VZCZCXRO2410
PP RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #1882/01 2260736
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 140736Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5457
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT  PRIORITY
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001882 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD FOR OSD/APSA - 
GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASALLA/ARAKEL IAN 
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 - MILLER 
STATE FOR EAP, PM/ISN 
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5 
USFK FOR J00/J01/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR MNUC KN KS JA
SUBJECT: PART 3 OF 4 -- ASD (APSA) GREGSON PARTICIPATES IN 
JULY 16-17 U.S.-JAPAN-ROK DEFENSE TRILATERAL TALKS 
 
REF: A. 08 SECDEF 8291 
     ¶B. TOKYO 1879 
     ¶C. TOKYO 1881 
 
Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 ( 
b/d) 
 
Please see Tokyo 1879 and 1881 for parts 1 and 2 of this 
cable. 
 
¶25.  (S) To manage the situation, Takahashi continued, it 
will be necessary for the United States, Japan, and the ROK 
to disrupt the DPRK's nuclear endeavors, coordinate on 
responses to actions, and maintain clear defense postures for 
deterrence.  It will especially be important to have a 
toolbox of measures to deploy should there be a sudden change 
in the situation, such as regime collapse, Takahashi 
asserted.  He recommended the following as areas for 
trilateral cooperation: continuing the DTT; coordinating 
responses and sharing information on DPRK's missile 
development; sharing information to implement UNSCR 1874; 
sharing future scenarios; cooperating on the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI); and engaging in trilateral 
humanitarian and disaster relief (HA/DR), search and rescue, 
and counter-piracy exercises. 
 
¶26.  (S) MOD DG Takamizawa commented that it will be 
important to respond appropriately to North Korean 
provocations.  Calm responses might not always be the answer 
as they may signal to the DPRK that the United States, Japan, 
and the ROK are not taking Pyongyang's bait, hence 
emboldening the DPRK further.  Takamizawa also noted that 
even if Japan did not pass the cargo inspection bill, due to 
the current domestic political situation, Japan could still 
legally take other action such as conducting surveillance 
flights and sharing information that would help implement 
UNSCR 1874. 
 
¶27.  (S) MOFA DDG Tomita said the overall goal is to resolve 
the North Korean issue by diplomatic means and that the 
Six-Party Talks and China's bilateral engagement with the 
DPRK should continue.  He lamented, however, that these 
efforts have not changed the DPRK's behavior and that Kim 
Jong-il's failing health and a possible succession would put 
a diplomatic solution further out of reach.  UN Security 
Council Resolutions are the most legal and powerful political 
weapons available to the international community for 
preventing the DPRK from becoming a nuclear state, Tomita 
continued.  When the UNSC takes action, even nations like 
Libya, Sudan and Iran cannot consider the DPRK's actions 
legitimate.  China, Tomita noted, will continue to  pressure 
the DPRK to avoid becoming isolated in the UNSC.  Beijing is 
pressed into action when it perceives possible instability on 
its borders or in the region that could disrupt its economic 
growth.  While it is hard to simulate such instability, it is 
important that the United States, ROK, and Japan show China 
that the three countries are serious and have a firm resolve 
toward North Korea.  Given Kim Jong-il's failing health and 
the possibility of instability in North Korea, perhaps it is 
time to deepen trilateral discussions on potential regime 
collapse scenarios for which the United States, Japan, and 
ROK would shoulder most of the response burden, Tomita 
offered. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Response to North Korea: U.S. Briefs 
------------------------------------ 

¶28.  (S) DASD Schiffer provided DOD's perspective on the DPRK 
issue, underscoring North Korea's goal to become a nuclear 
weapons state and stressing the importance of a unified 
approach. Schiffer emphasized that, while many DPRK 
provocations are attributed to succession planning, some 
actions indicate that many events were planned well before 
the onset of Kim Jong-il's sickness. Nevertheless, to 
minimize risk and maximize opportunities in the situation, 
the United States, Japan, and ROK need to send non-escalatory 
signals to North Korea, institutionalize trilateral 
cooperation, amplify defense commitments, fully implement 
UNSCR 1874, and assure adequate preparedness for DPRK 
provocations. 
 
