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Viewing cable 09TOKYO1813, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/07/09
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TOKYO1813 | 2009-08-09 21:40 | 2011-08-26 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO8327
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1813/01 2212140
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 092140Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5244
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8099
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5766
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 9576
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 3206
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6282
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0326
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6986
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6616
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 18 TOKYO 001813
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/07/09
INDEX:
(1) U.S. President exchanges views with ambassador-designate to
Japan, confirms importance of Japan-U.S. relations (Nikkei)
(2) North Korean may use former President Clinton's surprise visit
as a way to open bilateral talks with the U.S. (Tokyo Shimbun)
(3) Two weeks of secret U.S.-DPRK negotiations led to release of two
reporters: DPRK agreed to grant amnesty with Clinton visit, demanded
"direct deal" on nuclear issue (Yomiuri)
(4) DPJ stresses equal ties with U.S. (Sankei)
(5) 2009 Lower House election: Reports on the eve of election (Part
2): Tokyo 1st district; DPJ fears livelihood-oriented votes in
reaction to Tokyo poll; LDP to play up policies honestly in order to
find way out (Asahi)
(6) Secret nuclear agreement issue raises questions on inadequate
information disclosure, vagueness of bureaucrats' responsibility
(Nikkei)
(7) The Japanese dilemma over Obama's speech (Asahi)
(8) Citizens criticize Tamogami's speech calling for nuclear-option
debate on day of atomic bombing in Hiroshima as showing "lack of
consideration" (Tokyo Shimbun)
(9) Appalling misinterpretation and misunderstanding of strategic
dialogue (Sankei)
(10) LDP aiming for security debate (Asahi)
(11) With the import of F-22 now hopeless, selection of ASDF's next
fighter FX in limbo (Shukan Shincho)
ARTICLES:
(1) U.S. President exchanges views with ambassador-designate to
Japan, confirms importance of Japan-U.S. relations
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
Evening, August 7, 2009
Itaru Oishi, Washington
President Barack Obama met Ambassador-designate to Japan John Roos
at the White House on August 6. The two agreed that the Japan-U.S.
relationship will continue to be extremely important for the United
States. At the photo session at the beginning of the meeting, Obama
introduced Roos to the reporters as "the person who will be able to
advise me on the various issues that will arise between Japan and
the U.S." The appointment of Roos is expected to be confirmed by the
full Senate on August 7 along with Ambassador-designate to China Jon
Huntsman.
Roos is the second ambassador-designate that Obama has invited to
his office before Senate confirmation. He had also invited Huntsman
when he introduced him to the reporters at the time he was
nominated. It is believed that this is meant to show the importance
he gives to Japan amid concerns in Japan about the U.S. and North
Korea making progress in their dialogue after former President Bill
Clinton's recent visit to the DPRK.
The White House hopes that Roos will be confirmed by a unanimous
vote. It is thought that the meeting is also meant to emphasize
Roos's close ties to the President to Congress, since certain
Republican senators are opposed to his appointment.
Traditionally, ambassadors-designate refrain from making public
statements, except at their confirmation hearings. Roos did not
speak to the reporters.
TOKYO 00001813 002 OF 018
Obama gave the following explanation on Roos's nomination: "Japan
and the United States have built a very close relationship through
the sharing of common values and interests. Therefore, I attached
great importance to the choice of ambassador to Japan." He praised
Roos by saying: "I have picked somebody who has superb judgment and
an outstanding intellect and who will do his best. He is a very
close friend, has experience working in a private sector involved
with advanced technology, and has a profound interest in public
service."
With regard to the future of the bilateral relationship, Obama said:
"The Japan-U.S. relationship is one of the cornerstones of security
and the economy. I hope he makes a strong start."
(2) North Korean may use former President Clinton's surprise visit
as a way to open bilateral talks with the U.S.
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 7) (Full)
August 7, 2009
General Secretary Kim Jong Il is smiling broadly, while former
President Bill Clinton is keeping a firm expression, in a ceremonial
photo taken when Clinton visited Pyongyang and met with Kim on
August 4. The photo clearly tells which - the U.S. or North Korea -
won the bargaining.
They spent one hour and 15 minutes on talks. A get-acquainted
meeting over dinner took about three hours and 15 minutes. Regarding
the details of the meeting, the U.S. side simply noted that talks
were on the release of two journalists. Meanwhile, press reports in
North Korea underscored that the two held in-depth discussions on
various pending issues between Pyongyang and Washington and shared
the stance of settling issues through dialogue.
Pyongyang is still in a state of excitement. The Rodong Shinmun on
the 6th gave a list of foreign media organizations in an article
that noted many countries' news agencies, broadcasting stations and
newspapers reported on the meeting between General Secretary Kim and
the former U.S. President. It twice carried an article that the
former President respectfully conveyed President Obama's verbal
message, which the U.S. denied.
Diplomatic sources in Seoul are paying attention to the line-up of
North Korean officials who participated in the meeting. First Vice
Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu is in charge of nuclear issues and
relations with the U.S. Kim Yang Gon, the director of the United
Front Department of the Workers' Party, is responsible for
maneuvering South Korea-related affairs. As such, there is a
possibility of the meeting having covered a wide range of topics
from the nuclear issue to relations between South Korea and North
Korea. A diplomatic source has analyzed the nature of the meeting,
"The line-up of participants in the meeting made us feel that North
Korea pinned high hopes on the talks with the U.S."
Many South Korean observers are of the opinion that relations
between North Korea and the U.S. will shift from confrontation to
dialogue. As Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security
(IFANS) Professor Yun Dok Min said, "There is a possibility that
General Secretary Kim gave a politically important message (that
would provide some way to resume talks)."
