Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09SEOUL1308, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; August 14, 2009

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SEOUL1308.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1308 2009-08-14 07:03 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO2333
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1308/01 2260703
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140703Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5356
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9016
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0161
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6467
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6547
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1137
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 4889
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3857
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7057
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1391
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2709
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1788
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2396
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SEOUL 001308 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; August 14, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
 
Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, Hankyoreh Shinmun, 
Segye Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun, All TVs 
Hyundai Asan Worker Freed after 136 Days of Captivity 
in N. Korea 
 
JoongAng Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo 
Freed Hyundai Asan Worker: "I'm Happy to be Back... 
Thank You" 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
----------------------- 
 
A Hyundai Asan worker, who had been held incommunicado in North 
Korea since March 30, was freed yesterday evening. North Korea 
officially deported him on the 136th day of his detention for 
criticizing the North's political system. (All) 
 
The Unification Ministry denied a ransom was paid for his release, 
but gave no details of behind-the-scenes talks between the two 
countries. (All) 
 
Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jung-eun extended her stay in North 
Korea for one more day yesterday, possibly because of a delayed 
meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. She originally planned 
to return to Seoul on August 12. (All) 
 
A U.S. delegation led by Ambassador Philip Goldberg, coordinator for 
the U.S.'s implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, 
will visit Seoul late next week, around August 22. (JoongAng, 
Dong-a, Segye) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-N. Korea 
--------- 
 
 - Release of ROK Worker 
Yesterday's release of a Hyundai Asan worker, who had been held 
incommunicado in North Korea since March 30, received above-the-fold 
front-page treatment.  According to media reports, North Korea 
allowed the worker to leave by expelling him for criticizing the 
North's political system, and the ROK Unification Ministry stated 
that it neither paid a ransom nor offered an apology for his 
release, while giving no details of behind-the-scenes talks between 
the two Koreas. 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo's front-page report quoted an ROKG official 
as commenting: "Given several other pending issues, including the 
fate of four crewmembers of a fishing boat towed to the North after 
crossing the Northern Limit Line in the East Sea on July 30, the 
ROKG will not abruptly change its North Korea policy.  However, it 
is clear that a breakthrough has been made in inter-Korean ties 
following the worker's release." 
 
Chosun Ilbo also carried an inside-page analysis that said that 
Pyongyang may be returning to dialogue, because its "hostage 
politics," using the detained ROK worker and U.S. journalists as 
leverage in relations with the U.S. and the ROK, failed to deliver; 
that approach instead became increasingly burdensome for Pyongyang 
over time.  The Chosun analysis quoted local experts as observing: 
"Nothing comes without a price tag in relations with North Korea. 
Pyongyang probably expects some sort of financial compensation from 
Seoul for the worker's release." 
 
The ROK media also gave wide attention to Hyundai Group Chairwoman 
Hyun Jung-eun's decision to extend her stay in North Korea for one 
 
SEOUL 00001308  002 OF 006 
 
 
more day, possibly because of a delayed meeting with North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il. 
 
In a related development, conservative Chosun quoted an ROKG 
official as saying that the Hyundai chairwoman "must have met" Kim 
Jong-il because she was scheduled to return on Wednesday but 
extended her stay twice, and because the North's invitation only 
mentioned the start of her visit, "from Monday," but did not say 
when it would end. 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "North Korea must have 
released the ROK worker out of consideration that strained 
inter-Korean relations will not be to its advantage. ... The ROKG 
needs to send a forward-looking signal to North Korea. ... It can 
positively consider making a bold proposal, including resumption of 
humanitarian aid, through its upcoming speech to mark the August 15 
Liberation Day.  The fundamental resolution of the inter-Korean 
issue ultimately depends on the resolution of North Korea's nuclear 
issue.  In the process, however, we should make efforts to improve 
inter-Korean relations." 
 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo argued in an editorial: "Seoul should not 
interpret the ROK worker's release as signaling a major change in 
inter-Korean relations.  Resolution of humanitarian issues is one 
thing, but the North's nuclear dismantlement is quite another. 
Unless Pyongyang fundamentally changes its behavior toward nuclear 
weapons, no breakthrough in inter-Korean relations is possible." 
 
- Sanctions on N. Korea 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo and conservative Dong-a Ilbo and Segye 
Ilbo reported that a U.S. delegation led by Ambassador Philip 
Goldberg, coordinator for the U.S.'s implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1874, will visit Seoul late next week, around 
August 22.  According to reports, Ambassador Goldberg will stress 
during the visit that sanctions against North Korea have nothing to 
do with former President Bill Clinton's visit to North Korea and 
that they should continue. 
 