¶29.  (S) Elaborating on areas in need of cooperation, Lt Gen 
Rice discussed steps to enhance trilateral BMD cooperation. 
Rice explained the constraints imposed on BMD because 
information sharing occurs exclusively in bilateral 
U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK channels.  More effective BMD is 
possible with trilateral information sharing, with 
significant benefits from shared knowledge and capabilities. 
Successful BMD information sharing, coordination response, 
and resource-sharing between the United States and Japan in 
the last three years demonstrate potential trilateral gains, 
Rice said. 
 
¶30.  (S) OSD Transnational Threat Policy Director Steven 
Schleien briefed on cooperative UNSCR 1874 implementation, 
elaborating on sovereign rights and operational aspects of 
UNSCR 1874. Schleien stressed that UNSCR 1874 differs from 
1718 in allowing seizure and disposal of contraband and 
pointed out that nations have sovereign rights to inspect 
North Korean vessels in their territory and ports.  Exercise 
of sovereign rights is not contingent on meeting reasonable 
conditions outlined in the resolution.  The onus is on the 
DPRK to demonstrate compliance.  By demonstrating a unified 
stance, the international community will convey global norms 
to the DPRK and signal that diplomacy is the only viable 
path, Schleien asserted. 
 
¶31.  (S) Embassy Tokyo Charg d'Affaires, a.i. Ron Post 
provided a brief on strategic communications, outlining the 
essential role of coordinated public messaging in managing 
the North Korea situation.  Post emphasized the need to 
include public communications in the planning stages to 
ensure appropriate public messages regarding DPRK 
provocations in different scenarios.  Avoiding a crisis 
atmosphere is important, as a panic-riddled environment 
limits maneuverability for states and reduces effectiveness 
in responses.  Projection of coordinated preparation with 
Alliance partners via consistent public messaging is 
imperative, he asserted.  Maintaining visible contact between 
leaders and counterparts in each country is productive, while 
publicly speculating potential outcomes of coordination 
between parties is not.  When provocations occur during the 
daytime in Asia, absent immediate responses from Washington, 
the ROK and Japan, together with the resident U.S. Embassies, 
should maintain the official line, Post stressed. 
 
¶32.  (S) ASD Gregson characterized the three governments' 
response to date as strong, calm, and steady, and he noted 
that nobody is characterizing North Korean actions as a 
crisis.  DASD Schiffer said the U.S. Government believes this 
is an inflection point where North Korea sought to become an 
ICBM-capable, nuclear weapons state.  Noting the likelihood 
that future North Korean actions would involve the NLL and 
DMZ, Schiffer also advocated consideration of future 
provocations directed at Japan or Guam and incorporation of 
these scenarios into the trilateral dialogue.  DM Kim agreed 
with DASD Schiffer's assessment and noted that it would be 
wise not to focus solely on threats directed at the ROK. 
PACOM J-5 Director MajGen Alles proposed a trilateral 
observation of a ballistic missile test shot scheduled for 
December 9 in Kauai to start a policy-level dialogue on 
furthering cooperation on information sharing.  DG Takamizawa 
expressed support for the idea, adding there are other 
exercise observation opportunities as well, including the 
U.S. Navy SM-3 test shot in early 2010, as well as Nimble 
Titan.  DM Kim stated that the ROK delegation would review 
the proposals positively upon return to Seoul. 
 