TOKYO 00001813 003 OF 018
Clinton's visit to Pyongyang this time shares many similarities with
former President Carter's visit to that nation in June 1994, which
dramatically resolved the first nuclear crisis. Carter met with then
President Kim Il Sung at a time when the DPRK was about to face
sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC), as it declared its
decision to pull out of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). President Kim pledged to put on hold the nuclear development
program. North Korea and the U.S. in October the same year reached a
framework agreement that included the provision of light water
reactors to the North.
However, the conditions surrounding the U.S. and North Korea have
greatly changed from the time when Carter visited that nation. North
Korea, which carried out a nuclear test twice, aims to hold direct
talks with the U.S. as a nuclear nation. The U.S. will not reverse
its stance of holding dialogue within the Six-Party framework, based
on the precondition that the North will completely denuclearize
itself.
Washington denied Pyongyang's claim about the topics of the talks,
saying that the talks focused 100 percent on the release of the two
reporters. However, there is no denying that the North is preparing
its next stratagem, such as revealing the details of the talks with
the aim of having the U.S. engage in dialogue with it.
(3) Two weeks of secret U.S.-DPRK negotiations led to release of two
reporters: DPRK agreed to grant amnesty with Clinton visit, demanded
"direct deal" on nuclear issue
YOMIURI (Page 7) (Full)
August 7, 2009
Keiichi Honma, Washington; Yasuhiro Maeda, Seoul
The dramatic release of the two American reporters through former
President Bill Clinton's visit to North Korean was the result of two
weeks of secret contacts between the United States and the DPRK from
mid-July. At their meeting on August 4, Clinton pressed for a
solution to humanitarian issues, including the abduction issue,
while General Secretary Kim Jong Il demanded a "direct deal" with
the U.S. on the nuclear issue. We looked at the intense maneuverings
behind the scenes through interviews with U.S. and South Korean
government officials and reports by the U.S. Wall Street Journal.
On July 18, after over four months in detention, one of the arrested
U.S. reporters called her family in the U.S. North Korea had allowed
the two to make phone calls to the U.S. since spring, but the topic
of the conversation was different this time.
"If Mr Clinton comes to Pyongyang, North Korea will grant amnesty."
This was clearly a message from the DPRK authorities. The family
contacted U.S. government officials and former Vice President Al
Gore, founder of Current TV, which is the two reporters' employer.
The U.S. government verified the credibility of this message with
the North Korean side immediately. After getting a positive sense,
James Jones, national security adviser to the president, sounded out
Clinton on a visit to North Korea on July 24. Clinton basically
agreed on July 25, but insisted on making sure that the two
reporters would be freed.
TOKYO 00001813 004 OF 018
State Department officials then demanded a "firm commitment" on the
release of the two journalists through North Korea's UN mission in
New York. After intensive negotiations, the North Koreans finally
agreed to the condition on August 3, the day Clinton flew to
Pyongyang.
The U.S. government gave advance notice to Japan, the Republic of
Korea (ROK), and other concerned parties. The Japanese and ROK
governments each requested a solution to the abduction issue and
persuasion for the release of South Korean employees of companies
doing business in the Kaesong Industrial Park detained by the DPRK
and of the crew members of a fishing boat seized in July. The U.S.
government briefed Clinton twice on the latest situation in North
Korea and asked him to take up the abduction and detention issues of
Japan and the ROK.
Clinton arrived in Pyongyang on the morning of August 4. He met with
Kim for 1 hour and 15 minutes and had dinner with him for about 2
hours, which means that he was in Kim's company for a total of 3
hours and 15 minutes. In addition to the release of the two American
reporters, he pressed strongly for a solution to Japan's abduction
issue and the question of the detained South Koreans.
In response, Kim brought up wide-ranging issues of security and the
regional situation, indicating his desire for direct dialogue with
the U.S. on the nuclear issue. Clinton listened to him with a
serious expression, and on the nuclear issue, he demanded that North
Korea abandon its nuclear programs, since this will "trigger an arms
race in Asia and the Middle East."
When Gore met Clinton and the two released reporters at an airport
near Los Angeles on the morning of August 5, he praised the Obama
administration for its "deep involvement" in this affair. Clinton
himself has kept quiet about the meeting he had in Pyongyang.
President Barack Obama will meet him shortly to get a detailed
briefing from him directly.
(4) DPJ stresses equal ties with U.S.
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full)
August 7, 2009
Ahead of the upcoming general election for the now-dissolved House
of Representatives, the ruling and opposition parties have now come
up with their respective manifestos or public pledges, which show
different stances toward Japan's alliance with the United States as
the basis of Japan's foreign policy. The Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) are both poised to
base Japan's foreign policy on the Japan-U.S. alliance.
Specifically, however, there are substantial differences between the
LDP and the DPJ. Prime Minister Taro Aso criticized the DPJ in a
speech he delivered on Aug. 5 in the city of Okayama, saying: "We
cannot entrust a political party that is unable to work out its
fundamental policy for protecting Japan with Japan's national
security."
In response to such a perspective from the prime minister, the LDP
manifesto also puts forward nine policy proposals. For instance, the
LDP proposes strengthening security arrangements between Japan and
the United States and taking an resolute attitude toward North
Korea. It clearly proposes beefing up the Japan-U.S. alliance.
TOKYO 00001813 005 OF 018
What is noteworthy in the LDP's manifesto is that it proposes taking
necessary legislative measures from the perspective of Japan's
national security that will allow Japan to intercept North Korean
missiles headed for the United States and to protect U.S. naval
vessels acting in connection wiht missile defense (MD). It will be
unavoidable for the government to change its constitutional
interpretation of the right to collective self-defense in order for
Japan to strengthen its alliance with the United States. In this
regard, the LDP's manifesto proposes modifying the government's
interpretation thereof.
