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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000736 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP MOPS EC CO XM XR
SUBJECT: ECUADOR SECURITY MINISTER EXPLAINS "PERCEPTIONS" 
OF U.S.-COLOMBIA MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. 09 QUITO 715 ...



id: 221121
date: 8/17/2009 16:15
refid: 09QUITO736
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO570|09QUITO661|09QUITO704|09QUITO715|09STATE47202|09STATE82581
header:
VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #0736/01 2291615
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RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8325
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4252
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RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 3105
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RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL


----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000736 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP MOPS EC CO XM XR
SUBJECT: ECUADOR SECURITY MINISTER EXPLAINS "PERCEPTIONS" 
OF U.S.-COLOMBIA MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. 09 QUITO 715 
     ¶B. 09 STATE 82581 
     ¶C. 09 QUITO 704 
     ¶D. 09 QUITO 661 
     ¶E. 09 QUITO 570 
     ¶F. 09 STATE 47202 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  During his visit to attend President 
Correa's August 10 inauguration ceremony, DAS Christopher 
McMullen met with Security Minister Miguel Carvajal and MFA 
Under Secretary Jorge Orbe regarding the ongoing negotiation 
of a U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement.  McMullen 
provided assurances that the DCA did not represent a threat 
to Ecuador or any other country in the region.  Likewise, the 
proposed agreement did not expand the U.S. military presence 
in Colombia; rather, it simply sought to formalize existing 
ad hoc arrangements that have provided U.S. access to 
Colombian bases for a number of years.  Carvajal expressed 
Ecuador's concern about Colombia's intentions in the region 
and rejected the suggestion that GOE rhetoric on the issue 
was anti-U.S.  As a practical matter, McMullen suggested 
that, rather than communicating via the media, the U.S. and 
Ecuadorian embassies, as well as the U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral 
Dialogue, were more appropriate channels for discussion of 
issues such as the Colombia DCA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On August 7, the MFA accepted WHA Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Christopher McMullen's offer to discuss ongoing 
negotiations between the U.S.and Colombia regarding a Defense 
Cooperation Agreement.  Although the MFA told us the meeting 
would be with Under Secretary of Bilateral Affairs Jorge 
Orbe, upon arrival at the MFA the Coordinating Minister of 
Internal and External Security, Miguel Carvajal, and two of 
his under secretaries unexpectedly joined the meeting and led 
the discussion on behalf of the GOE.  DCM and PolOff, as well 
as MFA North America desk officer, also attended the meeting. 
 
NO INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING U.S. BASES 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In explaining the Colombia DCA negotiations, DAS 
McMullen made the following points: 
 
-- the U.S. has no plans to establish U.S. military bases in 
Colombia; 
 
-- the DCA negotiations aim at formalizing existing ad hoc 
arrangements that have provided access to Colombian bases on 
an informal basis for many years; 
 
-- the U.S. seeks access primarily to three air bases, 
including Palanquero, Apiai, and Barranquilla (although the 
latter largely for emergency or logistical purposes); 
 
-- the local Colombian commanders would retain control of 
these bases; 
 
-- the U.S. military presence in Colombia has been 
diminishing in recent years and will continue to do so as the 
U.S. transfers key counter-narcotics and security programs to 
Colombian control; 
 
-- the U.S. goal is to return eventually to pre-Plan Colombia 
levels of security assistance, a process that reflects 
Colombia,s increasing capabilities to combat the FARC and 
other illegal armed groups; 
 
-- the purpose of this DCA is to deepen and modernize 
existing security cooperation, most of which date back to the 
Cold War era and are no longer relevant to the current 
realities and challenges that we face, particularly 
transnational threats such as narco-terrorism in Colombia. 
 
TRANSFERING CN AND SECURITY PROGRAMS; REDUCING US MILITARY 
 
FOOTPRINT 
------------------------------------- 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) DAS McMullen explained that the U.S. has already begun 
transferring the control of security and counter-narcotics 
programs to the GOC, which has demonstrated the capability to 
sustain these programs.  He noted that USG assistance to 
Colombia would eventually return to what it had been prior to 
Plan Colombia.  He said that with a gradual reduction of U.S. 
security assistance over the coming years, the U.S. would 
likely reduce the number of military personnel in Colombia. 
He pointed out that while the U.S. congressional limit on the 
number of military personnel in Colombia was 800, an average 
of less than 300 had been present in Colombia the last 
several years. 
 
