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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1306/01 2260627
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140627Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5350
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY

UNCLAS SEOUL 001306 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL KS IR
SUBJECT: PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE WORKSHOP IN 
SEOUL - OUTBRIEF 
 
REF: STATE 64064 
 
¶1.  (U)  This cable is sensitive, but unclassified.  Please 
protect accordingly. 
 
¶2.  (U)  This is cable is an action request.  See para 19. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Summary.  The Government of the Republic of Korea 
(ROKG) on July 21-22 hosted a USG delegation at a workshop in 
Seoul to discuss the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
 Twenty-four representatives from nine ROK agencies attended 
the workshop, the purpose of which was to acquaint the ROK 
representatives with how PSI works, provide advice for 
building the capacity and interagency process for active PSI 
participation, and address ROK misperceptions that PSI 
focuses primarily on maritime interdictions and shipboarding. 
 Twenty representatives from eight USG agencies attended the 
workshop.  From USG presentations, the ROK representatives 
learned that maritime interdictions were one tool among many 
to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  The U.S. representatives stressed that an effective 
interagency process is key to handling actions related to 
stopping transfers of WMD-related items and materials.  The 
ROKG made numerous requests during the course of the 
workshop, of which the most significant were to join PSI's 
Operational Experts Group (OEG) and to receive additional 
training in maritime interdiction, cargo risk assessment, and 
proliferation-related equipment identification.  End summary. 
 
------------ 
Case Studies 
------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Director General (DG) Shin Dong-ik opened the 
workshop by saying that the ROK's participation in PSI was a 
symbol of an upgraded ROK-U.S. alliance on global issues and 
that the ROKG viewed PSI and UNSCR 1874 as closely linked. 
Shin continued by stating that the ROKG envisioned the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Ministry of 
National Defense (MND), and the Korean Maritime Police, (the 
equivalent of the Coast Guard), as the primary implementers 
of PSI.  MOFAT would have the lead coordinating role.  Shin 
expected the ROKG to finalize its PSI implementation 
mechanisms in August 2009.  In addition, Director Lee 
Jangkeun said, and it was reaffirmed throughout the workshop, 
that the ROKG saw itself primarily as a receiver of 
information.  This was questioned, however, by Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary (A/DAS) Foley who challenged the ROKG to 
find ways that they could generate information.  The ROKG 
inquired how sensitive information was transmitted and 
handled, and the degree to which the information is required 
to meet the legal standards of evidence.  Director Lee 
repeated throughout the workshop that significant portions of 
the ROKG misunderstood PSI as being primarily concerned with 
interdiction on the high seas, a misunderstanding that he 
hoped the workshop would correct. 
 
¶5.  (U)  Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (A/DAS) Tony Foley 
opened the workshop by making two points.  First, PSI 
attempted to counter the proliferation of WMD using a variety 
of tools, of which maritime operations (e.g. hail and query, 
boarding) were just a small part.  Second, while the 
Department of State was the lead coordinating agency for 
diplomatic activity, PSI decision making relied on a 
national, coordinated interagency process; and that in the 
U.S, the process involves the National Security Council 
staff; the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, 
Treasury, and Commerce; and the intelligence community. 
 
¶6.  (U)  The USG delegation presented and discussed two 
illustrative case studies, a maritime and an air shipment 
scenario, in order to illustrate how PSI might work.  The 
point of the illustrative case studies was to show that PSI 
was most successful when it leveraged multiple tools of 
national power: diplomatic, information, law enforcement, and 
military capabilities.  The ROKG delegation asked for an 
actual PSI operation to be presented.  The USG delegation 
explained that given the highly classified nature of the 
information shared, specific cases are not routinely 
discussed or made available in unclassified settings. 
However, as an example of a successful interdiction, the USG 
delegation pointed to the January 2009 incident in which the 
Cyprus Government recalled an Iranian-owned, Cyrus-flagged 
vessel after a U.S. military boarding team found arms related 
material in violation of UNSCR 1747 during an inspection on 
board the ship.  During this discussion, the ROKG delegation 
noted that UNSCR 1874 included seizure and disposition 
authority for prohibited items, including North Korean arms, 
 
a provision that PSI does not allow.  The U.S. side corrected 
this misperception by emphasizing that PSI does not obligate 
participating states to any particular course of action, make 
law, or authorize actions inconsistent with international law 
and national authorities. 
 