---------------------- 
Post-brief Discussions 
---------------------- 
 
¶33.  (S) DM Kim summarized three main discussion points on 
implementing UNSCR 1874: 1) surveillance and interdiction; 2) 
information sharing; and 3) understanding of each country's 
legal restrictions.  The three governments need to find 
effective means to cooperate on the first two items, to 
engage in trilateral table top exercises, and to work toward 
combining their respective regional activities.  Responding 
to Takamizawa's query on ideas for moving forward, Kim 
explained that the ROK government is reviewing its national 
plan for implementing UNSCR 1874 to be presented at the UN 
Security Council on July 27.  Under the plan, MOFAT leads 
interagency coordination and provides guidance on roles and 
missions specific to each government ministry and agency for 
implementation.  The plan also provides for ROK observation 
of multinational training exercises, Kim added.  DASD 
Schiffer suggested the DTT Working Group should, during its 
meeting in the fall, establish modalities for a UNSCR 1874 
action group to report to next year's DTT.  Both Kim and 
Takamizawa agreed to the idea. 
 
¶34.  (S) DASD Schiffer proposed convening a trilateral 
track-1 workshop on strategic communication, crisis response 
and management, to be hosted by the Asia Pacific Center for 
Security Studies (APCSS).  DG Takamizawa noted that he 
supports the U.S. proposal in principle, but added that ROK 
and Japanese ideas and thoughts ought to be incorporated into 
any workshop, as APCSS programs, while sophisticated, tend to 
be biased toward the U.S. perspective.  He pointed out that 
such a workshop is, nevertheless, extremely useful, as 
strategic communication between the ROK and GOJ has been 
insufficient, leaving the United States to assume the 
intermediary role.  Despite valiant efforts by Korean and 
Japanese Defense Attaches in both capitals, the Japanese 
government at times feel frustrated by the lack of 
communication even during the missile launches. 
 
¶35.  (S) ASD Gregson remarked that the APCSS should not be 
viewed as the exclusive venue and that the workshop could be 
hosted by Japan or Korea in any venue agreeable to all 
parties.  DM Kim stated that the ROK delegation would review 
the U.S. proposal and do its best to participate.  He agreed 
that all three countries should institutionalize trilateral 
dialogue on strategic communication.  He also expressed 
interest in promoting new channels of communication and 
re-invigorate existing channels at different levels of 
government among the DTT partners.  As suggested by 
Takamizawa, all three parties should review the discussion 
materials and share each other's briefs prior to the APCSS 
workshop to allow productive discussion, Kim said. 
 
-------------------------------- 
National Defense Strategies: QDR 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶36.  (S) DASD Schiffer outlined the QDR process and portrayed 
it as a balancing exercise between resources and efforts. 
Addressing current endeavors with an eye to future 
contingencies, DASD Schiffer stated that the QDR will address 
violent extremist movements, the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons, failed 
or failing states, and increased encroachment in the global 
commons (air, sea, space, cyberspace).  Schiffer also noted 
that the QDR will, for the first time, incorporate 
non-traditional security challenges of climate change and 
energy security.  DM Kim inquired about the extent to which 
the U.S. Government would solicit the opinions of its allies. 
 DASD Schiffer replied that the QDR is an open process and 
that meetings with the QDR team can be arranged to address 
specific concerns from allied governments. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
National Defense Strategies: ROK Defense Reform 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶37.  (S) LTC Kim Dong-gyun presented ROK Defense Reform Basic 
Plan (DR 2020), focusing on both structural reform of the ROK 
military, as well as management reform.  (Note: According to 
one U.S. delegation member, the content of DR 2020 was 
previously classified, demonstrating a new ROK government 
willingness to share sensitive information with Japan.  End 
Note.)  The ROK government, through DR 2020, seeks to 
strengthen Korea's defense capability by transforming the ROK 
military into a technology-driven military structure capable 
of dealing with comprehensive security threats.  LTC Kim 
noted that while the original DR 2020 reduced troops to the 
500,000 level, the revised DR 2020 pegged the number of 
troops at 517,000.  Establishing a ground operation command 
and transforming the ROK Navy, Kim added, are priorities, as 
are increasing the ROK Air Force's tactical precision strike 
capability and integrating and relocating scattered units. 
ZUMWALT