VZCZCXRO0501
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNT #1548/01 2371220
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251219Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1280
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0082
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0011
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0112
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0291
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0226
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0223
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0226
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0277
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 001548 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
AID/W FOR ASIA/EA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KDEM UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN PREPARES FOR DECEMBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
¶1.  Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public 
internet. 
 
¶2. (U) SUMMARY: The parliamentary elections in 
Uzbekistan slated for December 2009 are likely to 
result in minimal changes to the overall structure 
of decision-making in the country; however, what may 
define the development of government responsiveness 
and transparency in Uzbekistan is not the outcome of 
the elections, but how political parties are 
learning to run for office.  The elections represent 
a possible evolutionary shift in how the government- 
sponsored political parties in Uzbekistan run 
election campaigns, interact with the electorate, 
and compete in a closed political system.   The 
upcoming elections will be an opportunity for the 
Government of Uzbekistan to forestall possible 
social instability through political competition and 
consensus building, while laying the groundwork for 
greater receptivity to democratic principles. 
 
 
BACKGROUND: Political Parties in Uzbekistan 
 
¶3. (SBU) The December 2009 parliamentary elections 
offer an important, albeit limited, opportunity for 
parties and civic groups to engage citizens in 
decision-making.  The five political parties-- 
Adolat, Ecological (Green) Movement, Liberal 
Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, Milliy Tiklanish, 
and the National Democratic Party-must compete with 
each other for seats in the lower house.  Although 
these parties are loyal to the executive and they 
remain the only groups that can run campaigns and 
whose members can be nominated for election, the 
prospect of gaining or losing seats is a powerful 
motivation for improved campaigning.  While there 
continue to be constraints on political speech and 
association within Uzbekistan, the political parties 
are provided with sufficient space by the executive 
branch to compete in elections. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Despite this limited freedom to campaign 
provided to loyalist groups, parties remain 
relatively unaware of how democratic processes take 
place, how to engage the electorate, and how to run 
a campaign.  Indeed, many party members do not view 
the public as constituents and in the vacuum of 
Uzbek politics and media, representational 
government is a wholly alien concept.  Lack of 
public pressure and incentives to work with the 
public has meant that political parties do not have 
the experience and skills needed for assessing the 
demands and needs of the public, developing programs 
that address those priorities, and communicating 
these programs to the public.  For example, despite 
recent demonstrations, the parties have yet to 
address growing frustration with declining economic 
opportunities in their platforms or legislative 
agendas.  Continued inability to react to the 
demands of the people is potentially destabilizing; 
May bombings in the border region with Kyrgyzstan 
may portend future destabilizing acts. 
 
 
The Weak "Opposition" 
 
¶4. (SBU) In Uzbekistan, there is essentially no 
opposition to the current administration.  Human 
rights activists, journalists and others who speak 
out for change lack the ability to collectively 
advocate and make demands due to continued 
harassment and infighting between groups.  The clash 
of personalities preventing collaboration between 
movements is evinced in their genesis: the major 
unregistered political groups--Agrarian, Birlik 
(Unity), Erk (Liberty), Ozod Dekhon (Free Farmers), 
 
TASHKENT 00001548  002 OF 003 
 
 
and Sunshine Uzbekistan--all originated from the 
Soviet-era Birlik movement.  The government readily 
exploits the larger-than-life personalities of their 
leaders (three of whom are in exile outside of 
Uzbekistan) to further rifts; grants provided to 
these groups are sometimes met with allegations of 
donor favoritism by those who are not funded.  None 
of these non-registered political groups can 
participate in political decision-making or in 
elections. Generally, these groups have failed to 
offer the public independent points of view on 
issues due to weak organizational capacity.  Neither 
the exiled leaders nor those inside Uzbekistan have 
viable plans for building the bases of support for 
these groups. 
 