------------ 
Legal Issues 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (U)  Chip Wedan (Office of the General Counsel, 
Department of Defense) gave a presentation on the legal 
aspects of PSI.  Wedan's presentation made three main points: 
PSI does not violate international law; PSI does not infringe 
on a nation's sovereignty; and maritime interdiction on the 
high seas under PSI is permitted by principles of customary 
international law (e.g., master's consent, flag state 
consent, and Article 110 of the UN Law of the Sea 
Convention).  Wedan emphasized PSI's call for enhanced and 
consistent enforcement of domestic laws as the best method 
for stopping WMD proliferation. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Kim Byung-dae, (Director, Economic Cooperation 
Division, Ministry of Unification), gave a presentation on 
the Inter-Korean Agreement on Maritime Transportation of 
2002, as supplemented by the Annex of 2003.  The point of the 
presentation was to explain the Inter-Korean Maritime 
Agreement to the USG delegation.  The Agreement applies to 
vessels owned or rented by the DPRK and ROK shipping 
companies, (except for fishing boats, military ships, and 
non-commercial government vessels), and to ships transiting 
between ports designated by the DPRK and the ROK, between two 
DPRK ports, and between DPRK and ROK ports via a third 
country.  The Agreement establishes inter-Korean sea routes 
in international waters (and the Jeju Channel) and entry and 
exit routes into selected ports in each country.  The 
Agreement permits the maritime authorities to stop, board, 
and search a vessel if it is suspected of violating any of 
the banned activities under the Agreement, including: 
refusing to respond to radio enquiries, deviating from the 
established routes without authorization, and flight after a 
violation.  In practice, however, the ROK authorities simply 
issue warnings, requested course corrections, or escort 
violating vessels out of its controlled waters. 
 
------------------- 
PSI Implementation 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U)  The USG delegation opened the discussion on 
implementing PSI by explaining the opportunities for capacity 
building under PSI, specifically: the Operational Experts 
Group (OEG) meetings, live and table top exercises, bilateral 
engagements, and workshops.  In addition, the USG delegation 
explained how the ROK could meet its PSI commitments through 
participation in related initiatives and capacity-building 
opportunities such as the UNSCR 1540 Committee Donor 
Assistance, the U.S. Department of Energy's Commodity 
Identification Training program and its WMD and Missile 
Commodity Reference Manual, or through participation in the 
Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program. 
The USG delegation concluded with a discussion of the 
upcoming regional PSI workshop in Sydney on September 15-17 
and the DEEP SABRE II regional exercise on October 27-30, 
hosted by Singapore.  The ROK asked how it could participate 
in DEEP SABRE II, to which the USG urged the ROKG to contact 
Singapore, the exercise's host, and attend the upcoming 
planning meeting.  In addition, the United States would 
assist in ensuring that the ROK received an invitation to 
participate. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Multiple members of the ROK delegation said at 
various times throughout the workshop that unique 
circumstances on the Korean Peninsula (specifically, tensions 
with North Korea) would strongly influence what contributions 
the ROK could make to the PSI.  Still, a ROK representative 
said it was expected that the ROK's  "geo-political 
environment and economic power could contribute to the 
enhancement of PSI activities," and that its participation 
would strengthen the existing non-proliferation network.  The 
ROKG expected its participation to focus on information 
sharing, export/transshipment control, exercise 
participation, and eventual OEG participation.  The ROKG 
expected that PSI would upgrade its own domestic counter 
proliferation mechanisms.  DG Shin also suggested that the 
ROK could contribute to PSI by reaching out to other Asian 
nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Steve Schleien (Global Strategic Affairs, Office 
of the Secretary of Defense) updated the ROKG delegation on 
PSI's Operational Expert Groups (OEG), which met regularly to 
develop operational concepts of interdiction, develop a 
shared understanding of relevant domestic and international 
law, and share best practices of interdiction.  DG Shin asked 
how the ROK could join the OEG.  Schleien and A/DAS Foley 
said that granting membership in the OEG was a consultative 
process and that they would communicate the request within 
USG channels in Washington and to the other OEG member 
nations. 
 
