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Viewing cable 09TOKYO1893, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/17/09

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO1893 2009-08-17 21:32 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4706
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1893/01 2292132
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 172132Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5480
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8238
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5908
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 9716
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 3330
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6420
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0453
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7116
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6747
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 001893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/17/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(14) U.S. Ambassador to NATO: U.S. will not request SDF dispatch to 
Afghanistan (Yomiuri) 
(15) U.S. Ambassador to NATO: emphasis on practical advantage in 
contributing to Afghanistan; high marks for Japan's financial 
contribution (Yomiuri) 
(16) Defense Ministry to deploy PAC-3 missiles across Japan (Sankei) 
 
(17) U.S. wards off criticism against ex-President Clinton's visit 
by not easing sanctions on North Korea (Asahi) 
(18) Former senior MOFA official: MOFA should give explanation to 
the people on the secret nuclear agreement (Asahi) 
(19) DPJ plans to integrate nuclear administration, such as R&D, 
into METI (Sankei) 
(20) Three opposition parties to focus on shift away from Koizumi 
reforms (Yomiuri) 
(21) Environment Ministry views reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80% in 40 years as possible (Mainichi) 
(22) Government to provide yen loan for port infrastructure 
construction in Cambodia (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(14) U.S. Ambassador to NATO: U.S. will not request SDF dispatch to 
Afghanistan 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
August 16, 2009 
 
In an exclusive interview with the Yomiuri Shimbun on the 14th U.S. 
Ambassador to NATO Daalder disclosed that the Obama administration 
is not planning to request Japan make a military contribution to 
Afghanistan. He remarked that the possibility of the dispatch of the 
Self-Defense Forces to Afghanistan "has not even come up during 
private meetings." 
 
While noting "Japan's unique history" and expressing understanding 
for the large constraints placed on the Self-Defense Forces, the 
ambassador said he hoped Japan would continue and expand its past 
help with reconstruction through financial assistance and dispatch 
of civilian experts. The Bush administration had floated the idea of 
Japan's dispatching such things as transport planes, but Ambassador 
Daalder remarked that "every country should decide on its own 
weighty matters such as the mobilization of military forces." 
 
Mr. Daalder, who was in charge of formulating foreign policy for the 
Obama camp during the presidential election, assumed the post in 
May. 
 
(15) U.S. Ambassador to NATO: emphasis on practical advantage in 
contributing to Afghanistan; high marks for Japan's financial 
contribution 
 
YOMIURI (Page 6) (Full) 
August 16, 2009 
 
Ivo Daaler, the brains behind President Obama's foreign diplomacy 
and the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, indicated that behind the U.S. 
decision not to press Japan for a military contribution to 
Afghanistan was an alliance strategy of "emphasis on practical 
advantage" -- which draws on each country's area of specialty -- 
 
TOKYO 00001893  002 OF 009 
 
 
while avoiding friction between allies. 
 
The ambassador remarked that any contribution to the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan would be appreciated, drawing a sharp distinction 
between the current administration and the previous Bush 
administration, whose pressuring countries to send more (forces) 
invited a backlash in Europe. In addition, he indicated that the 
stabilization of Afghanistan was "a joint responsibility of the 
international community," and that a unified strategy in which 
allied countries mutually complement one another is desirable. 
 
He pointed out that "in spite of legal and political constraints, 
there are many ways a country like Japan can make a contribution." 
He particularly gave high marks to Japan's contributing 
approximately 125 million dollars to pay the salaries of about 
80,000 Afghan police officers for half a year. 
 
He called for a "global response to globalized threats,' and 
indicated that in the future he would continue to actively promote 
extra-regional missions such as the Afghan mission and anti-piracy 
operations in the waters off Somalia. 
 
He said there would be no change to the structure in which allies, 
including Japan and other non-NATO countries, cooperate by 
contributing troops or funds even for future military operations. He 
stressed that failing to make a contribution to international 
security, that  is, "taking a free ride," would not be tolerated. 
 
(16) Defense Ministry to deploy PAC-3 missiles across Japan 
 
SANKEI (Top play) (Excerpts) 
August 16, 2009 
 
The Ministry of Defense decided yesterday to deploy Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3 (PAC-3) ground-to-air missiles throughout the country 
as part of a missile defense (MD) system. The step is intended to 
increase the country's capabilities to deal with contingencies, with 
the threat from North Korea in mind. Funds for additional defense 
equipment will be included in the ministry's budgetary request for 
fiscal 2010. The Air Self-Defense Force's (ASDF) air defense missile 
groups, which include some PAC-2 units to intercept aircrafts, will 
all be equipped with PAC-3 missiles, and the units will be 
streamlined as well. 
 
