (the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by) then prime minister Junichiro 
Koizumi won an overwhelming victory. After this election, the 
government began to offer privatized postal services in October 2007 
under a system of four companies placed under Japan Post Holdings 
Co. The four businesses are Kampo Life Insurance Company, Postal 
Savings Company, Mail Delivery Company, and OTC Services Company. 
But in the campaigning for the upcoming election, the ruling and 
opposition parties have vowed to revise their initial stances to one 
degree or another. 
 
With an eye on taking over the reins of government, the DPJ promises 
in its policy manifesto to sweepingly revise the nation's postal 
services. The party proposes to offer postal, savings and insurance 
services in an integrated manner by freezing such plans as listing 
stocks of Postal Savings Co. and Kamp Life Insurance Co. planned on 
the market in fiscal 2010 and selling the government's shares in 
these two companies and Japan Post. 
 
The DPJ made the proposals in response to public criticism of the 
planned abolition of post offices and mail-delivery service 
degradation. In addition, the party apparently gave priority to 
garnering votes linked to the postal business through election 
cooperation with the People's New Party (PNP), which has opposed the 
privatization of postal services, and to forming a coalition 
government with the Social Democratic Party and the PNP. Given that 
there is a group in favor of postal privatization within the party, 
a senior party member said: "We will not turn the businesses into 
state-run or public corporations again. But the party has yet to 
present a clear post-reform vision about what business form they 
will take. 
 
If a government led by the DPJ is inaugurated and if the planned 
sales of its shares in the companies are delayed from late September 
2017, it means the government's involvement in the businesses will 
be prolonged and will eventually undermine the postal reform's 
principle of shifting the flow of money from the government to the 
private sector. 
 
The LDP's manifesto specifies that the party will maintain the 
four-company system but notes: "We will take measures to secure 
offering postal, savings and insurance services in an integrated 
manner." The party thus indicates a willingness to revise its 
conventional policy. Some party members have taken action while 
bearing in mind the recent trend of postal service-related votes 
leaving from the LDP, for instance, Internal Affairs & 
Communications Minister Tsutomu Sato's reference to a review of the 
four-business system. The LDP's scenario for postal privatization is 
also extremely unclear. 
 
TOKYO 00001966  011 OF 014 
 
 
 
Steadily privatizing postal services is indispensable for 
sustainable economic growth. The bureaucracy-controlled financial 
system, under which huge funds collected with the backing of the 
government are injected into ineffective projects and public 
investment, has shown its limitation. It is necessary to give 
consideration to local users of postal services, but the burden on 
the people will never be reduced without efforts to effectuate the 
services. 
 
Under the current situation, large portions of the postal savings 
and Kamp insurance premiums have been used to float government 
bonds. Unless this situation is altered, the structure of the 
Japanese economy will never be improved. The LDP and the DPJ should 
keep in mind that the retreat of postal reform will bring about a 
major loss to Japan in the future 
 
(9) Four wise men behind Obama's Prague speech in April on "world 
without nuclear weapons" 
 
GAIKO FORUM (Pages 42-44) (Slightly abridged) 
August 2009 
 
Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Nihon Keizai Shimbun editorial staff 
 
The road to "a world without nuclear weapons" - Behind this grand 
strategy proposed by President Barack Obama, leader of the only 
country that has used a nuclear bomb, the United States, is the 
notion of U.S. experts that nuclear bombs are inhuman and should not 
be used from a moral standpoint. How did this notion come to the 
attention of the President and become a concrete policy goal? We 
examined this process based on testimonies from parties involved 
with this affair. 
 
Legacy of Reykjavik 
 
In September 2006, three foreign policy and security experts were 
having dinner in a corner of the Stanford University campus in 
northern California. They were George Schultz, known as the 
heavyweight secretary of state during the Reagan administration, 
William Perry, secretary of defense during the Clinton 
administration, and Sidney Drell, a physicist turned expert on 
nuclear disarmament and arms management. Just when everyone was 
having a good time at the dinner, Schultz suddenly noted: 
 
"This year marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S.-Soviet summit in 
Reykjavik. Can we not examine the 'significance' of that summit on 
this occasion?" 
 