JoongAng Ilbo's Senior Journalist Kim Young-hie opined: "(Current) 
International sanctions against North Korea are much more powerful 
and effective than any other sanctions in the past. ...  North 
Korea's invitations of former President Clinton and Hyundai Group 
Chairwoman Hyun Jung-eun are related to this grave situation. ... 
What matters is moderating the intensity of sanctions.  It is time 
to calculate accurately to what extent we should put pressure on 
North Korea in order to maximize the effects of sanctions and to 
bring the North back to the Six-Party Talks, while making the 
country deliver on its agreements.  Otherwise, North Korea will 
become desperate - like a mouse chased by a cat - and resort to 
self-destructive acts, including nuclear and missile tests.  Now 
that U.S. -North Korea relations have entered a new phase, the 
release of the Hyundai Asan employee may serve as a significant 
breakthrough in inter-Korean relations." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
'REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN' HOLBROOKE AND 'REPRESENTATIVE FOR 
NORTH KOREA' BOSWORTH 
(Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 2009, page 4) 
 
By Washington correspondent Lee Ha-won 
 
On August 12, a forum organized by the pro-Obama Center for American 
Progress (CAP) was held at the St. Regis hotel in Washington, DC. 
At the event, John Podesta, the President of CAP, and Richard 
Hoolbrooke, the U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan stood 
behind a podium.  They were flanked by five people.  There were 
sixteen TV cameras lined up on the opposite side.  150 seats were 
arranged, and about 40 people, who were not able to seat themselves, 
pricked up their ears. 
 
Representative Holbrooke introduced his 10 aides and said that he 
 
SEOUL 00001308  003 OF 006 
 
 
had never worked with a team as strong as this one in 40 years.  The 
aides, who came from the Department of State, Department of 
Treasury, Department of Defense, and so on, explained their own 
roles and answered questions from the audience.  Jane Marriott, who 
was introduced as "a special figure borrowed from the British 
government," spoke in a British accent and stressed international 
cooperation. 
 
By showing the harmony among him and his ten staff members on this 
day, Holbrooke instilled trust in U.S. Afghanistan policy.  This 
scene reminded me of Stephen W. Bosworth, who was appointed as U.S. 
Special Representative for North Korea at the same time as 
Holbrooke.  Since attending a Foreign Press Center briefing in April 
and a Senate hearing in June, Special Representative Bosworth has 
been conducting virtually no activities. 
 
Despite some criticism that he is a "part-time" envoy, he still 
doubles as the Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at 
Tufts University.  He, of course, spends more time in Medford, 
Massachusetts, where the university is located.  Compared to 
Holbrooke, who shows up at the Department of State every day and 
deals with Afghan issues, Bosworth reportedly makes a "business 
trip" to Washington D.C. when necessary.  This is also in contrast 
to a flurry of activities by Ambassador Philip Goldberg, coordinator 
for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874.  This 
is why some people call Bosworth an "invisible man."  We just hope 
that somewhere out of sight, he is focusing his efforts to devise 
strategies for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue "once and 
for all." 
 
 
MODERATING PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA IS THE KEY 
(JoongAng Ilbo, August 14, 2009, Page 43) 
 
By Senior Journalist Kim Young-hie 
 
A source well-versed in ROK-U.S. cooperation on North Korea said 
that the USG seemed to have notified the ROKG on roughly 80 percent 
of the outcome of former President Clinton's visit to the North. 
Since the remaining 20 percent is Clinton's subjective impression 
during his meeting and dinner with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, 
it is the part to be shared only with U.S. President Barack Obama. 
Based on those conversations, the ROKG surmises that since Clinton 
was restricted by the USG not to act as a negotiator in Pyongyang, 
except for the release of the journalists, he unilaterally explained 
what he believed the Obama Administration's stance is on the 
resolution of North Korean issues - including the nuclear standoff - 
and otherwise kept quiet.  This made Kim feel dispirited, and thus, 
while explaining North Korea's position at length, Kim gave Clinton 
the message that he hoped would be delivered to President Obama. 
Kim emphasized the need for the U.S. to discontinue its 'hostile 
policy toward the North' as a condition for improvement in 
U.S.-North Korea relations. 
 
A starting point for calculating the effects of the Clinton visit is 
to examine what Kim gained from it.  Kim scored many points at home 
and abroad.  He was able to trumpet the fact that the former U.S. 
President and husband of the current U.S. Secretary of State paid a 
visit to Dear Leader Kim, while apologizing for the U.S. 
journalists' illegal entry into the North, and appealing for 
leniency.  Kim may also be pleased that he showed to the outside 
world considerable generosity by freeing the U.S. journalists who 
had been sentenced to 12 years of hard labor.  One flaw in this 
picture is the issue of the Hyundai Asan employee.  The impression 
that Kim is generous to Americans but mean to people of the same 
ethnicity does not match the "considerable generosity" that Kim 
wants to show off.  In this context, the issue of the ROK employee 
does not go beyond the influence of the Clinton visit. 
 