The ministry had originally planned to introduce the PAC-3 to the 
ASDF's three air defense missile groups out of its six groups in the 
nation. In fiscal 2006-2007, the ministry completed deploying the 
PAC-3 in the 1st Air Defense Missile Group in Saitama Prefecture 
covering the Tokyo metropolitan area. The original plan also 
included deploying the system to the 4th Air Defense Missile group 
in Gifu Prefecture defending the Nagoya-Osaka area and to the 2nd 
group in Kasuga, Fukuoka Prefecture, covering northern Kyushu, in 
fiscal 2008-2010. 
 
This deployment plan was intended to give top priority to defending 
the nation's major cities full of political and economic nerve 
centers from ballistic missile attacks. The ministry planned to 
maintain the remaining 3rd group in Chitose, Hokkaido, 6th group in 
Misawa, Aomori Prefecture, and 5th group in Naha as PAC-2 units to 
intercept enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, North Korea launched a 
long-range ballistic missile in April and seven mid-range missiles 
in July, including a Nodong that is capable of reaching Japan. North 
 
TOKYO 00001893  003 OF 009 
 
 
Korea has deployed some 2,000 Nodong missiles. There is also an 
observation that the North has successfully developed a nuclear 
warhead small enough to fit onto a missile. 
 
Given the situation, the Defense Ministry has recognized the need to 
expand the PAC-3 defense network nationwide and to equip all its six 
air defense missile groups with PAC-3 missiles. 
 
Viewpoint 
 
Naohisa Hanzawa 
 
The Defense Ministry's plan to deploy the PAC-3 system across the 
nation clearly shows the government's determination to defend the 
Japanese people from ballistic missile attacks. PAC-2 missiles are 
incapable of intercepting incoming Nodong missiles. It can be said 
that the ministry has made an appropriate change to its original 
plan in order to eliminate the threat from North Korea, which is 
becoming increasingly belligerent. 
 
(17) U.S. wards off criticism against ex-President Clinton's visit 
by not easing sanctions on North Korea 
 
ASAHI (Page 9) (Full) 
August 15, 2009 
 
Yusuke Murayama, Washington; Yoshihiro Makino, Seoul; Tetsuya 
Hakoda, Tokyo 
 
The United States has not shown any signs of easing sanctions on 
North Korea after the surprise visit of former President Bill 
Clinton to the DPRK, which resulted in the release of two female 
American reporters. It announced on August 13 that a senior State 
Department official will be visiting Japan, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), and other countries to make sure that sanctions are being 
implemented thoroughly. On the other hand, North Korea has been 
quietly expressing its hopes for the resumption of dialogue with the 
U.S. While the U.S. is very likely to take the same posture from now 
on, the Japanese and ROK governments have begun to step up their 
"preparations," in case there is a sudden breakthrough in U.S.-DPRK 
dialogue. 
 
On August 13, Philip Goldberg, U.S. government coordinator for the 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1874, announced his visit to 
Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and the ROK from next week, stressing 
that the sanctions will not be relaxed. One week after Clinton's 
visit to North Korea, the Department of the Treasury had just added 
a North Korean bank rumored to handle the "secret funds" of General 
Secretary Kim Jong Il to the sanction list on August 11. 
 
Increasing criticism from conservatives against the Clinton visit is 
behind the U.S. government's maintaining its tough stance. In an 
article contributed to a U.S. paper, former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger denounced the trip for "enabling Kim Jong Il to convey to 
North Koreans, and perhaps other countries, that his country is 
being accepted into the international community, which is precisely 
the opposite of (the U.S. goal of the DPRK) abandoning its nuclear 
weapons program." 
 
In response to such criticism, presidential national security 
adviser James Jones has been appearing on all major TV programs to 
explain that, "While North Korea may use (the visit) for its own 
 
TOKYO 00001893  004 OF 009 
 
 
purposes domestically, it is clear internationally that the visit 
was for the purpose of rescuing the reporters." Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton also made efforts to calm things down during her 
visit to Africa, saying that, "We have absolutely not given (North 
Korea) any rewards." 
 
The U.S. government is stressing that "the visit to North Korea is 
not related to policy on the DPRK," (Secretary Clinton) and has 
conveyed to the governments of Japan and the ROK that: (1) 
resumption of U.S.-DPRK dialogue is premised on the latter's return 
to the Six-Party Talks; and (2) sanctions on North Korea will 
continue. However, details of the discussions between ex-President 
Clinton and Kim, which reportedly lasted for 3 hours and 15 minutes, 
have not been revealed. 
 