In addition, the LDP's manifesto advocates enacting a permanent law
that will allow Japan to send the Self-Defense Forces overseas as
needed. The SDF's overseas missions connote assistance to the United
States.
In the meantime, the DPJ's manifesto lays emphasis on its stance of
forging an equal-footing bilateral alliance between Japan and the
United States. This posture is evident from its manifesto's softened
wording. For example, the DPJ's manifesto says the DPJ will "bring
up the issue of revising the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement"
and will "move in the direction of reviewing the realignment of U.S.
forces in Japan." The DPJ, in its index of policies for 2008, took
the position that the DPJ would "set about making a drastic
revision" of the SOFA pact. Concerning the U.S. force realignment,
the DPJ, in its index of policies for that year, declared that the
DPJ would "push ahead with a revision" of the SOFA pact. However,
the DPJ seems to have shifted to a down-to-earth policy course for
the time being.
DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada met with business leaders from
Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) on Aug. 4. In that
meeting, Okada strongly denied that Japan-U.S. relations will become
unstable if the DPJ takes the reins of government. However, DPJ
President Yukio Hatoyama told the Sankei Shimbun and other media in
an interview on July 31 that the DPJ "could ask the United States to
take an appropriate posture for security." In addition, the Social
Democratic Party, a potential coalition partner of the DPJ, declares
clearly in its manifesto that the SDP will call for the U.S. force
realignment to be rediscussed will also demand an all-out revision
of the SOFA pact. This will likely create friction between the DPJ
and the SDP.
What is important in foretelling the DPJ's U.S. policy is the
Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.
In its manifesto, the DPJ does not touch on this overseas task. On
July 29, however, Hatoyama proposed ending the MSDF's refueling
activities there in January next year. However, it is certain that
the United States will ask Japan to make up for the MSDF's
withdrawal.
Concerning Japan's international contributions, the DPJ's manifesto
goes no further than to say that Japan will "participate in United
Nations peacekeeping operations and the like to play a
peace-building role." However, the DPJ once implied that Japan could
participate in U.N. military actions.
For the time being, the DPJ is not expected to deviate markedly from
the present government's policy course in its foreign and security
policies. However, DPJ Deputy President Ichiro Ozawa, in 2007 when
he was DPJ president, advocated participating in the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The DPJ could
TOKYO 00001813 006 OF 018
discuss the possibility of sending Ground Self-Defense Force troops
to Afghanistan in order for Japan to make up for the MSDF's pullout
from its refueling activities in the India Ocean.
(5) 2009 Lower House election: Reports on the eve of election (Part
2): Tokyo 1st district; DPJ fears livelihood-oriented votes in
reaction to Tokyo poll; LDP to play up policies honestly in order to
find way out
ASAHI (Page4) (Abridged)
August 7, 2009
Koji Sonoda
On the evening of Aug. 6, a briefing on the manifesto (campaign
pledges) of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was held before some
60 people at Banri Kaieda's office in Tokyo's Shinjuku Ward. Some of
them voiced severe opinions. For instance, one said: "The manifesto
says that the party will abolish the provisional tax rate on
gasoline, but tax revenue is important from an environmental
perspective." Another said: "The nation's GDP must be increased.
Making expressways toll free is about the only approach specified in
the manifesto to achieve that goal."
Ever since the DPJ announced its manifesto on July 27, Kaieda has
received many opinions. In response to the party's key plan to
provide a monthly child care allowance of 26,000 yen per child, one
expressed concern about the abolition of the spousal deduction
system. Party executives' inconsistent views on the extension of the
refueling operation in the Indian Ocean also prompted one to pose
this question: "Where exactly does the DPJ stand on this issue?" The
Aug. 6 briefing was intended to contain such concerns.
The DPJ has become the largest party (in the Tokyo Metropolitan
Assembly) for the first time as a result of the July 12 Tokyo
election. A plan is being mentioned in the DPJ to achieve an
overwhelming victory in Tokyo in the next general election by
keeping up this momentum. But it appears that society's view of the
DPJ is becoming severer with growing chances of a change of
administration.
In fact, the DPJ had been 11 points ahead of the LDP in an Asahi
Shimbun survey immediately after the Tokyo poll, but the difference
shrunk to 2 points in early August. Kaieda took this view: "In the
Tokyo election, voters used their votes to punish the ruling
parties. In the next election, they are likely to vote for something
that is closely associated with their livelihoods. I think there is
an obstacle in their mentality." (The DPJ) fears a swing-over from
the "Tokyo election shock."
Kaieda's rival in the Tokyo 1st district is the Liberal Democratic
Party's (LDP) Yosano Kaoru, 70, who has been responsible for
economic measures as the Aso cabinet's finance minister and
financial services minister. "Japan has problems that cannot be
resolved unless the administration changes. Bureaucrats are pulling
the strings of lawmakers behind the scenes." In the eye of Kaieda,
Yosano, who appears under the thumbs of Finance Ministry officials,
is a symbolic figure of bureaucracy-led politics that must be
changed.
Yosano and Kaieda have beaten each other twice in the four elections
that have taken place under the single-seat system. "Winds" often
TOKYO 00001813 007 OF 018
dictate the results of elections in urban areas where there are many
swing voters. Delivering political campaign fliers is becoming
increasingly difficult in urban areas where self-locking high-rise
apartments are concentrated. In such areas, candidates opt to hold
mini-town hall meetings to develop their stock arguments.
