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Viewing cable 09TBILISI1587, GEORGIAN COAST GUARD CRACKS DOWN ON ABKHAZIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TBILISI1587 2009-08-24 14:48 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi
VZCZCXRO9704
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1587/01 2361448
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241448Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2085
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0037
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0020
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 0008
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4889
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHSA PGOV EWWT ETRD CB FR PM RS
SY, TU, GG 
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN COAST GUARD CRACKS DOWN ON ABKHAZIA 
SHIPMENTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary and comment.  On August 15 and 18 the 
Georgian Coast Guard detained two vessels for violations of 
the Law on Occupied Territories and other infractions, 
including for traveling in restricted Black Sea waters off 
the coast of Abkhazia.  Although both vessels were stopped 
more than 24 nautical miles beyond Georgia's coast, the Coast 
Guard maintains both their suspicions of previous criminal 
activity and the principle of hot pursuit gave them the 
authority to take action.  The MFA also asserts the 
detentions took place within what Georgia considers its 
broader maritime space; FM Vashadze assured the Ambassador 
that there was no Georgian intention to take more provocative 
actions such as stopping Russian ships.  Abkhaz de facto 
"president" Bagapsh reacted strongly, issuing an open letter 
to the UN, EU and French President Sarkozy accusing Georgia 
of destabilizing the situation, demanding international 
condemnation of Georgia's action, and threatening vague 
consequences otherwise.  EU officials, including Special 
Representative Morel, took initial interest in the story, but 
the lack of any public response by Russia seems to have 
reduced concerns.  Although the Abkhaz could still carry 
through on Bapapsh's threats, including at Geneva, it seems 
unlikely at this point.  End summary and comment. 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY 
 
2. (SBU) As Georgian Coast Guard sources told EmbOff, the 
Georgian government divides the waters off the Georgia into 
three zones: territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical 
miles from the coast; the contiguous zone, which extends 
another 12 nautical miles beyond the territorial waters; and 
an exclusive economic zone, which extends from the contiguous 
zone in a rough triangle out into the Black Sea.  The 
economic zone roughly encompasses the area defined by one 
imaginary line extending from the Georgia/Russia border and 
another such line extending from the Turkey/Georgia border. 
The Georgian government calls this area the "maritime space 
of Georgia."  In terms of maritime jurisdiction, Georgia does 
not distinguish the area off the coast of Abkhazia from the 
area off the coast of the rest of Georgia.  It does consider 
the Port of Sukhumi closed, however, and the Law on Occupied 
Territories, among other pieces of Georgian law and 
regulation, declares movements in and out of Sukhumi that 
have not been properly registered with the Georgian 
government to be unlawful. 
 
THE INCIDENTS 
 
3. (C) Information on the following incidents was provided by 
the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Coast 
Guard sources (provided in part to EUR/CARC electronically). 
On August 18, the Georgian Coast Guard seized the 
Cambodia-flagged "Afro Star," en route from Sukhumi to 
Turkey, carrying 1,255 tons of scrap metal.  The crew 
consisted of seven Syrian citizens.  Coast Guard sources told 
post they tracked the vessel by radar from Sukhumi; during 
the time it was in Georgian territorial waters off Abkhazia, 
its Automatic Identification System (AIS) was turned off, in 
violation of international regulations.  Once it passed 
beyond the contiguous zone, it turned its AIS system back on. 
Qbeyond the contiguous zone, it turned its AIS system back on. 
 Somewhere beyond that point, but within the exclusive 
economic zone, the Coast Guard, which had evidence of 
previous criminal activity on the part of the Afro Star, 
stopped the vessel on the basis of that evidence.  Upon 
searching the boat, it found documentary evidence that it had 
entered the Port of Sukhumi; the Coast Guard then took the 
vessel into custody at the Port of Poti on that basis.  The 
Coast Guard noted to post that it had tracked the vessel by 
radar from Sukhumi, so it also had the right to stop the 
vessel on the basis of hot pursuit.  Authorities have opened 
an investigation into the ship's possible violation of 
Article 322, Part II, sub-paragraph A of the Criminal Code of 
Georgia, which concerns the rules for entering the occupied 
territories of Georgia. 
 