A diplomatic source in Seoul points out that: "Even if Mr. Clinton 
did not make any political statements, it is fully possible that 
North Korea might have made concrete proposals. The U.S. government 
is probably analyzing them meticulously, along with an analysis of 
the condition of General Secretary Kim's health." 
 
Even senior U.S. government officials who are pushing for sanctions 
are saying that "North Korea indicated its willingness to improve 
relations (during the visit)." Despite the U.S. government's tough 
stance, it appears certain that the gap between the U.S. and the 
DPRK regarding "finding a solution through dialogue" has been 
narrowed. Although the DPRK has declared its withdrawal from the 
Six-Party Talks, it will still be possible to conduct dialogue by 
remaining ambiguous over the point of whether the dialogue is within 
the Six-Party Talks framework or not. 
 
Since direct U.S.-DPRK dialogue has been instrumental for breaking 
out of past deadlocks on several occasions, Japan and the ROK are 
concerned that the U.S. and the DPRK may go ahead with their own 
talks. There is now an opinion in the ROK government that, "We 
should take steps to improve North-South relations, such as by 
giving humanitarian aid or resuming the project for the reunion of 
separated families, in order not to be left behind in the process." 
 
The U.S. government has been saying that "the ball is now in North 
Korea's court" (State Department Deputy Spokesman Robert Wood), 
urging North Korea to soften its attitude. A ROK government official 
describes the present situation as follows: "The ball is indeed in 
North Korea's court, but the U.S. holds the key to what sort of ball 
North Korea will be made to throw." 
 
(18) Former senior MOFA official: MOFA should give explanation to 
the people on the secret nuclear agreement 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
August 15, 2009 
 
Notes written by Kazuhiko Togo, visiting professor at Kyoto Sangyo 
University; former director general of Treaties Bureau and European 
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former ambassador to 
the Netherlands 
 
I was the director general of the Treaties Bureau (now the 
International Legal Affairs Bureau) of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) from July 1998 to August 1999. In addition to my 
regular duties, I was responsible for sorting out the enormous 
amount of documents that were left behind by past Treaties Bureau 
 
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chiefs in the course of their demanding job. 
 
From each of the three divisions in the Bureau one administrative 
officer was assigned to help me, and we spent a month selecting the 
most important documents. We sorted them in a user-friendly manner 
through comparison with the special transition documents left by my 
predecessor. We devoted the most effort to sorting materials 
relating to the conclusion and implementation of the Japan-U.S. 
security treaty. Among the many sensitive materials, those relating 
to the secret agreement on bringing nuclear arms into Japan, 
allegedly signed at the time of the conclusion of the security 
treaty in 1960, were extraordinary in volume. 
 
I will not comment on whether the so-called secret agreement was 
included in MOFA's files because I think there are more important 
issues. 
 
Maintaining "ambiguity" 
 
Actually, what is the essence of the secret-agreement issue? 
 
There was a gap between the Japanese and U.S. governments on the 
scope of the introduction of nuclear weapons. 
 
However, the two governments refrained from making this gap public. 
The Japanese side has continued to state its belief that "unless 
there has been a request for prior consultation, nuclear arms have 
not been introduced." Neither has the U.S. side addressed this issue 
squarely. 
 
By maintaining "ambiguity," Japan was able to fully maintain its 
security amid the Soviet threat in an age when national sentiment 
was opposed to nuclear weapons and proceed on the path of economic 
reconstruction. The significance of this should be taken into 
consideration. 
 
Furthermore, I believe that the time has come to end the argument 
over the consistency of the government's statements to the Diet 
concerning the existence or non-existence of the secret agreement. 
 
Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, Japan has evolved from 
its response during the Gulf War, termed "Japan's defeat" because of 
the tardiness of the response, to prompt cooperation with the U.S. 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The North Korean threat has 
emerged, and Chinese military power is on the rise. This is an era 
when Japan and the U.S. are discussing expanded deterrence, 
including the nuclear umbrella. The new Obama administration is 
advocating the eradication of nuclear weapons, and in this regard, 
initiatives by Japan are desired. This is the time to think about 
the meaning of "not introducing" nuclear weapons, one of the three 
non-nuclear principles of "not possessing, producing, or introducing 
nuclear arms." 
 
The past should be dealt with in the context of a future-oriented 
approach. Under such an approach, the people should receive an 
explanation of whether the secret document existed in MOFA's files 
and of how my predecessors dealt with this issue. I believe the onus 
for giving this explanation primarily rests with my former 
colleagues at MOFA. 
 
