VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1358/01 2360829
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240829Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5455
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

UNCLAS SEOUL 001358 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD PINR KN KS CH
SUBJECT: FM YU TELLS ALBRIGHT DENUCLEARIZATION IS TOP 
PRIORITY 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) At a breakfast for the U.S. Presidential Delegation 
to the funeral of former ROK President Kim Dae-jung, FM Yu 
Myung-hwan told former Secretary Albright that Seoul's 
message to the North Korean funeral delegation had been 
simple:  without progress on denuclearization, improvement in 
North-South relations would be difficult.  While hesitant to 
characterize UNSCR 1874 as the reason for North Korea's new 
willingness to engage on North-South issues, FM Yu agreed 
that 1874 was making it harder for Pyongyang to do business 
as usual.  The resolution was helping put pressure on the 
north as it went through what Yu predicted would be a 
difficult three-year leadership transition from Kim Jong-il 
to Kim Chong-un.  Noting that Chinese thinking about North 
Korea appeared to be evolving, Yu said the DPRK's refusal to 
return to the six-party process had apparently prompted the 
recent publication of several Chinese Communist 
Party-approved press articles critical of Pyongyang.  FM Yu 
emphasized that KORUS passage was extremely important to 
Korea and warned that other countries would soon start 
benefiting from concessions won by the hard work of U.S. 
trade negotiators.  Former Secretary Albright called on Seoul 
to honor Kim Dae-jung's legacy by continuing to work for 
human rights improvements in Burma.  End summary. 
 
One Hour Breakfast with FM Yu Focuses on DPRK... 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (SBU) ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan assured former 
Secretary Albright and the other members of the Presidential 
Delegation that Seoul's message to the North Korean 
delegation had been simple and consistent:  without progress 
on denuclearization, improvement in North-South relations 
would be difficult.  The North Koreans, Yu said, knew that 
they could generate domestic political pressure on the Blue 
House with conciliatory rhetoric and gestures.  The ROKG 
message to the DPRK delegation was therefore clear:  talks 
are fine, but Seoul is committed to implementing UNSCR 1874. 
Yu agreed with the delegation members that it would be 
critical to maintain solidarity between Washington, Seoul, 
Tokyo, Moscow, and Beijing on the importance of implementing 
¶1874. 
 
¶3. (SBU) While hesitant to characterize 1874 as the reason 
for North Korea's new attitude, FM Yu agreed that it was 
making it harder for Pyongyang to do business as usual.  The 
resolution, combined with ROK cuts in purchases of 
construction materials and seafood, was putting pressure on 
the north as it went through what Yu predicted would be a 
three-year leadership transition from Kim Jong-il (KJI) to 
Kim Chong-un (KCU).  The north's apparent goal, Yu asserted, 
was to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state by 2012 -- 
when the DPRK will mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of 
Kim Il-sung, the 70th birthday of KJI and the 30th birthday 
(lunar calendar) of KCU. 
 
...China's Evolving Role... 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Yu noted that Chinese thinking about North Korea 
appeared to be continuing to evolve.  PRC FM Yang had assured 
him that Beijing wanted Pyongyang to return to the 6PT and 
had delivered that message via several channels, only to be 
rebuffed.  That intransigence, Yu said, apparently prompted 
the publication of several articles critical of North Korea 
in prominent Chinese Communist Party-affiliated publications. 
 Yu agreed with members of the delegation that while Beijing 
clearly feared a quick collapse of the North Korean regime 
and had "less influence than we think," China still supplied 
massive amounts of food and fuel to the north and therefore 
had leverage.  Yu acknowledged that younger DPRK analysts in 
the PRC think-tank community had even begun to refer to 
Pyongyang as a security liability for Beijing.  FM Yu said 
the ROKG was reaching out to these scholars to establish a 
Track Two dialogue about North Korea. 
 
...Prospects for KORUS Passage... 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Turning to economic issues, FM Yu emphasized that, 
for Korea, the FTA was more than simply a trade deal. 
Passage of KORUS, he said, would signal to the ROK public a 
U.S. commitment to making trade a cornerstone of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance in the 21st century.  While taking former Secretary 
Albright's point about the "toxic" political atmosphere for 
trade deals on Capitol Hill, Yu agreed with Ambassador 
Bosworth's observation that other countries would take 
advantage of the hard work done by U.S. negotiators on KORUS. 
 The ROKG was preparing to sign an FTA with the European 
Union and was already in negotiations with Canada and 
Australia, among others; benefits won by U.S. negotiators 
would go to companies from other countries, Yu lamented. 
 
...and Burma 
------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Noting the ROK's unique position in Asia as a 
country that had made the transition from authoritarian rule 
to democracy, former Secretary Albright called on Seoul to 
honor Kim Dae-jung's legacy by continuing to work for human 
rights improvements in Burma.  Calling it the "saddest 
country in Asia," FM Yu noted that the ROKG has been 
increasingly active, along with Indonesia, in calling for 
improvements in human rights conditions. 
STEPHENS