Although Yosano played a central role in the compilation of
supplementary budgets involving massive fiscal spending, he is
originally an advocate of spending cuts. With the government's
"mid-term program," he has successfully paved the way for a
consumption tax hike. Yosano criticized scores of policies in the
DPJ's manifesto as "outrageous." He provocatively said: "The
implementation of all DPJ policies requires a Swedish system. The
consumption tax rate must be raised to 25 percent, which is of
course one approach."
Nevertheless, the LDP was suffering from the aftereffects of the
Tokyo election. Yosano complained to Prime Minister Taro Aso on July
15, three days after the Tokyo poll: "An adverse wind blew strongly
against our party during the Tokyo race. The conditions are still
harsh throughout the country." At a temple in Shinjuku Ward on the
night of July 29, Yosano apologized to some 60 people associated
with his support association, saying, "My efforts were inadequate. I
am deeply sorry." An LDP incumbent lost his seat in Shinjuku Ward,
and the LDP Tokyo secretary general also failed to win his seventh
term in Chiyoda Ward.
Yosano held a press conference on Aug. 4 in which he emphatically
said: "We are going to play up our political nature and policies
honestly. I am certain that will help us find a way out."
Prospective candidates in Tokyo 1st district (Chiyoda, Minato, and
Shinjuku wards)
Name Age Party
Kaoru Yosano 70 LDP
Banri Kaieda 60 DPJ
Naoki Tomita 33 JCP
Junko Tanaka 47 Small party
Mitsuo Matayoshi 65 Small party
Mac Akasaka 60 Small party
(6) Secret nuclear agreement issue raises questions on inadequate
information disclosure, vagueness of bureaucrats' responsibility
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged)
August 5, 2009
The secret nuclear agreement issue raises questions not only on
national security, but also on the classic problem of relations
between politicians and bureaucrats.
"What else can we say about something that does not exist?"
"This is not an issue worth raising again and again."
In anticipation of change of administration
The government's statements on the secret agreement have been curt.
However, what Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka said at his news
conference on July 13 has given rise to speculations that there are
"signs of change" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
TOKYO 00001813 008 OF 018
When asked if the government's position will remain unchanged even
in the future, Yabunaka said: "At this point, we have not changed
our thinking." This was an expression that could be taken to mean
that the possibility for modification in the future is left open.
A senior MOFA official explained that, "I think the remarks had in
mind the possibility of a change of administration." With regard to
the secret agreement, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President
Yukio Hatoyama had said that, "Once we take over the administration,
we will first locate the document and conduct an open discussion."
The exposure of the secret agreement will be ideal material to
illustrate the DPJ's policy of breaking away from bureaucratic
control. MOFA is already panic-stricken.
To be sure, there is a persistent opinion in the ministry that,
"Even if there is indeed a secret agreement, it is not necessary to
admit to that just because the DPJ has taken over the government."
It is also said that the "one sheet of paper on the introduction of
nuclear weapons" that was used as a document for transitional
purposes (from one vice minister to the next) that former Vice
Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata talked about had been discarded
before the information disclosure law took effect in 2001 on grounds
that it was "not an official document."
It is inevitable that certain details of diplomatic negotiations are
kept secret for a period of time. Even in the DPJ, only a minority
negate all secret agreements. The issue is that the judgment on "who
designates a document as confidential" and "who have access to
diplomatic secrets" is all left to the discretion of a handful of
MOFA bureaucrats.
"Foreign ministers not informed"
Murata has testified that "there were foreign ministers who were not
informed about the secret agreement." The Treaties Bureau (now the
International Legal Affairs Bureau), which is considered the
conservative mainstream, is traditionally a powerful organization in
the MOFA because many of its chiefs have eventually risen to the
top. It prides itself on being the keeper of the Japan-U.S.
alliance, which has been the basis of Japan's "policy of light
armament" responsible for its economic development after World War
II. A senior official of this bureau even went as far as saying:
"Whether or not to report secrets depends on the relationship of
trust with the politician."
MOFA itself is also the one deciding the criteria for judging
whether or not to release information. While the rule is that
diplomatic documents over 30 years old should basically be made
public, any document that is designated as "confidential" becomes an
exception. This is in sharp contrast with the United States, where
the designation of confidentiality on memos exchanged between
cabinet members and other detailed materials was lifted through a
presidential order.
A former MOFA official made the following observation on diplomatic
secrets: "There are also politicians who prefer not to know instead
of having to continue to tell lies." There is no denying that a
mechanism of relegating decisions to "bureaucrats' discretion" has
been established over the long years of LDP rule.
TOKYO 00001813 009 OF 018
Will the House of Representatives election on August 30 become a
turning point for conducting diplomacy with a sense of pressure that
"this negotiation will be made public someday"?
(7) The Japanese dilemma over Obama's speech
ASAHI (Page 3) (Excerpts)
August 6, 2009
Japan, the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, is now,
64 years after nuclear weapons were used in war, conflicted over
nuclear weapons. Expectations for achievement of the ideal of
eliminating nuclear arms are running high in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
However, there is also the reality that Japan, as an American ally,
shelters under the U.S. umbrella amidst a changing security
environment, exemplified by North Korea's nuclear tests. Japan's
approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons, a cherished national
goal, is now being called into question.
Antinuclear organizations invigorated
Kunikazu Noguchi, chairman of the steering committee for an
international conference held on August 5 in Hiroshima City by the
Japan Council Against A & H Bombs (Gensuikyo, affiliated with the
Japanese Communist Party), gave an overview of the conference,
remarking that President Obama's speech in April on the elimination
of nuclear arms provided momentum for work toward the review
conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 2010.
Likewise, the 2009 World Conference, which started on the 4th and
was hosted by the National Congress Against H & A Bombs (Gensuikin,
affiliated with the former General Council of Trade Unions of
Japan), mainly focused on Obama. Yoshiko Yanagawa (80), who
recounted her experiences as an A-bomb victim, said at the end of
her speech, "I have been given hope by President Obama, who spoke
about the realization of a nuclear-free world."
