VZCZCXRO4374
PP RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0944/01 2291429
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171429Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2536
INFO RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0648
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0448
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0276
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 1594
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0193
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0799
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3753
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0185
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3961
RUEHFR/UNESCO PARIS FR PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3032
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4853

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000944 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL PHSA SO IT

SUBJECT: ITALY: PIRATES RELEASE BUCCANEER CREW WITHOUT 
RANSOM PAYMENT 
 
REF: ROME 00930 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 

¶1. (C) Summary: On August 11, Poloff met with Massimiliano 
D'Antuono, Deputy Head of the MFA Crisis Unit, to discuss the 
details of the release of the MV Buccaneer crew which was 
taken hostage by pirates off the coast of Somalia. A Somali 
pirate is quoted in the press as saying that a four million 
euro ransom had been paid.  This conflicts with Foreign 
Minister Frattini's statement that "Strong political work 
with local authorities as well as an Italian warship that was 
standing by with Special Forces finally made the pirates 
understand there was no other solution than to release the 
ship."  D'Antuono affirmed that the hostage release was the 
result of diplomatic, military and intelligence efforts.  He 
asserted that the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) of Somalia was instrumental in the 
negotiations with the pirates because of his 
family/clan/tribal links.  End summary. 

Background 
- - - - - 
 
¶2. (C) On April 11, the deep water tugboat MV Buccaneer was 
slowly towing two large barges at 4-5 knots in the Gulf of 
Aden. Because it was moving too slowly to join a convoy, and 
because its rear deck was designed to be low to the water 
line, the crew of 10 Italians, 5 Romanians and 1 Croat was an 
easy target for Somali pirates.  According to D'Antuono, a 
couple of hours after the ship was commandeered, one crew 
member was able to push a distress button calling for help. 
The ship's owner received an email from the Buccaneer with 
its location coordinates, but he correctly identified the 
message as a ruse because ""the English used was better than 
anything the crew was capable of.""  The pirates were able to 
anchor the ship in a cove on the Somali coast.  After 2-3 
weeks, the Italian Navy ship San Giorgio arrived in the 
vicinity to take up a position approximately eight miles off 
the shore.  Italian Special Forces, who arrived on the San 
Giorgio, routinely positioned themselves and their small 
boats in close proximity to the Buccaneer so that they could 
react within 20-30 seconds to an assault by the pirates on 
the hostages.  D'Antuono implied the pirates knew the Special 
Forces had positioned themselves within striking distance 
even if they were not able to visibly locate them. 

¶3. (C) The Crisis Unit worked under the direct supervision of 
the "highest levels" of the MFA to negotiate the hostages' 
release.  D'Antuono described a "three-pillar approach using 
diplomatic, military and intelligence resources."  He 
traveled to Somalia with Margherita Boniver, FM Frattini's 
Special Envoy for Humanitarian Emergencies, to leverage 
Italy's "special relationship" with Somalia and the GOI's 
current support for the TFG.  Meetings with the TFG Prime 
Minister Sharmarke served to exert pressure on the pirates by 
virtue of family/clan/tribal relations.  Asked for specifics, 
he demurred that "the Prime Minister was the one who made the 
release happen." 
 
¶4. (C) D'Antuono emphasized that under Italian law, no ransom 
could be paid to release the sailors.  He stated that the 
owner of one of the barges offered to pay a ransom, but was 
informed that proceeding with that course of action would 
result in prosecution by the Italian courts.  In contrast to 
the barge owner's interactions with the GOI, he described the 
governments of Romania and Croatia, whose nationals were also 
being held captive, as being completely supportive of the 
GOI's lead role in the negotiations. 
 

¶5. (C) Without discussing details, D'Antuono stated that at a 
certain point, the Special Forces from the San Giorgio were 
cleared to board the Buccaneer after all of the pirates had 
vacated the ship.  The Special Forces took control of the 
ship and set sail with the crew to Djibouti.  After a medical 
assessment in Djibouti, the crew flew to Italy where they 
will brief the prosecutor's office in Rome responsible for 
handling such cases for possible future action.  D'Antuono 
believed the crew was treated reasonably well with the 
exception of a "beating of one of the Romanians" by the 
pirates.  He mentioned that, at least once, the crew was 
taken ashore to offer relief from the cramped quarters of the 
ship. 
 
¶6. (C) D'Antuono emphasized the GOI's aversion to resorting 
to a military operation because of the negative Italian 
public opinion that would likely follow any loss of life.  He 
suggested that headlines describing fatherless children would 
have been a public relations disaster for the GOI, especially 
as the world focused its attention on Italy as the host of 
the G8 Summit in June. 
 
Ransom Paid? 
- - - - - - - 

¶7. (C) Andrew Mwangura, of the Mombasa-based East African 
Seafarer's Assistance Programme was quoted in the press as 
saying that the pirates received a four million euro ransom. 
Sometimes described as an intermediary between pirates and 
those who pay ransom, his role, if any, in the release of the 
Buccaneer crew is not clear.  D'Antuono stated that the MFA 
is "familiar with" Mwangura, but dismissed his claims of a 
paid ransom as "a marketing technique."  He reasoned that 
releasing a crew without receiving a ransom would set an 
unprofitable precedent.  He assessed claims of having 
received a ransom as a necessary strategy to protect the 
economic value of the pirates' illicit activities. 
 

¶8. (SBU) In terms of what the GOI did offer the TFG, if not 
the pirates, an MFA statement describes financial support in 
2009 dedicated to ""Somali institutions and to the peace 
process"" totaling 13 million euros.  Additional money has 
been disbursed through the Italian Development Cooperation. 
(see reftel) 

Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶9. (C) The official line on the Buccaneer release is a 
substantial but incomplete accounting of factors that brought 
this situation to a peaceful conclusion.  Gaining the release 
of the Italian vessel and hostages was a top priority, albeit 
low profile effort, for the Italian government.  Prime 
Minister Berlusconi himself reportedly made many of the early 
critical decisions.  Italy, with U.S. assistance, moved 
quickly to ensure that it had a full range of options 
available to resolve the issue, including the strategic 
positioning of elite forces ready to engage in an 
extraction/rescue operation if necessary.  These efforts were 
buttressed by Italy's re-energizing its relations with 
Somalia and engaging in a high profile ""embrace"" of its 
former colony.  In spite of Italy's slashed overseas budget, 
it has dedicated significant development and humanitarian 
assistance to the TFG and announced its commitment to re-open 
an embassy in Mogadishu at the June 2009 International 
Contact Group on Somalia meeting held in Rome.  A logical 
quid pro quo for Italy's new engagement was TFG action to 
resolve the hostage crisis.  Adamant denials that Italy paid 
ransom, directly or otherwise, have been accompanied by 
claims of ignorance of TFG initiatives to liberate the 
hostages.  The GOI was acutely aware of the strong USG 
opposition to the payment of ransom in this case and we 
believe that resulted in Italy relying heavily on the TFG to 
deliver its citizens. 
DIBBLE