VZCZCXRO8623
PP RUEHGI
DE RUEHC #7508/01 2332051
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 212033Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 8084
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0185
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI PRIORITY 1415
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 8141
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 6224
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5965
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6293
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 4802
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7426
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 087508 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
ADDIS ABABA AND KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS CG UG SU
SUBJECT: CIVILIAN PROTECTION AGAINST LRA ATTACKS IN THE 
CAR, DRC, AND SOUTHERN SUDAN 
 
¶1. (U) This is an Action Request for Khartoum/Juba, 
Kinshasa, and Bangui.  Please see para 4. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) -- though 
dispersed by Operation Lightning Thunder/Rudia II -- 
continues to attack civilian populations in border areas 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), southern 
Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR), leading to 
widespread civilian displacement and frustrating 
humanitarian relief efforts. Refugee arrivals in southern 
Sudan since September 2008 have now reached over 20,000 -- 
mostly Congolese but including some 600 recent arrivals 
from the CAR.  LRA attacks are reported in the DRC and 
southern Sudan weekly.  Recent attacks near Obo, CAR are 
troublesome new developments. Some humanitarian 
organizations are concerned that the LRA may be seeking to 
regroup inside CAR.  The UN estimates that over 1,000 
people have been killed, 1,500 abducted, and over 250,000 
displaced in an area spanning the DRC, Sudan, and CAR 
since September 2008. 
 
¶3. (SBU) There is a limited presence of humanitarian 
organizations in the tri-border area but insecurity and 
poor infrastructure impede access to the populations most 
in need.  State/PRM and USAID are supporting international 
organizations and NGOs for emergency interventions for 
affected populations in the DRC and Sudan and will need to 
address the CAR also.  (Note: Senator Feingold has 
reintroduced a bill to support humanitarian and 
development assistance in LRA-affected areas.  The bill, 
in committee, calls for a regional strategy for civilian 
protection and elimination of the LRA threat.  AF has 
concerns with the bill as drafted including that it would 
require duplicative efforts to those underway. End Note). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Protection of civilians remains a critical 
concern. In light of new developments, State and USAID are 
refining (for an Interagency Policy Committee) 
recommendations on civilian protection in the tri-country 
area currently affected by the LRA, and PRM is seeking 
posts' input on practical recommendations guided by the 
following questions.  Note that we do have some inputs 
from international and non-governmental organizations, but 
are looking for posts' best and candid judgments. 
 
For Khartoum/Juba: 
 
-- What is the current UNMIS, SPLA, UPDF response capacity 
in LRA-affected areas?  (We note that in last week's LRA 
attack on Ezo town, neither the UPDF nor the SPLA soldiers 
acted effectively to stop the LRA from entering the center 
of town, attacking IDPs, and looting the Commissioner's 
premises.  Reasons are unclear.) 
 
-- Given recent attacks in areas of refugee/IDP 
settlement, what is the GOSS and UN strategy to provide 
civilian protection and ensure that humanitarian 
assistance is not targeted for looting? 
 
-- How would any additional humanitarian resources best be 
used to provide assistance and protection to 
refugee/IDP/other civilian populations? 
 
-- What are the shortfalls in NGO/IO humanitarian 
operations (including beyond the usual financial 
resources) in LRA-Affected areas and what obstacles are 
creating these? 
 
-- What has been the local response to the security 
threats?  Have militias been formed to ward off LRA 
attacks? 
 
For Kinshasa: 
 
 
STATE 00087508  002 OF 002 
 
 
-- What are the current MONUC and FARDC response 
capacities in LRA-affected areas? 
 
-- What is the impact of real or perceived MONUC mandate 
limitations with regard to civilian protection in the 
areas affected by the LRA? 
 
-- Post has provided considerable information to date on 
shortfalls in NGO/IO humanitarian operations in 
LRA-affected areas.  We would appreciate any further 
information on shortfalls, and particularly what obstacles 
are creating these? 
 
-- How would any additional humanitarian resources best be 
used to provide assistance and protection to civilian 
populations? 
 
For Bangui: 
 
-- What is the current FACA and UPDF response capacity in 
LRA-affected areas? 
 
-- What is the current capacity for humanitarian response 
in LRA-affected areas?  (Comment.  We know of course that 
it is quite limited but would appreciate some specific 
level of effort that post judges might be achieved with 
additional international support.)  What additional 
resources might be required/effectively used? 
 
-- Is there any scope for MINURCAT or other international 
(e.g., MICOPAX) military role in civilian protection? 
 
-- If the LRA were to re-group in the CAR, does the UN 
country team, government, military, humanitarian actors, 
etc have contingency plans in place? (We note the affected 
areas are far from Bangui but Embassy's assessment of 
this would be helpful.) 
 
-- What are other international players' response to 
LRA-affected areas and what are they reporting on the 
situation? (SBU response if available). 
 
¶5. (U) At least a preliminary answer would be appreciated 
by Tuesday, August 25 if possible. 
CLINTON