Local communities have high hopes that Obama will visit the
atomic-bombed cities. The Nagasaki Execution Committee of the Global
Citizen's Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, joined by
NGOs, has already launched a campaign to gather signatures. Local
middle school and high school students, who are planning to visit
the U.S. to ask the president to visit Hiroshima, will stand on
streets to ask passers-by to fold origami paper cranes to console
the souls of A-bomb victims. Their goal is to bring to the U.S more
paper cranes than the 20,000 plus nuclear warheads in the world.
But in Hiroshima there is also a viewpoint that has not been swayed
by the Obama speech. This is the call for a nuclear deterrent in the
face of a threat from North Korea.
Nippon Kaigi Hiroshima (Japan Congress Hiroshima), which consists of
about 750 Hiroshima residents, will invite on the evening of the
6th, the day of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 64 years ago, Toshio
Tamogami (61), the former Air Self-Defense Force chief of staff, who
advocates nuclear armament. He is expected to deliver a speech on
the theme "Doubts about peace in Hiroshima."
Masanari Tade (49), the executive director of Nippon Kaigi Hiroshima
and the son of an A-bomb victim, said, "What Hiroshima has learned
is that a recurrence of a nuclear disaster must be prevented. It has
also learned that it must prevent future victims of atomic bombs. We
TOKYO 00001813 010 OF 018
want to consider how to build peace amid the tense international
environment surrounding Japan."
(8) Citizens criticize Tamogami's speech calling for nuclear-option
debate on day of atomic bombing in Hiroshima as showing "lack of
consideration"
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 26) (Slightly abridged)
August 7, 2009
On August 6, the day the atomic bomb was dropped by the U.S. on
Hiroshima, at a hotel in Hiroshima Toshio Tamogami, a former Air
Self-Defense Force chief, delivered a speech expounding his theory
that "Japan should pursue a nuclear option." Hiroshima Mayor
Tadatoshi Akiba and others had asked Tamogami to change the date of
his speech, emphasizing the need for consideration of the sorrow of
atomic-bomb survivors. But the organization hosting Tamogami's event
carried it out as scheduled.
With a number of plain-clothes policemen stationed at the entrance
and in the lobby of the venue, a tense atmosphere enveloped the hall
from before the start of Tamogami's speech.
The hall's seating capacity was 850 people. Advance tickets (1,200
yen) were all sold out. Thunderous applause greeted Tamogami's
appearance on the platform at 6:00 p.m. in the hall.
After the audience sang the national anthem of Japan and prayed
silently for those who were killed by the bombing, Tamogami
delivered a speech titled "Casting doubt on the peace of
Hiroshima."
He introduced himself as a "dangerous person," provoking laughter
from the audience, and said, "Abolishing nuclear weapons is
absolutely impossible and is just an empty dream." He then
emphasized the need for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons,
saying:
"State leaders consider that if they go nuclear, they will find
themselves safer. There will be no winner in nuclear warfare. That
is why a large-scale war has not broken out. Japan should pursue a
nuclear option in order to survive in the world."
When the plan of Tamogami's speech was disclosed in June, Mayor
Akiba asked the host organization to "move the date of Tamogami's
speech from the anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing, out of
consideration for the Hiroshima citizens' feelings."
However, Japan Conference Hiroshima, the group which hosted the
event, noted in an ad carried by a local newspaper on July 27:
"Abolishing nuclear weapons is our wish." In the ad the group
included this criticism: "No reference was made to North Korea's
nuclear program in the Hiroshima peace declarations of last year and
the year before last."
The ad further explained why it scheduled the event for the memorial
day, noting, "It is necessary for the Hiroshima citizens to both
pray for peace and also consider what they should do in reaction to
North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear tests so that they will
never become the victims of nuclear weapons once again." The
organization then carried out the event as scheduled.
TOKYO 00001813 011 OF 018
In areas around the Peace Memorial Park that day many citizens
consoled the souls of those who were killed by the bombing.
Asked for his view Tamogami's speech, a 65-year-old man in Kure City
replied in front of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial:
"I wonder why the event was set for this day. I think the plan
stemmed from such a provocative idea as drawing public attention to
Japan's nuclear option. I have high hopes for U.S. President Barack
Obama's goal of a nuclear weapon-free world. Giving consideration to
others is imperative to bring about peace, and those who cannot give
consideration to others are not qualified to speak of peace."
Remarked another man, "Setting aside the matter of the content of
the speech, I think there is no need to restrict holding a lecture
itself." But most people interviewed expressed doubts about the
scheduling of Tamogami's speech on the memorial day.
A series of speeches by atomic-bomb survivors was held at the
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, joined by a number of citizens.
Toshiko Kajimoto, 78, who was 14 years old and was working at a
factory when the atomic bomb was dropped, was exposed to radiation.
What she said in her speech was very impressive:
"Since human beings are stupid, they repeat what they did in the
past. I don't have no enough time to tell about what I experienced
in the war, but I want you to tell your children and grandchildren
about (the misery of) the war. To bring about real peace, I think it
is necessary to remove atomic bombs from this world."
(9) Appalling misinterpretation and misunderstanding of strategic
dialogue
SANKEI (Page 9) (Abridged)
August 6, 2009
Kunihiko Miyake, Ritsumeikan University visiting professor and
research director of the Canon Institute for Global Studies
The first round of the Japan-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
was held in Washington on July 27-28. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton delivered opening remarks. The event was co-chaired by
Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on the U.S. side.
The old framework has been expanded and upgraded for form's sake.
