VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0731/01 2391549
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271549Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0609
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS RABAT 000731 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND INR/B 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: MINISTERIAL CHANGES SHORE UP THE 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: RABAT 0497 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  On July 29, Morocco's King Mohammed VI 
approved the appointments of new ministers:  a second 
Minister of State without portfolio, a Minister of Culture, a 
Minister of Youth and Sports, and a Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs.  The Minister of State and Secretary of 
State appointments were probably given to the Popular 
Movement (MP) Party in exchange for its agreeing to join the 
ruling coalition.  While the MP is a small party on the 
Moroccan political landscape, the move shored up the 
government's tenuous hold on power by restoring a majority 
coalition, which was lost when the Party of Authenticity and 
Modernity (PAM) withdrew from the government shortly before 
the nationwide municipal elections held on June 12.  The MP's 
move into government appears to be an effort to ameliorate 
the party's political troubles; at the same time it likely 
guarantees stability of the current government until the 2012 
legislative elections.  End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
Government Shakeup 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a small but significant shakeup in the ruling 
government coalition, Morocco's King Mohammed VI on July 29 
appointed a new Minister of State, a new Minister of Culture, 
a new Minister of Youth and Sports, and a new Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs.  MP Secretary General Mohand 
Laenser assumed the position of Minister of State.  (Note: 
The senior Minister of State position is held by Mohamed El 
Yazghi from the Socialist Union of Popular Forces Party or 
USFP.  End Note.)  Senior MP member Mohamed Ouzzine became 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, a post that has been vacant since the 
dismissal of Istiqlal's Ahmed Lakhrif in December 2008. 
Bensalem Himmich, from USFP, was appointed Minister of 
Culture replacing Touriya Jabrane, from the same party, who 
stepped down for health reasons.  Moncef Belkhayat from the 
National Rally of Independents (RNI), a government coalition 
partner, replaced Nawal El Moutawakil, also from RNI, as the 
Minister for Youth and Sports.  During a meeting on August 12 
with Belkhayat, who has a reputation as a "no-nonsense" 
manager, Charge learned that Moutawakil had been replaced 
because of her growing obligations as a member of the 
International Olympic Committee and Moroccan sports team,s 
poor record during her tenure. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Weakened Government Majority Precipitates Changes 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Minister of State and Secretary of State 
appointments were the reward for the MP,s entry into the 
ruling coalition.  The ministerial reshuffle had been 
expected after the PAM surprised its allies by abruptly 
withdrawing its support from the government and officially 
joining the parliamentary opposition in the run-up to the 
June 12 local elections.  The move created a de facto balance 
between the ruling coalition and opposition in the lower 
house.  PAM's withdrawal was widely interpreted as an effort 
to position itself as a "political outsider" in the recent 
elections (reftel). 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Although a shock to the ruling coalition, PAM's 
shift took place during the summer recess, giving the 
government time to form another coalition before the October 
parliamentary session, when it needs a majority to pass the 
critical budget bill.  King Mohammed VI ensured survival of 
the government by expressing his confidence in Prime Minister 
Abbas El Fassi in a telephone call that was publicly 
disclosed the day after PAM's move.  The MP brought 70 
parliamentary seats into government -- approximately 40 in 
the Chamber of Representatives (the parliament's lower house) 
and 30 in the Chamber of Councilors (upper house), restoring 
the government's parliamentary majority with more than 200 
members in the more important 325-seat lower house. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Internal Problems Prompts MP Move into Government 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) On August 12, 2009, MP Executive Member Lahcen 
Haddad told Acting PolCouns and D/PolCouns that internal 
problems hurt the MP in recent elections.  He described 
internal divisions, a growing "Anti-Palace" perception, and 
an apparent loss of interest in Berber-related issues among 
younger voters among the concerns that prompted the MP to 
seek "harbor in the storm" by joining the government.  In 
 
local elections on June 12, the MP garnered approximately 
eight percent of the vote, down from 15 percent in the 
previous communal elections in 2003. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Internal divisions within the MP, precipitated by 
the absorption of two other Berber-oriented parties in 2006, 
had created paralysis within the party.  According to Haddad, 
instead of a catalyst effect, the merger left the party 
divided.  He said that MP Party Secretary Mohand Laenser had 
chosen a laissez-faire approach to the internal rivalries, 
perpetuating the problem.  The appointment to ministerial 
posts of Laenser and Ouzzine, both of whom are from the same 
MP faction, and the concomitant fact that at least one of the 
ministerial posts was not allocated to another faction, were 
symptomatic of the problem.  Growth of the party (in targeted 
constituencies such as labor unions and university 
professors) had been stunted by the internal rivalries, 
according to Haddad, because each of three factions were more 
concerned that its rivals would benefit more for the growth 
than itself. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The MP, normally considered a "pro-Palace party," 
as reflected by its traditional participation in government, 
had also been hurt by its recent stint in the opposition. 
Two years ago, the MP was relegated to the opposition as a 
result of a disagreement over the distribution of ministerial 
portfolios following the 2007 legislative elections. 
According to Haddad, MP party leaders had little to offer 
party members and constituents in terms of political largesse 
while in opposition, which further complicated MP's internal 
dynamics. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Haddad added that many Moroccans of the younger 
generation no longer identify with the issues that had given 
rise in the past to the established political parties like 
Istiqlal, USFP, and MP.  The MP has always been seen as a 
party advocating on behalf of Morocco's Berber (Amazigh) 
population, resisting the government's traditional 
"Arabization" policies and supporting the preservation of 
Amazigh cultural and linguistic identity.  Government 
accommodation of these concerns in recent years may have 
diminished their political urgency.  Haddad said that part of 
the appeal of PAM was that, unlike the MP, it did not have a 
lot of the "historical baggage," adding that the MP had 
suffered a disproportionate number of defectors to the PAM in 
the run up to the municipal elections. 
 
------------------------------------ 
MP Seeks Resuscitation in Government 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Given these internal troubles, MP leaders 
considered joining the government to be the most expedient 
way to stop the party's decline.  Haddad considers the 
current leadership of the MP to be weak and prone to the old 
reflexes of "being told what to do by the Palace," and to the 
desire to return the party to its traditional role as "friend 
to the King."  He also considered the two posts that the MP 
received for joining the government to be "empty shells," 
with no tangible benefit to the party, saying the posts are 
powerless, with no influence on government decision-making or 
contact with constituents.  The MP may have felt pressure to 
accept less-than-favorable ministerial posts because the 
government probably would have asked another small party, the 
Constitutional Union Party (UC), with its 27 deputies, to 
join the government if the MP had tried to bargain harder for 
better posts.  Rumors that the government was at least 
exploring a dialogue on this score with the UC were confirmed 
by other Embassy contacts. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Comment:  Optimists liken the MP's new position in 
the Moroccan political spectrum to be similar to the 
"kingmaker" role played by the Liberal Free Democratic Party 
(FDP) in Germany, whereby a small party garners 
disproportionate political power because larger parties 
cannot form a majority without it.  Nonetheless, the MP 
continues to remain divided and increasingly unpopular. 
Instead of making tough choices to consolidate and share 
power within its ranks, the MP appears to have chosen the 
easier route of joining the government.  The MP's acceptance 
of the two moribund posts reflects the party's desperation in 
this regard.  While the MP remains troubled, its entry into 
government has certainly bolstered the ruling coalition, 
virtually guaranteeing that this government will survive into 
the 2012 elections, baring the unlikely defection of another 
coalition partner.  End Comment. 
 
 
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Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
Jackson