Some experts on North Korea think that since Clinton fully explained 
Washington's position to Kim, the ball is now in North Korea's 
court.  As explained by Clinton, the USG's position also reminds the 
North of the harsh reality that, without denuclearization, Pyongyang 
should not anticipate an improvement in its relations with the U.S. 
 
SEOUL 00001308  004 OF 006 
 
 
North Korea is certainly being weighed down under UN-led sanctions 
and additional steps taken by the U.S.  However, the North Koreans 
are a weird group, well accustomed to such situations; therefore, 
Washington is not in a position to continue to endlessly tighten the 
screws on the North.  Sanctions are a means, not an end.  The U.S. 
is putting pressure on North Korea as a strong means to lure North 
Korea back to the Six-Party Talks while making the North pursue 
irreversible and verifiable denuclearization. 
 
U.S.-North Korea relations before and after Clinton's visit to 
Pyongyang will be quite different.  David Sanger, the diplomatic 
affairs reporter for The New York Times, said in an August 10 report 
that the Obama Administration is gradually refocusing its policy on 
classic "containment" of the North's ability to export its nuclear 
technology.  This report reflects a change that has been palpable in 
Washington since Clinton's North Korea visit.  Sanger said, "Few of 
Mr. Obama's aides believe that the North will ever give up 
everything in its nuclear panoply."   He added, "The more immediate, 
and practical, goal, then, is to neutralize Mr. Kim's ability to 
reap cash and power from exporting its know-how for building a crude 
nuclear device."  These remarks send an important signal that even 
though this is not the official position of the Obama 
Administration, the U.S.' North Korea policy could be enacted on the 
notion that Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear ambitions. 
President Lee Myung-bak also sensed this change in U.S. position 
during the June ROK-U.S. summit. 
 
(Current) international sanctions against North Korea have been much 
more powerful and effective than any other sanctions in the past. 
Moreover, the U.S. is choking off North Korea's financial supplies 
independently.  If this continues for another six months, North 
Korea will be very likely to lose almost all channels for 
international financial transactions except its small accounts in 
many Chinese banks.  North Korea's invitations of former President 
Clinton and Hyundai Group Chairwoman Hyun Jung-eun are related to 
this grave situation.  This is also why North Korea no longer uses 
provocative words, including suggesting an additional nuclear test 
or a missile launch.  Encouraged by the effects of sanctions, the 
U.S. seems to intend to push harder since it is reaping good 
results. 
 
What matters is moderating the intensity of sanctions.  It is time 
to calculate accurately to what extent we should put pressure on 
North Korea in order to maximize the effects of sanctions and to 
bring the North back to the Six-Party Talks, while making the North 
deliver on its agreements.  Otherwise, North Korea will become 
desperate - like a mouse chased by a cat - and resort to 
self-destructive acts, including nuclear and missile tests.  Now 
that U.S. -North Korea relations have entered a new phase, the 
release of the Hyundai Asan employee may serve as a significant 
breakthrough in inter-Korean relations.  The ROK should respond to 
the release of the ROK worker considering a change in U.S.-North 
Korea relations. 
 
 
N. KOREA MUST FREE FISHERMEN 
(Dong-a Ilbo, August 14, 2009, page 27) 
 
Hyundai Asan Corp. worker Yu Seong-jin was freed yesterday after 
spending 137 days in detention in North Korea.  His release is 
apparently the North's overture to the ROK after Pyongyang sent a 
conciliatory gesture to the U.S. by releasing two American 
reporters.  The North had repeatedly urged "unity among all 
Koreans," so it would have been difficult to keep Yu detained even 
after freeing the two journalists in the wake of former U.S. 
President Bill Clinton's visit to Pyongyang. 
 
Despite Yu's release, a slew of humanitarian issues remain between 
the ROK and North Korea.  Four ROK fishermen from the vessel 800 
Yeonan remain prisoners in the North.  The boat strayed into North 
Korean waters due to a mechanical failure on July 30.  Ironically, 
the ROK repatriated a North Korean fishing boat that accidentally 
crossed the inter-Korean border in the Yellow Sea the same day the 
800 Yeonan entered the North.  Pyongyang must immediately release 
 
SEOUL 00001308  005 OF 006 
 
 
the four fishermen and stop taking hostages. 
 
Thirteen months have passed since the North's killing of ROK tourist 
Park Wang-ja, who was shot to death July 11 last year by a North 
Korean soldier at Mount Kumkang.  Pyongyang, however, has yet to 
apologize for her shooting, let alone promise to prevent a 
recurrence.  Tours to the scenic mountain should not resume before 
the killing is resolved.  The North is mistaken if it believes her 
death will also be forgotten the way Yu's detention was resolved. 
 