Schultz, who was present at the Reykjavik Summit, remembered clearly 
that Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev used the words 
"eradication of nuclear arms." He was wondering if such a 
possibility should not be pursued once again in the 21st Century. 
Perry and Drell, who thought that Schultz's proposal was a great 
idea, immediately suggested holding a workshop of experts at 
Stanford University. 
 
After the small workshop ended, Perry put forward two goals for the 
future: hold a similar workshop one year later and publish the 
points discussed at the workshop. 
 
Here, Schultz set a further condition to Perry's proposal. Among the 
 
TOKYO 00001966  012 OF 014 
 
 
many participants in the workshop, there were many "dyed-in-the-wool 
Democrats" (in Perry's words), including former Democratic senator 
Sam Nunn, who was responsible for passing the Nunn-Lugar Act 
supporting the safe management of the nuclear weapons of the former 
Soviet Union. Schultz was the only Republican. 
 
Schultz wanted the position paper to be produced by the workshop to 
be "bipartisan," so he invited former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, who was known to have studied issues relating to nuclear 
capability since his days at Harvard University, to join the group. 
Schultz, Perry, Nunn, and Kissinger later came to be known as the 
"four wise men" who drew up a scenario for the complete eradication 
of nuclear arms. 
 
Encounter with Obama 
 
An op ed signed by the four was published in the U.S. paper Wall 
Street Journal in early 2007. In this appeal entitled "Toward a 
Nuclear-Free World," Schultz, Perry, et al enumerated the following 
specific policy goals: (1) drastic cuts in the nuclear capability of 
the nuclear powers; (2) eliminate tactical nuclear weapons in the 
allies and friends of the United States and Russia; (3) U.S. 
ratification of the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty); 
and (4) complete stop in the production of fissile materials used in 
weapons. 
 
As expected by Perry and his group, there was a deluge of positive 
response from all over the world to this article dealing with the 
momentous subject of "eradication of nuclear arms." Groups modeled 
after the American workshop were launched in the UK, Germany, 
Russia, and India, and they all asked for cooperation from Perry's 
group. 
 
Needless to say, the proposal of the four wise men also became a 
great sensation in the United States. Amid the heated debate on the 
pros and cons, Perry noticed that one senator stood out in his 
positive response. His name was Barack Obama. Obama, who had already 
decided at that time to run in the 2008 U.S. presidential election, 
called Perry's office several times subsequently to seek his advice 
on drawing up a blueprint for the eradication of nuclear arms. 
 
Perry made the following promise to Obama: "Senator, I am an old man 
over 80 years of age. On condition that even if you get elected, I 
will not assume an important government position, I am willing to 
help in whatever way I can." 
 
Perry left the job of briefing Republican presidential candidate 
John McCain to Schultz, and was exchanging views frequently with the 
Obama camp's foreign policy and security advisers, including former 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Eventually, Obama's campaign 
advisers began drafting concrete "ideas for a comprehensive policy 
to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime" (in the words of 
an Obama administration official) based on the four wise men's 
paper. 
 
Bipartisan committee launched 
 
At about the same time, an idea emerged in the U.S. Congress that a 
bipartisan committee should be formed to discuss the nuclear issues. 
Perry, who became the chair of the Congressional Commission on the 
Strategic Posture of the United States, devoted himself to drawing 
up a concrete strategy for a nuclear-free world, dividing his time 
 
TOKYO 00001966  013 OF 014 
 
 
between the group of four wise men and the Congressional 
commission. 
 
Perry is a mathematician by training and is known for his promotion 
of the development of stealth fighters. His approach was based on a 
realistic geopolitical viewpoint. He called this "lead and hedge." 
 