¶12.  (U)  Sabina Kook, (Office of Terrorist Financing and 
Financial Crimes (TFFC), Department of the Treasury), gave a 
presentation on how Treasury combats proliferation finance by 
targeting the proliferation support network (financiers, 
logistical support, front companies, and suppliers) and not 
just the WMD proliferators (individual or organization). 
Kook explained how UNSCRs (1737, 1747, and 1803 for Iran; and 
1718 and 1874 for North Korea) provided the international 
framework and authorities to protect the international 
financial system from illicit activities, including the 
proliferation of WMDs.   The Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) is an international standard-setting body that has 
been recognized by the UNSC for its guidance on preventing 
the financing of proliferation activities.  The FATF is 
currently in the middle of a project on examining 
proliferation finance and the viable policy options available 
to address this threat.  Also explained was the recent 
Treasury advisory issued to financial institutions warning 
them of the illicit finance risk posed by North Korea. 
 
¶13.  (U)  Scott Renda explained that the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC), within the Treasury Department, 
administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based 
on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals.  In the 
WMD context, the primary tool at the disposal of the USG is 
Executive Order 13382, an authority aimed at freezing the 
assets of WMD proliferators and their supporters.  A 
designation under this authority has the practical effect of 
prohibiting transactions between the designees and any U.S. 
person and freezes the property and interests in property the 
designees may have within the United States or within the 
possession of U.S. persons.  This includes those listed in 
the Order,s Annex; any foreign person determined to have 
engaged or attempted to engage in activities that materially 
contribute to or pose a risk of materially contributing to 
the proliferation of WMD; any person determined to have 
provided or attempted to provide support for or goods or 
services in support of those designated under E.O. 13382; and 
any person determined to be owned or controlled by, or acting 
or purporting to act for or on behalf of, any blocked party. 
Renda clarified the difference between the Order, the Annex, 
and primary (State) and derivative (Treasury) designations. 
Renda concluded by noting that E.O. 13382 was the legal 
mechanism by which the U.S. implements its obligations 
related to the asset freezing, financial services, and 
vigilance provisions in UNSCRs 1718 and 1874.  In response to 
a ROKG question on asset forfeiture, Kook explained that 
Treasury used E.O. 13382 to freeze assets, but that a 
criminal case was necessary for forfeiture. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Lawrence Lee, (Director, Foreign Exchange Policy 
Division, Ministry of Strategy and Finance), asked for USG 
help with obtaining ROK membership on FATF.  In addition, he 
asked for a FATF document that described what actions FATF 
members has taken against Iran in response to the FATF 
statement calling for counter-measures.    Lee also asked for 
specific cases on proliferation finance and Kook referred him 
to the FATF Typology Report which includes case studies. 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Although the ROKG supports multilateral, counter 
proliferation efforts against Iran as embodied in the UNSCRs 
and in multilateral export control regimes, Director Lee 
explained that dealing with Iran was a delicate issue for the 
ROKG because Iran was the fourth largest petroleum supplier 
to the ROK, and because Iran was the ROK's largest export 
market in the Middle East.  Since Iranian oil accounted for 
roughly ten percent of the ROK oil supply, relations with 
Iran were a matter of energy security.  Director Lee Jangkeun 
said that the ROK did not have legal mechanisms (domestic or 
otherwise) to implement unilateral sanction regimes. 
 