4. (C) On August 15, the Georgian Coast Guard stopped the 
Panama-flagged "Buket," en route from Izmit, Turkey to 
Sukhumi, carrying 2,088 tons of gasoline and 700 tons of 
diesel fuel.  The crew consisted of 13 Turkish and four 
Azerbaijani citizens.  Coast Guard sources told post they had 
evidence of previous criminal activity on the part of the 
Buket and therefore stopped it on that basis.  In searching 
 
TBILISI 00001587  002 OF 003 
 
 
the vessel, they found documentary evidence of the vessel's 
intention to sail to Sukhumi, and the Coast Guard took the 
Buket into custody at the Port of Poti on that basis.  The 
sources told post that part of the evidence of previous 
criminal activity was a pattern of turning off the vessel's 
AIS while within Georgia's contiguous zone and territorial 
waters off Sukhumi, similar to that shone by the Afro Star. 
Authorities have opened an investigation of the same 
provision of Georgia law as for the Afro Star. 
 
THE REACTION 
 
5. (SBU) After the August 18 seizure, Abkhaz de facto 
"president" Bagapsh reacted swiftly, releasing an open letter 
dated the same day.  Addressed to the Chairman of the UN 
Security Council, John Sawers, the EU High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and 
the President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, the 
letter denounces the August 17 seizure of a tanker sailing 
under the Turkish flag, by which he apparently means the 
(Panama-flagged) Buket, which had Turkish crew members.  It 
calls the Georgian act "piracy" and intentional 
destabilization and calls on the international community to 
assess the incident adequately -- i.e., to declare how 
destabilizing it is.  Absent such an assessment, the letter 
hints that the Abkhaz de facto authorities will reevaluate 
their participation in the Geneva talks and the Incident 
Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM).  It also states 
that, unless the international community helps Abkhazia 
recover the vessels and their cargoes, the de facto 
authorities reserve "the right to undertake proportional 
measures on protecting the cargoes going to Abkhazia, and 
lays the blame for possible consequences on the Georgian 
side." 
 
6. (C) Shortly after Bagapsh's letter appeared, Head of the 
EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Hansjoerg Haber noted that the 
de facto authorities had not appealed to the Russian 
Federation for assistance in this matter, and that Russia had 
not reacted in any official capacity.  To Haber, this 
suggested that Bagapsh's vague threat of retaliation was an 
empty one.  An EU official in Tbilisi said on August 24 that 
fairly senior EU officials, including Special Representative 
Pierre Morel, initially expressed concerns about the 
situation, but the lack of any further developments since the 
letter appeared served to reduce anxieties.  The fact that 
such seizures have happened before, without any significant 
consequences, was also reassuring.  Morel, who is a French 
diplomat, was apparently especially concerned because 
President Sarkozy was one of the addressees.  At this point, 
the official said that the EU is unlikely to respond to the 
letter. 
 
THE JUSTIFICATION 
 
7. (SBU) In a non-paper (provided to EUR/CARC 
electronically), the Georgian MFA outlined the government's 
legal argument in support of its actions.  Citing Article 2 
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the paper notes 
the principle of a state having sovereignty over adjacent 
waters.  Citing Article 3 of the Georgian constitution and 
Article 15 of the Law on Maritime Space, it explains the 
government's definition of the maritime territory under 
Georgian jurisdiction.  Citing the Georgian Law on State 
QGeorgian jurisdiction.  Citing the Georgian Law on State 
Borders, it notes the general principle that unauthorized 
travel into Georgian waters is a violation.  Citing Georgian 
Presidential Decrees 140 (1996) and 313 (2004) and Article 2 
of the Law on Occupied Territories, it indicates that the 
waters off Abkhazia in particular are closed to all 
navigation.  Finally, citing Article 111 of the UN 
Convention, it takes note of the principle of "hot pursuit." 
When the Ambassador asked FM Vashadze about the incidents, 
the Foreign Minister noted that these actions were not new 
and suggested that the Georgians would not take any 
provocative acts such as stopping Russian vessels attempting 
to enter the port of Sukhumi. 
 
COMMENT: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOT MUCH? 
 
8. (C) These incidents are not the first such cases of 
Georgia seizing vessels bound to or from Abkhazia.  The Coast 
Guard, for example, provided a list of nine other such 
incidents from 2007 to the present.  What seems to be 
different in this case, and therefore to have gotten the 
 
TBILISI 00001587  003 OF 003 
 
 
attention of some, is the strongly worded reaction of de 
facto "president" Bagapsh.  Any follow-through from Bagapsh 
on his threats, either on the Black Sea or the Geneva 
talks/IPRM context, would of course be significant.  Judging 
from the relative lack of reaction from the Russian side, 
however -- the one country in the region that would 
presumably agree with Bagapsh's assessment of the incidents 
as violations of Abkhazia's "sovereignty" -- it seems likely 
that his bluster was meant more for domestic political 
consumption than anythin else, as Abkhazia prepares for its 
"presidential" elections in December. 
TEFFT