Seoul should not interpret the ROK worker's release as signaling a 
major change in inter-Korean relations.  Resolution of humanitarian 
issues is one thing, but the North's nuclear dismantlement is quite 
another.  Unless Pyongyang fundamentally changes its behavior toward 
nuclear weapons, no breakthrough in inter-Korean relations is 
possible. 
 
For more than 10 years, the pattern of North Korean aggression, U.N. 
sanctions against the North, the dispatch of a special envoy, and 
compensation followed by dialogue has repeated itself.  U.S. 
President Barack Obama, however, has made it clear that Washington 
will break the pattern of compensating the North for its 
provocations.  The U.S. says the release of the two journalists is a 
separate matter from the nuclear issue.  It also added Kwangson 
Banking Corp. to the list of North Korean entities subject to 
financial sanctions on Tuesday.  The North is apparently making 
conciliatory gestures toward the ROK and the U.S. to avoid 
international isolation resulting from UN economic sanctions after 
its second nuclear explosion and missile tests.  Pyongyang must face 
the reality that no breakthrough in ties with Seoul or Washington 
will occur unless it gives up nuclear weapons. 
 
Seoul must maintain a cool-minded and principle-based stance toward 
Pyongyang to prevent the North from misjudging that the ROK and the 
U.S. will return to the pattern of the past.  It is thus premature 
to say that if Pyongyang releases detainees and talks of returning 
to the Six-Party Talks, the ROK can resume sending aid to the 
North. 
 
 
S. KOREAN'S RELEASE IS NOT THE END OF THE MATTER 
(Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 2009, page 31) 
 
North Korea released an ROK staffer at the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex on Thursday, 136 days after he was suddenly arrested on 
March 30.  The release of Yu Seong-jin, which came during a visit to 
North Korea by Hyundai Group chairwoman Hyun Jung-eun, is welcome 
news not only for his family but for all ROK people. 
 
We will soon find out what Hyun discussed during her trip to North 
Korea when she returns to the ROK.  Hyundai Asan has been the main 
ROK business partner of North Korea after agreeing nine years ago to 
operate the Kaesong Industrial Complex with the North's Asia-Pacific 
Peace Committee.  Asan is also the operator of package tours to Mt. 
Kumgang, which have been halted for more than a year.  The results 
of Hyun's trip to the North will determine the future of both those 
tours and the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
 
But Yu's release does not mean that all problems have been solved. 
The ROK and North Korea have many issues that need to be addressed 
so that incidents like the one involving Yu do not happen again. 
The fundamental problem is that the ROK will remain helpless if 
North Korea chooses not to abide by an agreement signed by the two 
sides in 2004 regarding entry and sojourn within the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex.  The ROK strives to abide by these rules under 
the principles of good will and sincerity, but North Korea has 
demonstrated its willingness to ignore them at whim. 
 
Article 10, Clause 3 of the agreement contains the guarantee of 
personal safety, stating clearly that the basic human rights of a 
South Korean under investigation must be guaranteed.  But during the 
136 days Yu was detained, North Korean authorities did not allow an 
ROK official or attorney to meet him.  Article 12, Clause 1 of the 
agreement concerning cooperation and exchange of information 
 
SEOUL 00001308  006 OF 006 
 
 
stipulates that the ROK and North Korea must notify each other of 
information necessary for the fulfillment of the terms of the 
agreement and respond to requests for information by the other side. 
 But North Korean authorities refused to state the specific reason 
that led to Yu's arrest and did not tell the ROK where he was being 
detained. 
 
Article 10, Clause 4 of the agreement states that if a South Korean 
in the Kaesong Industrial Complex violates North Korean law, the 
North will investigate the matter and inform the ROK of the details 
of the violation and deal with the offense with a warning, fine or 
deportation.  But the North Korea "investigated" Yu for 136 days 
without giving a detailed explanation or account. 
 
The two sides must immediately look for ways to resolve problems in 
the implementation of the agreement and come up with any 
supplementary measures necessary.  Discussions must take place on 
the scope of Article 10, Clause 2, which concerns "grave 
violations."  The guarantee of an individual's safety is the most 
fundamental factor among many that determine the success or failure 
of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.  The project cannot succeed 
unless North Korea resolves fears of sudden arrest and indefinite 
detention among ROK workers there. 
 
Yu may have been released, but the four crewmembers of the fishing 
boat 800 Yeonan, which strayed into North Korean territorial waters 
in the East Sea on July 30 due to instrument failure, are still 
being detained by North Korean authorities.  The North must send 
them back as soon as possible, abiding by a 20-year custom of 
returning fishermen who have accidentally crossed over into the 
other side's territorial waters. 
 
 
STEPHENS