Remaking Parties to Be More Democratic 
 
¶5. (U) Despite the generally poor record on 
elections and the development of diverse, responsive 
political parties, the position of the Government of 
Uzbekistan towards outside help on these issues (and 
human rights) appears to be slightly shifting.  The 
government proclaims the abolition of the death 
penalty and its adoption of the right of habeas 
corpus as evidence that Uzbekistan shares certain 
democratic values.  In February 2009, Uzbekistan 
became a signatory to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Peoples with Disabilities, demonstrating 
that there are selected policy areas in which 
parliament has limited autonomy to set policy in 
social spheres. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Perhaps more critically has been the 
unprecedented access of USAID grantee the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) to political parties for 
training purposes.  In a country where donors lack 
the ability to directly collaborate with 
legislators, NDI's experience assisting parties in 
techniques such as developing campaigns, voter 
outreach, codes of ethics and candidate selection 
indicate a sea change in how parties relate to the 
public.  Since the last election in December 2004, 
NDI has maintained a presence in Uzbekistan and 
maintained relationships with the GoU, even as many 
international NGOs were forced to close.  Starting 
with workshops and conferences to discuss best 
practices in elections with international experts, 
trust between this American partner organization and 
the Government of Uzbekistan has been rebuilt, 
resulting in parties directly participating in the 
first of a series of trainings for the December 2009 
elections in August 2008.  NDI provided information 
about best practices for assessing voters' concerns 
and priorities and gave practical tools to party 
members on how to mobilize a grassroots campaign. 
The nine-day seminars also included discussions of 
up-to-date citizen outreach methods, communication 
techniques, candidate selection, and message 
development.  A series of workshops in the run-up to 
the election are building upon basic concepts (e.g. 
advertising, press conferences) with the same group 
of representatives from different groups to enhance 
the depth of knowledge and practical tools available 
to all parties. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In the workshops, party members are showing 
they know how to apply their new knowledge: in an 
August 2009 training, party members designed mock 
campaigns for their candidates.  While presenting 
their ideas, participants suggested using SMS 
technology, public polls, and direct interaction 
with vulnerable groups like the homeless to give 
their candidates the edge.  Anyone familiar with 
politics in Uzbekistan will agree that these tactics 
are ground-breaking and may indicate parties are 
ready to actively listen to the demands of the 
 
TASHKENT 00001548  003 OF 003 
 
 
populace. 
 
Signs of Competition between Parties 
 
¶6. (SBU) Although the outcomes of these trainings 
cannot fully be gauged until the candidate 
nomination process and elections have taken place, 
anecdotal evidence of the change in the orientation 
of parties is appearing.  In April 2009, Uzbek 
language newspapers (such as newspaper Tashkent XXI 
Asr) began reporting that the People's Democratic 
Party of Uzbekistan had "set itself a main goal of 
increasing, in every possible way, its influence in 
neighborhoods" to affect election results.  This 
article is significantnot only because the PDP is 
led by the presidentas it shows that the PDP is 
seriously considering how to become more competitive 
against other parties (a characteristic generally 
lacking in the political landscape of Uzbekistan's 
parties) or at least points to criticism of the 
ruling party in the media.   This article was 
followed by two similar articles indicating 
increasing competition among political parties over 
successive months, including an article where the 
PDP struck back against criticism, stating that the 
Liberal Democratic Party had begun campaigning too 
early; ostensibly a clear violation of the 2008 
election law (Vesti Newspaper, June 09, 2009). 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: The unexpected energy and 
innovation of political party members in trainings 
paired with public criticism of government- 
sanctioned parties may indicate that the attitudes 
and perceptions of those standing for election in 
Uzbekistan are changing. Clearly the enthusiasm of 
political party workshop participants demonstrates 
that lower-level government representatives are open 
to new methods of campaigning and listening to the 
electorate.  Over the long-term, the type of 
training and support provided to parties and civil 
society through USAID programs has the potential to 
extend the impact of these incremental improvements. 
NORLAND