To reach the "distant summit" (in the words of Perry) of eradication 
of all nuclear weapons, a base camp needs to be built, and "two 
paths" consisting of: (1) the maintenance of deterrence; and (2) 
reinforcing arms management and the non-proliferation regime, will 
be built from this base camp toward the reduction of nuclear arms. 
This "base camp concept" came to be supported by a certain measure 
of consensus at the bipartisan Congressional commission. 
 
It will be difficult to achieve the elimination of all nuclear 
weapons without a dramatic geopolitical change on earth. It is 
necessary to maintain nuclear deterrence not only for America, but 
expanded deterrence (nuclear umbrella) will also have to be 
maintained for allies and friendly countries. The "strategic 
ambiguity" on the "first use of nuclear weapons" will have to be 
maintained for the time being. 
 
The recommendations in the final report issued by the Congressional 
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States on May 6, 
2009 point to the fact that there will be many twists and turns and 
difficult problems on the path to a "nuclear-free world." 
 
Prague speech 
 
One month before Perry and his group submitted their final report, 
Obama, the 44th president of the United States was in Prague, 
capital of the Czech Republic in East Europe, on April 6. There, he 
gave a policy speech on realizing "a world without nuclear weapons," 
a policy he had been advocating since the presidential election 
campaign, and called on the world for cooperation. 
 
He cited specifically the ratification of the CTBT, which the 
Clinton and Bush administrations had given up on, and negotiations 
for a new treaty on ending the production of fissile materials for 
weapon use, declaring that the U.S. will exert utmost efforts for 
the eradication of nuclear arms. 
 
Furthermore, Obama became the first U.S. president to talk about the 
"moral responsibility of the only nuclear power to have used a 
nuclear weapon" because the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki during World War II. 
 
Obama stated the above unequivocally even after receiving reports 
that some 8,000 kilometers from Prague, North Korea had fired its 
long-range ballistic missile "Taepodong-2" into the Pacific Ocean. 
His resolute stance came as a "pleasant surprise" even to Perry, who 
had advised Obama on the path to "a world without nuclear weapons." 
 
About a week before the Prague speech, Perry visited Moscow with the 
other three wise men. During their meeting with President Dmitriy 
Medvedev at the Kremlin, they were bombarded with enthusiastic 
questions from the president on their vision of a "nuclear-free 
world." 
 
Perry and his partners sensed Medvedev's sincerity when he stated 
forcefully that he would like to realize START (Strategic Arms 
 
TOKYO 00001966  014 OF 014 
 
 
Reduction Treaty) III with the U.S. A few hours later, Kissinger had 
a separate meeting with the "real power holder in Russia" Premier 
Vladimir Putin. He whispered to Perry later: "Putin is also 
positive. I think we can safely conclude that there are no 
contradictions or differences between Medvedev and Putin on this 
issue (nuclear disarmament)." 
 
Top priority issue 
 
On May 19, 2009, Obama invited the four wise men to his office in 
the White House to seek their advice on policies for achieving "a 
world without nuclear weapons." 
 
Obama, who was then facing an unprecedented economic crisis, with 
the symbol of American manufacturing industries General Motors 
filing for bankruptcy protection, but he devoted 90 minutes to his 
meeting with the four wise men despite his extremely tight schedule. 
Seeing that Obama did not use any notes at all and expressed his 
thoughts eloquently in his own words, Perry felt once again that 
"this president is serious." 
 
The four wise men, who are planning to visit Beijing to meet 
President Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders this fall through 
Kissinger's mediation, made two policy recommendations to Obama at 
the meeting on what needs to be done for now, namely: "comprehensive 
strategic dialogue" with Russia, including on nuclear disarmament, 
and the maintenance of expanded deterrence (nuclear umbrella) for 
Japan and other allies. 
 
"The United States will cooperate with Russia and other countries to 
play a leading role in eliminating the nuclear threat." 
 
After stressing to reporters his determination to achieve "a world 
without nuclear weapons" in the above terms, based on the advice of 
Perry and his group, Obama related his conviction to the four wise 
men: "This issue is one of my top four priorities." 
 
ROOS