Destroyed documents should be restored 
 
 
TOKYO 00001893  006 OF 009 
 
 
However, according to media reports, a senior MOFA official ordered 
the destruction of all documents relating to this issue in 2001. I 
would be astounded if that's true. 
 
Among the documents I sorted were ones pertaining to MOFA officials' 
painstaking debate on how to reconcile popular sentiment with the 
Japan-U.S. alliance. There were also records written by my father 
Fumihiko Togo, who was the division chief in charge of the security 
treaty in the early 1960s, reportedly the period when the secret 
agreement was signed, as well as documents written by past directors 
general of the Treaties Bureau. Heated debates had taken place when 
the statements of La Rocque and Reischauer were made. There were 
many documents that deserved to be perused with great care. 
 
Should we not learn from our predecessors and present new policies 
by making the best use of their wisdom? If the media reports are 
true, I think MOFA should restore the old documents in the process 
of formulating new policy and reproduce the records of the 
negotiation process. 
 
I think foreign policy not firmly rooted in the past will have no 
future. 
 
(19) DPJ plans to integrate nuclear administration, such as R&D, 
into METI 
 
SANKEI (Page 1) (Abridged) 
August 16, 2009 
 
The major opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has decided to 
shift the control of research and development of nuclear energy, 
which now rests with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science, and Technology (MEXT), to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI) if it takes power in the upcoming House of 
Representatives election. By integrating the METI-controlled 
commercial use and development of nuclear energy, the step is 
designed to increase the efficiency of nuclear administration, to 
enhance the safety of nuclear power generation, and to develop the 
nuclear industry. Coordination is underway in the DPJ to centralize 
the Cabinet Office Nuclear Energy Council and other bodies at METI 
in the future. The country's nuclear administration is likely to 
undergo a major transformation with the establishment of a DPJ 
administration. 
 
Under the current system, the Cabinet Office Nuclear Energy Council 
and other bodies formulate basic nuclear policies. Based on those 
policies, the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy in METI 
oversees the commercial area, including nuclear power generation. 
Meanwhile, MEXT, which is responsible for the R&D of nuclear power 
generation, has jurisdiction over Monju, the country's only fast 
breeder, in Fukui Prefecture. 
 
Once it takes the helm of government, the DPJ intends to integrate 
the government's policy planning and supervisory functions that are 
currently split between the commercial and R&D areas. 
 
By combining the administrative functions that are divided between 
METI and MEXT, the DPJ plans to implement comprehensive nuclear 
policies ranging from development to commercial use, as well as to 
shore up efforts for safety and for developing the nuclear power 
industry. Additionally, the DPJ intends to boost efforts to branch 
out overseas by nuclear plant makers, such as Toshiba Corp., Hitachi 
 
TOKYO 00001893  007 OF 009 
 
 
Ltd., and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., and power companies. 
 
(20) Three opposition parties to focus on shift away from Koizumi 
reforms 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Excerpts) 
August 15, 2009 
 
A feature of the common policies for the upcoming House of 
Representatives election, which three opposition parties - the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Social Democratic Party (SDP), and 
People's New Party (PNP) - revealed on Aug. 14, is a policy of 
shifting away from the structural reform policy, which has been 
implemented by the government since the Koizumi cabinet, including a 
review of the social security system and postal privatization 
program, which led to employment uncertainty and the collapse of 
local economies. The common policies also include a pledge not to 
raise the consumption tax rate, so it is still uncertain how fiscal 
resources for household support, including a child allowance 
program, will be secured. There still remains a cause of concern 
because they did not mention foreign policy or national security. 
 
With regard to the postal privatization program, the coalition 
government of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito has 
said that it will achieve complete privatization by selling off the 
shares of Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance Co. Reforming 
this policy in their common policies, the two parties aims to 
continue to involve the government in the two financial companies 
through Japan Post. Their view is that if it is possible to manage 
the two financial companies and Japan Post Network as a unit, it 
will be easier to protect local post offices. 
 
However, since Japan Post Holdings Group Co. has started management 
with an eye on the listing of stock and complete privatization of 
the two financial companies, the cancellation of complete 
privatization and selling of shares could have a major impact on 
markets and economic circles. 
 
Abolishing the present health insurance system for people aged 75 or 
older will be difficult. The DPJ had said that it will reintroduce 
the old insurance system for the elderly and look into creating a 
new system. However, the party just stipulates in the common 
policies that the nation will bear the burden of an increase in the 
national insurance fees caused by abolishing the present health 
insurance system. 
 