The two sides agreed on President Barack Obama's visit to China and
the United States' participation in the (2010) Shanghai World Expo,
among other matters. As was reported, the two countries also
conducted probing discussions on a wide range of subjects, such as
the economic issue, climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, North
Korea and Iran.
At the same time, there seem to be subtle yet critical differences
in what was reported in Japan and other countries. First, I was
surprised by the following misinterpretation that was carried by
some Japanese articles.
A certain news agency in Japan reported that in his speech,
President Obama, putting the top priority on U.S.-China relations,
said "(the relationship between the United States and China) is more
important than any bilateral relationship in the world." What
President Obama actually said was: "The relationship between the
TOKYO 00001813 012 OF 018
United States and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it
as important as any bilateral relationship in the world."
How could that be interpreted as "putting the top priority on
U.S.-China relations"? In the absence of some sort of preconceived
idea, it is impossible to misinterpret such a middle-school-level
sentence. It was a relief to find that a certain newspaper editorial
pointed out this misinterpretation.
One Japanese national newspaper also carried this headline: "G-2 now
in motion; U.S. prioritizes cooperation over outstanding issues;
Initiative gives China a sense of satisfaction." Needless to say,
the word "G-2" is not specified in any official documents adopted by
the United States and China. Neither did major European or U.S.
media report on "America's conspicuous approach toward China." Even
China is skeptical about the notion of G-2. This notion, too, must
be a product of misunderstanding, or a preconceived idea. To begin
with, an important bilateral relationship does not necessarily mean
a good and friendly relationship in Washington. In American
diplomacy, an enemy is often referred to as a "challenge" rather
than as a "threat" outright. By the same token, the relationship
with a certain country is referred to as "important" because there
are outstanding issues and tensions with that country.
Furthermore, attention must be paid to the contents of the
U.S.-China dialogue. The two-day event produced dozens of pages of
documents, including six speeches, one of which was given by
President Obama, factsheets, and joint press releases. Anyone who
looks through the documents can tell that the two countries have
agreed only on "cooperation and efforts to strengthen their
dialogue," which are abstract ideas, by shelving outstanding issues,
and that they have accomplished little in reality.
It is clear that full-fledged U.S.-China dialogue has just begun,
and there is no guarantee that this will succeed. The G-2 theory is
the product of obsessive ideas and paranoia, so to speak. Japan
should make every effort to resume a true dialogue with the United
States rather than to worry about such a concept.
(10) LDP aiming for security debate
ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged)
August 5, 2009
The government yesterday released a report of recommendations
submitted by its advisory panel on Japan's security and defense
capability. The panel report urges the government to go ahead with a
policy changeover for Japan's proactive use of its defense
capabilities, seeking to allow Japan to participate partially in
collective self-defense and ease its self-imposed three principles
on weapons exports. The Liberal Democratic Party is using the
release of the panel's report as an opportunity to wage a vigorous
security debate. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is
poised to revamp its security policy after taking the reins of
government.
"We protect Japan, we protect the people. This is the government's
major responsibility." So remarked Prime Minister Aso when he
received the panel report at his office yesterday. His words echoed
the catchphrase in the LDP's manifesto, or campaign pledges -- "the
competency to protect Japan."
TOKYO 00001813 013 OF 018
The panel report bears the stamp of Aso's views. Aso has been
insisting on reviewing the government's arms embargo policy. Late
last year, he asked Tsunehisa Katsumata, chairman of the Tokyo
Electric Power Company, to preside over the advisory panel. On that
occasion, Aso asked him to ready industrial circles for a review of
the policy. Also, former Prime Minister Abe has insisted on allowing
Japan to participate in collective self-defense.
Aso, who is lagging behind his DPJ rival, is playing up the LDP's
establishment of Japan's alliance with the U.S. in an effort to
rattle the DPJ over security policy.
Meanwhile, DPJ President Hatoyama referred to the panel report in
yesterday's press conference. "The LDP government selected the
advisory panel's members, and they made policy proposals," he said.
"After taking the reins of government, we will have to review the
report from our standpoint." He chose his words carefully, adding,
"The government's views on such matters as the three principles on
arms exports and the right to collective defense are well
established."
Hatoyama is planning to build a personal relationship of mutual
trust with U.S. President Obama soon after he takes the reins of
government. The DPJ thinks it cannot take up specific issues in the
security area until it captures a single-party majority in the House
of Councillors in next summer's election. The government is set to
revise its national defense program guidelines late this year.
However, the DPJ is not holding itself to that timetable, with one
of the DPJ's policy-planning executives saying it can be rescheduled
for a later date.
Security panel report and LDP, DPJ manifestos
Security panel LDP DPJ
USFJ The U.S. military's stable presence in Japan is needed. U.S.
force realignment will lead to reducing the burden of base-hosting
localities and maintaining the U.S. military presence. Carry out
U.S. force realignment in a steady way. Reduce the burden on Okinawa
and other base-hosting localities. Propose revising the Japan-U.S.
Status of Forces Agreement. Review the realignment of U.S. forces in
Japan and the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan.
North Korea Review the government's interpretation of the right to
collective self-defense. Allow Japan to intercept U.S.-bound
ballistic missiles and protect missile-warning U.S. naval ships.
Take steps needed for national security so Japan will be allowed to
intercept U.S.-bound ballistic missiles and protect U.S. naval ships
acting in concert for ballistic missile defense. North Korea's
repeated nuclear tests and missile launches are a clear threat to
Japan and international peace and stability. Such actions are never
acceptable.
SDF missions overseas Review Japan's 5 PKO principles and amend the
PKO Cooperation Law. A permanent law should be established at an
early date. Aim to establish a permanent law so Japan can send the
SDF overseas without delay. Participate in PKO, etc., on Japan's own
initiative and under democratic control to play a peace-building
role.