¶16.  (U)  Ms. Lou Green (Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
Department of Homeland Security) gave a presentation on the 
customs-related aspects of PSI, specifically, CBP's strong 
role in the detention and/or seizure of export/import goods. 
The ROKG asked many questions about the legality of detention 
(in which the owner retains title to the property) and 
seizure (a legal process through which the CBP attempts to 
acquire title to the property, which implies a pending 
criminal investigation).  Green explained that CBP had legal 
authority to detain all goods transiting across the national 
border, even goods destined for transit to another country 
via the U.S.  Furthermore, CBP may request departed vessels 
to off-load suspicious cargo at another port or order the 
redelivery of the suspicious goods back to the U.S. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Korean Maritime Police (Coast Guard) 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  The USG delegation visited the Korean Maritime 
Police (Coast Guard) located in Inchon, a port city 24 miles 
west of Seoul.  Superintendent General (SG) Kim Suk-kyoon 
greeted the delegation and was the main presenter and guide 
for the visit.  Kim's presentation confirmed Director Kim 
Jangkeun's statement that the Korean Coast Guard did not see 
itself as a security agency, but rather as an economic 
agency.  For SG Kim, "trade and cooperation between the two 
Koreas were a domestic matter."  SG Kim said that the 
maritime police were responsible for surveillance of DPRK 
vessels, and in fact, had monitored the Kang Nam I for two 
days.  (Note:  The Kang Nam I was a DPRK vessel suspected of 
carrying weapons contraband in violation of UNSCR 1874.  The 
vessel ultimately turned around mid-voyage and returned to 
North Korea.  End note.)  SG Kim said that although the 
Inter-Korean Agreement on Maritime Transportation gave the 
ROKG the right to board North Korean merchant ships, the 
maritime police had yet to do so because the ROKG believed 
that not only would such a move raise tensions between the 
two Koreas, but also because the crews on DPRK vessels were 
likely to be armed with light weapons.  SG Kim said that the 
maritime police would carry out any interdictions on the high 
seas jointly with the Navy. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Courtesy Call on Deputy Minister Oh Joon 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  A/DAS Foley on July 22 had a courtesy call 
meeting with Deputy Minister Oh Joon, Deputy Minister for 
Multilateral, Global, and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade.  DM Oh said that he was glad to hear that 
the PSI workshop went well, especially considering that PSI 
and the interagency cooperation it entailed were new for the 
ROKG.  DM Oh asked if the ROKG should approach any other 
countries regarding their models for PSI coordination, to 
which A/DAS Foley suggested that New Zealand, Australia, 
Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada all 
had effective models of PSI interagency coordination.  Oh 
said that MOFAT was the central point (or "channel") for PSI 
activity because most other ministries lacked foreign 
experience and therefore looked to MOFAT for guidance.  In 
addition, Oh said that the "negative attitudes" about PSI 
were based on misperceptions that MOFAT tried to correct by 
publishing a small booklet about PSI.  Regarding PSI and the 
media, Oh agreed with Foley that much of the information used 
in PSI interdictions would be difficult to declassify; 
instead, Oh continued, he thought that what the public should 
know about PSI was that it followed and used domestic laws to 
accomplish its aims.  Like DG Shin, Oh also said that perhaps 
the ROKG could contribute to PSI by reaching out to other 
Asian nations, specifically, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, 
and Thailand.  Oh concluded the meeting by stating that the 
ROKG would like to be in the OEG, to which Foley responded 
that Steve Schleien would look into the matter.  Foley 
reminded Oh that membership in the OEG required consultation 
with other OEG members and would require a commitment of ROK 
resources. 
 
------------ 
Action Items 
------------ 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  Below is a summary of ROK inquiries: 
 
--Membership in the OEG 
 
--Sharing of information 
 
--Participation in DEEP SABRE II exercise in Singapore 
 
--Practical interdiction training for the maritime police and 
navy (which can be done in the U.S.) 
 
