VZCZCXRO8911
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #7595/01 2341836
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221818Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AUSTRALIA GROUP COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 3159
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1128
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 5523
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 087595 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM ETTC
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: CHEMICAL MICRO-REACTOR SYSTEMS 
EXPERTS GROUP (#1 OF 4) 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 1003 
     ¶B. STATE 82614 
     ¶C. COATES-HARTELL E-MAIL 8/6/2009 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 2. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Drawing on the background below, Department 
requests Australia Group (AG) country Embassies provide the 
non-paper in paragraph 6 to appropriate host government 
officials and elicit a response. (Note: This is the first of 
four cables conveying U.S. proposals. End Note)  In 
delivering this non-paper, posts should indicate that the 
U.S. is sharing this non-paper as part of preparations for 
the September 21-25 AG plenary and that we would appreciate 
hearing their views or any suggestions they may have on the 
non-paper.  Request Embassy Canberra provide the non-paper to 
the AG chair for circulation as an official AG document. 
 
------------------ 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Embassies should report results of this demarche by 
cable before September 7.  Please contact ISN/CB Andrew Souza 
at 202-647-4838 or via e-mail for further information. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The manufacturing process for many chemical warfare 
agents can be extremely caustic, requiring equipment that is 
made of specialized corrosion and heat-resistant materials. 
To help limit the proliferation of chemical weapons, the 
40-country AG has agreed to require government permission for 
exports of this specialized chemical production equipment. 
The chemical micro-reactor, a pejorative term used to 
describe very millimeter-sized high-throughput reactors, is 
an emerging technology that has the potential to eventually 
supplant the traditional chemical production equipment listed 
on the AG's control list.  For further background on chemical 
micro-reactor technology, see REF B. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) To prepare for such an event, we are proposing that 
AG participants assemble a group of experts to consider 
advances in micro-reactor technology as they relate to 
chemical weapons proliferation and potential steps the AG 
could take to address the issue.  The U.S. has already shared 
this proposal with the UK, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands, as they currently represent the vast majority of 
global micro-reactor production countries.  The UK and 
Germany have voiced preliminary support for the proposal 
(REFs A and C), but France and the Netherlands have yet to 
provide their views. 
 
--------- 
NON-PAPER 
--------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Begin Text of non-paper: 
 
AG-In-Confidence 
 
AUSTRALIA GROUP 
 
Australia Group Doc 
AG/Jul09/ExC/USA/xx 
 
Chemical Micro-reactor Systems Experts Group 
 
Issue 
 
Should the Australia Group establish an experts group to 
consider awareness-raising guidelines or controls for 
multi-unit (numbered up) commercially-manufactured 
micro-reactor and/or meso-reactor systems with process 
 
STATE 00087595  002 OF 003 
 
 
throughput (yield capabilities of a metric ton or greater per 
annum)? 
 
Background 
 
Commercial manufacturers of industrial 
micro-reactor/meso-reactor systems produce units capable of 
yielding metric ton (and greater) per annum product yields. 
These systems can rival in yield, and especially in product 
purity, chemicals produced with standard 100 L - 20,000 L 
(AG-controlled) reactor technologies.  The concern from the 
standpoint of the AG is that even though these reactor 
systems are as capable as traditional reactor systems, they 
do not meet the parameters of current controls.  The small 
size of these reactor systems would also make it easier to 
conceal a production process within a chemical plant.  This 
would present a tempting opportunity for chemical weapons 
proliferators with sufficient financial resources and a high 
level of technical sophistication.  Since this problem will 
only become more significant over time, contemplating action 
now, while the technology has not widely diffused, would be 
prudent. 
 
There is also a possibility that micro-reactors/meso-reactors 
will eventually supplant some traditional chemical production 
technology.  Assembling a group of experts would be a prudent 
first step towards understanding what, if any, aspects of 
this reactor technology can be controlled to prevent 
proliferation without imposing an undue burden on commercial 
industry. 
 
Discussion 
 
Multiple publications have voiced concerns about 
micro-reactor/meso-reactor systems as pathways for avoiding 
AG export controls and Chemical Weapons Convention 
inspections, but none have offered solutions for minimizing 
this risk.  These systems are highly sophisticated and rather 
specialized, so at this point they might not readily lend 
themselves to use for chemical weapons proliferator, although 
this may change in the future.  At this time, they are also 
significantly more expensive than standard glass production 
equipment and designed for continuous production processes. 
Some are only capable of generating a limited variety of 
chemical products. 
 
However, micro-reactors and meso-reactors do have a number of 
advantages over traditional chemical production equipment. 
For example, many chemical reactions have shown improved 
reactivity, product yield, and selectivity when executed on 
this scale.  They also simplify the problems associated with 
scaling-up a process by combining multiple reactors in 
arrays, a process also known as  numbering-up.,  The high 
throughput of these reactor systems when numbered-up could 
allow for the production of hazardous chemicals on demand, 
minimizing handling and storage needs.  Processing highly 
toxic or corrosive materials in these reactors produces a 
smaller waste stream and higher reaction yield (i.e., 
purity).  Their small size also makes them more difficult to 
detect.  All of these characteristics would make them very 
advantageous to chemical warfare agent production. 
 
Though  numbering-up, avoids some scale-up difficulties of 
conventional chemical production, it is not without hurdles, 
as it requires real-time computer control to coordinate and 
monitor all of the individual modules and the total system. 
Micro-reactors and meso-reactors are also not well-suited for 
processing solid chemicals, requiring would-be proliferators 
to address technological challenges, such as filtering, 
preventing fouling, heat management, catalyst implementation, 
ensuring absolutely uniform flow equi-partitioning, and 
control of the subunits in a reliable and robust manner. 
 
Recommendations 
 
-- The United States recommends that AG participants 
establish an experts group on micro-reactor/meso-reactor 
technologies (analogous to the group established for 
synthetic biology) to evaluate current commercial industrial 
systems for their dual-use proliferation potential during the 
2009-2010 intersessional period. 
 
-- The United States suggests that this experts group 
consider whether to provide awareness-raising guidelines for 
producers of commercial micro-reactor/meso-reactor systems. 
 
STATE 00087595  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
-- The experts group should also consider whether current 
trends in the adoption of micro-reactor/meso-reactor 
technology warrant the AG to consider appropriate controls 
for multi-unit (numbered-up) automated micro/meso chemical 
factory systems. 
 
-- In addition to evaluating these reactor systems, the 
experts group should also look at  enabling technologies,, 
which specifically enable micro-reactor/meso-reactor systems 
to evolve and overcome current limitations. 
 
-- It probably would be useful to have the experts group meet 
informally with appropriate representatives of AG country 
industry on the margins of its meetings, to ensure a thorough 
understanding of the technology and its commercial 
implications. 
 
-- If it appears that controls will eventually be necessary, 
AG members could then ask the group to identify 
micro-reactor/meso-reactor equipment specifications that 
could be used as the basis for future controls. 
End non-paper. 
¶7.  (U) Please begin all responses with AUSTRALIA GROUP and 
slug for ISN. 
¶8.  (U) Department thanks posts for their support. 
CLINTON