(11) With the import of F-22 now hopeless, selection of ASDF's next
fighter FX in limbo
SHUKAN SHINCHO (Pages 52-55) (Excerpts)
August 6, 2009
TOKYO 00001813 014 OF 018
Shigeru Handa, Tokyo Shimbun editorial staff
The selection process of the Air Self-Defense Force's (ASDF) next
mainstay fighter has not made any progress four years after it
started because the United States is reluctant to sell its
state-of-the-art F-22s and is also using this issue in its diplomacy
with China. Japan's defense program is now in limbo due to its lack
of a national strategy. Shigeru Handa, a Tokyo Shimbun editorial
staff member reports on the situation.
Three models of fighters are currently deployed for the ASDF's
combat operations, the F-15, the F-4, and the semi-locally
manufactured F-2. The F-4s, which were introduced in 1966, are
gradually being retired. The ASDF has picked the following six
possible choices of the next fighter (FX): the F-22, the F-15FX, the
FA-18E/F-Hornet, and the F-35 Lightning manufactured by the U.S.;
and the Eurofighter Typhoon (jointly developed by European
countries) and the Dassault Rafale (French).
The F-22 is the top candidate. However, the U.S. Congress has
included provisions prohibiting the export and divulgence of
information on the F-22 in its defense authorization bills each year
since 2007.
That is, the F-22 is the "impossible fighter" for Japan. Toshio
Tamogami, former ASDF chief of staff who was replaced over the
controversial essay he wrote, has stated repeatedly when he was
still in active service that, "We want the F-22 desperately."
His successor, ASDF Chief of Staff Kenichiro Hokazono has also
expressed his concern: "There will be countries possessing stealth
fighters in areas close to Japan in the near future. In such a
situation, the absence of stealth fighters in Japan will mean a
serious handicap in terms of air defense and the military balance."
What did Hokazono mean by "areas close to Japan"? More than one
senior Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials answered unanimously:
"None other than China."
"Stealth fighters indispensable for policy of exclusive defense"
China's defense spending has grown by two digits for 21 consecutive
years. This trend of military buildup is particularly pronounced in
the navy and the air force. Comparing Chinese and Japanese air force
capability, the advanced fighters used by the PRC navy and air force
are 347 Chinese-made Jianji-10s, Russian Suhoi-27s (Jianji 11), and
Suhoi-30s (The Military Balance 2009 edition), which is much larger
in number than the ASDF's 286 F-15s and F-2s of the same generation
(Defense White Paper 2009 edition).
While China is increasing its advanced fighters each year, the ASDF
is stuck with the FX issue, resulting in an ever widening gap in air
power.
Furthermore, Russia, supplier of China's fighters, is developing the
stealth fighter Suhoi T-50 (PAK-FA).
It is believed that China is certain to procure the T-50, so
Hokazono's fears about a "handicap in the military balance" will
probably become reality.
In the event of an airmada of the PRC air force approaching Japan,
TOKYO 00001813 015 OF 018
if the ASDF's fighters have stealth capability, they will be able to
shoot down the bombers and the escort fighters and repulse the
attack.
Otherwise, the ASDF will be pushed back and the invasion of the
Japanese mainland will succeed.
A senior ASDF officer stresses that, "Due to constitutional
constraints, (the ASDF) is unable to carry out preemptive strikes.
Stealth fighters are indispensable for Japan, which adopts an
exclusively defensive policy."
Why has the U.S. banned the sale of this fighter so coveted by its
ally?
It is generally believed that the U.S. government decided on the
embargo out of its concerns about the leakage of information by the
SDF after the incident of leakage of confidential information on the
Aegis ships in 2007. However, it appears that this is not the case.
A senior MOD official brings China into the picture and says:
"Actually, China has engaged in intensive lobbying activities in
Washington for continuing the export ban because 'the sale of F-22s
to Japan will lead to the collapse of the military balance in East
Asia.' China is also opposed to arms exports to Taiwan for the same
reason. It's a real hassle because both arguments are convincing."
The Obama administration is keenly conscious of China, which has
become an economic and military power.
A Japan-U.S. diplomatic source notes that, "Under Secretary Michele
Flournoy came to Japan to discuss North Korea's nuclear arms and
missiles in June, but she had visited China first before coming to
Japan. This reminds us of the 'Japan passing' during the Clinton
administration, when the U.S. judged that 'Japan no longer had any
value as a deterrent against the Soviet Union' after the end of the
Cold War in the 1990s."
Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has dismissed the F-22 as
an "expensive legacy of the Cold War era" and announced the end of
the production of this fighter. The production lines will stop in
2011, so this will mean that Japan will not be able to procure the
F-22.
The F-22 costs 140 million dollars (approximately 13 billion yen)
each. It is incomparably more expensive compared to earlier
fighters, so it represents an opportunity to kill two birds with one
stone - control skyrocketing defense spending and show U.S.
consideration for China -- for the U.S. government.
However, a divine wind blew for Japan at the critical moment.
On June 25, the U.S. House of Representatives passed with an
overwhelming majority the defense authorization bills for FY2010
with provisions on studying the possibility of exporting the F-22 to
Japan and the budget for the procurement of additional F-22s. This
was followed by the Senate Armed Services Committee's passage of a
resolution with the same provisions.
There are numerous companies in 44 states that are involved with
F-22 production. It is obvious that the termination of production
TOKYO 00001813 016 OF 018
will have a serious impact on local employment, and this will
influence the outcome of federal elections next year. That is, while
the lawmakers argue for the "importance of the F-22" for security
reasons on the surface, in reality, they are thinking of their own
election campaign.