--CBP training in customs operations/interdiction 
 
--CBP training in synchronizing cargo risk management with 
the Secure Freight Initiative's (SFI) 100% screening mandate 
 
--National Nuclear Security Administration (Department of 
Energy) training in material identification 
 
--Bilateral consultations/workshops in Seoul or Washington 
 
--Membership in FATF 
 
--Receipt of the FATF Topology Report 
 
--Summary of major "take-away" points of the workshop 
 
--------------------- 
Workshop Participants 
--------------------- 
 
¶20.  (U)  USG Delegation (20 persons): 
Tony Foley (A/DAS Counterproliferation - State) 
Joseph Yun (A/DCM - Embassy Seoul) 
Steve Schleien (Global Strategic Affairs - OSD) 
Beth Flores (Global Strategic Affairs - OSD) 
LTC Steve Park (Asian & Pacific Affairs - OSD) 
Chip Wedan (Office of the General Counsel - DOD) 
CDR Tony Crego (Joint Staff J5 - DOD) 
Lou Green (Customs and Border Protection - DHS) 
Bennett Courey (Customs and Border Protection Legal - DHS) 
John Kroft (National Counterproliferation Center - DNI) 
Lance Stubblefield (National Nuclear Security Administration 
- DOE) 
Sabina Kook Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial 
Crimes - Treasury) 
Scott Renda (Office of Foreign Assets Control - Treasury) 
LCDR Mel Naidas (USPACOM) 
Markus Garlauskas (USFK) 
David Jeffrey (Embassy Seoul) 
Tyler Carson (Embassy Seoul) 
LCDR Patricia Springer (U.S. Coast Guard - Embassy Seoul) 
John Yu (FBI - Embassy Seoul) 
Erik Hunt (Foreign Commercial Service - Embassy Seoul) 
 
¶21.  (U)  ROK Delegation (24 persons) 
Shin Dong-ik (Director General, International Organization 
Bureau - MOFAT) 
Lee Jang-keun (Director, Disarmament and Nonproliferation - 
MOFAT) 
Koo Hyun-mo (Director designate, Disarmament and 
Nonproliferation - MOFAT) 
Kim Jae-woo (Disarmament and Nonproliferation - MOFAT) 
Koh Young-kul (Disarmament and Nonproliferation - MOFAT) 
Park Eun-jin (Disarmament and Nonproliferation - MOFAT) 
Jin Gi-hoon (Director, Inter-Korean Policy - MOFAT) 
Kang Myong-il (International Legal Affairs - MOFAT) 
Song Si-jin (North American Division I - MOFAT) 
Hong Jee-pio (ROK Embassy Washington) 
Lim Sang-beom (Office of Secretary to the President for 
National Security Strategy - Blue House) 
Col Kim Mu-kyum (Director, WMD Policy Division - Ministry of 
National Defense) 
LtCol Kang Kyu-tai (WMD Policy Division - Ministry of 
National Defense) 
Kim Byung-dae (Director, Economic Cooperation Division - 
Ministry of Unification) 
Lee Lawrence (Director, Foreign Exchange Policy - Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance) 
Park Chan-ho (Foreign Exchange Policy - Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance) 
Kim Myung-hoon (Port Management - Ministry of Land, Transport 
and Maritime Affairs) 
Kweon Si-hong (International Air Transport - Ministry of 
Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs) 
Park Joon-soo (Air Traffic Management - Ministry of Land, 
Transport and Maritime Affairs) 
Kim Suk-kyoon (Superintendent General - Korean Maritime 
Police) 
Kim Un-ho (Superintendent - Korean Maritime Police) 
Seo Sang-wook (Korean Maritime Police) 
Im Joong-cheol (Director, Surveillance Division - Korean 
Customs Service) 
Han Yoo-lim (Senior Researcher - Institute of Foreign Affairs 
and National Security) 
 
¶22.  (U)  This cable has been cleared by ISN A/DAS Tony Foley 
and the USG delegation. 
STEPHENS