The three parties will discuss diplomatic and security policy in 
consultations on forming a coalition government after the general 
election, according to DPJ Policy Research Committee Chairman 
Masayuki Naoshima. If the DPJ wins the Lower House election, the new 
prime minister is expected to visit the United States in late 
September to attend the G-20 financial summit, the United Nations 
General Assembly session, and a U.S.-Japan summit. 
 
(21) Environment Ministry views reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80% in 40 years as possible 
 
MAINICHI (Page 1) (Full) 
August 15, 2009 
 
The Environment Ministry yesterday released its draft plan that 
includes specific measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% 
 
TOKYO 00001893  008 OF 009 
 
 
from 2005 levels by 2050. The ministry notes that even if the 
nation's gross domestic product's (GDP) growth rate stays at 1-2%, 
it will be possible to attain the 80% reduction goal by means of 
replacing all vehicles with eco-friendly ones as a measure to cut 
back on the use of fossil fuels (such as oil) and boosting the 
volume of electricity produced by solar power by 120 to 140 times 
more than 2005 levels as a measure to save energy. 
 
The declaration issued by the July Group of Eight (G-8) summit in 
L'Aquila, Italy proposed decreasing the total volume of greenhouse 
gases emitted by all industrialized countries by more than 80% by 
2050. The ministry drafted the plan based on this pledge. 
 
The Environment Ministry views a reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80% as possible if the nation takes such measures as 
slashing the amount of energy used by 40% and introduces renewable 
energy (such as solar power and natural energy). The ministry 
envisions two different scenarios for Japan in 2050: (1) a society 
in which the population and capital are concentrated in urban areas 
as a result of priority given to economic growth; and (2) a society 
in which the population and capital are dispersed to local areas as 
a result of people pursuing comfortable lives. 
 
The first scenario is premised on an annualized growth rate of 2%. 
Under this scenario, the ministry sets the ratio of renewable energy 
to all energy consumed at 28% and the ratio of nuclear power at 26%. 
In this scenario, it would be necessary to increase the amounts of 
electricity produced by solar power and nuclear power by 120 times 
and 1.4 times over 2005 levels, respectively. The ministry also 
proposes replacing all vehicles with eco-friendly ones. 
 
The second scenario is premised on an annualized growth rate of 1%. 
Under this scenario, renewable energy would account for 40% of all 
energy consumed, and the ratio of nuclear power would be 26%. It 
would be necessary to increase the amounts of electricity produced 
by solar power and by nuclear power by 140 times and 1.2 times over 
2005 levels, respectively. As for autos, the ministry sets the 
ratios of electricity cars and highbred cars at 50% each. In both 
scenarios, the usage rate of public means of transportation would be 
raised to 50% (a 10-point increase from 2000). Environment Minister 
Tetsuo Saito said: "Industrialized countries are obligated to attain 
(the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by) 80%. Attaining 
this goal is the only way for Japan to survive." 
 
(22) Government to provide yen loan for port infrastructure 
construction in Cambodia 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
August 16, 2009 
 
The government has decided to extend a yen loan to Cambodia for its 
project to expand and improve Sihanoukville Port so that it can 
accommodate large-sized ships in response to a growing volume of 
cargo. Cambodia has been actively promoting forestation for 
papermaking by Japanese companies and also the exploitation of crude 
oil and natural gas offshore. It is aiming to improve the 
environment with an eye on exports of such products to Japan in the 
future. 
 
Small in scale and superannuated, Sihanoukville Port can't keep up 
with demand for handling such products as iron steel, coal, and 
grain. The Japanese government plans to construct a facility capable 
 
TOKYO 00001893  009 OF 009 
 
 
of dealing with bulk cargos in the range of 50,000 tons bulk. It 
aims to complete the work in 2014 with a goal of a handling capacity 
of 11.2 billion tons in cargo, a six-fold increase from 2007, in 
2016. 
 
The government intends to provide Cambodia with a loan of as much as 
7,176 million yen through the Japan Industrial Cooperation Agency 
(JICA). It would be the largest such loan ever to Cambodia. 
 
The yen loan has a repayment period of 40 years with annual interest 
of 0.01%. JICA and the Cambodian government are scheduled to sign a 
contract on August 21. 
 
Cambodia's moderate weather bodes well for the future growth of the 
export of woodchips for papermaking. Japanese companies are also 
considering making inroads into Cambodia. Off Sihanoukville Port, 
Mitsui Oil Exploitation and other companies are developing oil and 
natural gas fields, so they have high expectations for Sihanoukville 
as a port for the export of such natural resources. 
 
ZUMWALT