Eurofighters as an option
Although the U.S. Senate has decided to stop the deployment of F-22s
by the U.S. Air Force, it approves of developing an export version
of the F-22. Even so, it remains unclear whether the Obama
administration will sell the aircraft to Japan. The F-35, which has
been developed as a cheaper alternative to the expensive F-22, has
emerged as Japan's second best choice in terms of stealth
capability.
As a matter of fact, Gates offered the F-35 to Defense Minister
Yasukazu Hamada at the meeting of defense chiefs on May 1. It seems
that while the U.S. is refusing to sell the F-22, which directly
affects U.S. interest, it does want the yen.
However, the development of the F-35 has not been completed, and
only two finished products have ever been manufactured. It is
impossible to determine the merits and demerits of a fighter that
has not been deployed in actual operations.
The FX selection process has been at the mercy of U.S. motives, so
the British BAE Systems, manufacturer of the Eurofighter, has
attempted to take advantage of this situation.
BAE Vice President Andy Latham, in charge of Eurofighter exports,
came to Japan in June and was busy visiting the MOD and other
offices. He emphasized the superiority of the Eurofighter at an
exclusive interview with this writer.
"The Eurofighter won overwhelmingly against the F-35 in air battles
on the computer using software certified by the NATO Eurofighter and
Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) formed by the UK, Germany, and two
other countries. Simulations show that even with a reversal of the
offensive and defensive sides, while 90 percent of the F-35s were
shot down, only 5 percent of the Eurofighters were hit."
He also discussed the stealth capability that Japan places great
importance on. "What is important is not the stealth capability
alone. The Eurofighter is capable of carrying more weapons than the
F-35 and has superior maneuverability.
While U.S. weapons are shrouded in secrecy like a "black box," BAE
Systems takes pride in "open source."
Latham said: "We are willing to meet Japan's requirements, whether
it is licensed production or importation."
MOD officials in charge of arms trade with the U.S. have taken note
of BAE Systems' posture of emphasizing the merits for Japan. A
senior ASDF officer says:''
"Actually, the top secret documents in the MOD mostly consist of
information on U.S. weapons. When parts designated as top secret
black box break down, they need to be sent back to the manufacturer
in the U.S. for repairs. Sometimes, these parts are left unattended
for extended periods of time due to circumstances on the other side.
TOKYO 00001813 017 OF 018
It is possible that we will not be able to use them at a critical
moment."
In reality, almost all the advanced equipment of the SDF, including
the Aegis system on Aegis ships and missile defense systems, are
made in the U.S.
However, Japan will not be able to benefit from the transfer of
technology in the future if it continues to merely assemble U.S.
made parts. It will not be able to produce weapons using advanced
electronic technology. In other words, Japan will remain a
"subcontractor" of the U.S.
When Tamogami was in active service, he told this reporter: "We need
only some 50 FXs. I have a feeling that since the number is small,
the U.S. will not object too strongly if we choose the Eurofighter.
If the U.S. is willing to open up the black box of the F-35, we are
willing to consider it."
He once indicated the above alternative plan. If he had retired in a
normal way, his influence would have remained in the MOD, and it is
highly possible that the Eurofighter would have been the top
candidate for the FX.
However, the whole MOD still negates Tamogami even today. The FX
selection process is now back to square one.
Weak "consciousness of national defense"
Comparing the F-22 with the Eurofighter, the latter is inferior
overall because while it has the super cruise function, its stealth
capability is not comparable to the F-22.
However, the export version of the F-22 to be sold to Japan, like
all exported weapons, will be a downgraded version with poorer
performance. On the other hand, development cost will be added to
the price, making the price tag of one aircraft 250 million dollars
(approximately 24 billion yen), which is almost twice the
procurement price of the U.S. forces.
In contrast, the Eurofighter costs only 10 billion dollars (sic; as
published; should be 100 million dollars) (approximately 9.5 billion
yen) apiece. Furthermore, licensed production will also make the
transfer of technology possible.
The U.S. has vacillated continuously on the export of F-22s. Under a
situation where the mass production of F-35s has not started, the
Eurofighter is a realistic choice for the FX. Yet, the ASDF
continues to be obsessed with the F-22, partly because Japanese
politicians are unable to repel the pressure from the United
States.
In 2001, Japan was forced by the U.S. to "show the flag," so it
enacted the special antiterrorism measures law and dispatched
Maritime Self-Defense Force escorts and supply vessels to the Indian
Ocean. In 2004, Japan was ordered to send "boots on the ground (send
the Ground Self-Defense Force)," thereby dispatching the SDF to
war-torn Iraq based on the special measures law on Iraq
reconstruction aid.
Japan's posture of following the U.S. blindly is a result of the
United States' selling weapons to Japan in the name of the bilateral
TOKYO 00001813 018 OF 018
alliance and turning Japan into a "vassal state." A senior SDF
officer talks about this cynically: "The clich a Japan-U.S.
alliance sharing common values misses a critical part - 'except when
it comes to business'."
A former ASDF officer also voices this criticism: "We should have
developed our own fighter even in a roundabout way. The development
of the F-2 was an opportunity for the manufacture of a purely
locally-produced fighter, but the politicians bowed to U.S.
pressure, and this became a joint development project. The U.S. even
broke its promise to provide the technology. The Japanese government
has not had a basic debate on what is national defense. That is why
Japan has remained subservient to the U.S."
The ASDF will now draft a document on its required specifications
for fighters and start to narrow down the choices. From past
experience, this document will most probably be focused on the
question "which is most suitable, the F-22 or the F-35" with the
United States in mind. This will be nothing but an exercise with a
predetermined conclusion.
ZUMWALT