COLOMBIAN BASES ARE NOT A REPLACEMENT FOR MANTA FOL 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5. (C) McMullen pointed out that U.S. discussions with 
Colombia regarding formalizing access to Colombian bases had 
begun well before the GOE's announcement that it would not 
renew the agreement for U.S. access to the Forward Operating 
Location (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador.  He added that the access 
to Colombian bases would not replace the capabilities that 
were lost with the closure of the Manta FOL.  He noted that 
the Colombian bases were in the interior of the country, far 
from the Eastern Pacific where maritime narco-trafficking was 
taking place. 
 
ECUADOR HAS ITS DOUBTS 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Minister Carvajal interjected that Ecuador had a 
"distinct perception" regarding the U.S. military presence in 
Colombia, and that others in the region shared Ecuador's 
concern.  He said the announcement that the U.S. would use 
Colombian bases came as a big surprise, just as the 
reactivation of the Fourth Fleet for use in counternarcotics 
had been a surprise.  McMullen countered that the Fourth 
Fleet's mission was not counternarcotics; it was primarily 
humanitarian in nature. 
 
¶7. (C) Carvajal pressed on, stating that Ecuador seriously 
doubted Colombia's commitment to combating the FARC and 
narco-trafficking.  He stated that Ecuador's key issue was 
that Colombia had not provided a guarantee that there would 
be no more attacks on Ecuadorian soil; if it did so, all else 
would be negotiable.  He then cited several reasons why the 
GOE mistrusts and doubts Colombia's intentions: 
 
-- March 1, 2008, Colombian bombing of a FARC camp in 
Ecuadorian territory. 
 
-- Excessive investment by the USG in Colombia via Plan 
Colombia and Plan Patriota. 
 
-- Imbalance in the size of Colombia's military compared to 
other countries in the region. 
 
-- Lack of reduction in the production of cocaine in 
Colombia.  Carvajal asserted that despite USG assistance, 
Colombia still had 90 million hectares of coca, whereas 
Ecuador had none. 
 
-- Years of damage to licit crops in Ecuador caused by aerial 
eradication along the border, with no compensation to 
Ecuadorians affected by the spraying. 
 
-- Minimal presence of Colombian security forces along 
Colombia's border with Ecuador.  Carvajal stated that 
Colombia had only 3,000 troops and five bases (two permanent 
and three mobile) along its border, whereas Ecuador had 7,000 
military and 3,000 police personnel and four times the number 
of bases. 
 
 
-- Colombia's ongoing media campaign to discredit Ecuador. 
Carvajal cited the Mono Jojoy video (Ref D) as an example, 
calling the video a fake. 
 
-- Lack of Colombian assistance in assisting approximately 
135,000 Colombian refugees currently in Ecuador. 
 
DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to Carvajal's question on why Colombia did 
not station more of its troops along its border with Ecuador, 
McMullen said that it would be best to ask Colombia directly 
regarding its strategy, and expressed hope that Ecuador would 
improve its relations with Colombia.  McMullen added that 
Colombia was engaged in a difficult conflict with the FARC, 
ELN and other armed groups, and had suffered greatly from 
their brutal tactics.  In recent years, the GOC has made 
impressive progress in the fight against these illegal armed 
groups.  He then drew a contrast with Venezuela, noting that 
the GOV had increased its military strength even though it 
did not face a similar threat.  Carvajal quickly responded 
that Venezuela's threat was Colombia. 
 
CARVAJAL DOWNPLAYS HARSH ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) McMullen noted that Ecuador had been a good partner in 
the fight against narcotrafficking, and said he had been 
surprised by President Correa and other GOE officials' harsh 
rhetoric calling the U.S. military presence in Colombia a 
"provocation."  He observed that the accusations were even 
less understandable considering the Ambassador's August 4 
assurances to Foreign Minister Falconi (Ref C), as well as 
President Obama's recent remarks stating clearly that there 
would be no U.S. bases in Colombia, that the U.S. would not 
control Colombian bases, and that the purpose of our presence 
in Colombia was to continue the fight against 
narcotrafficking.  Carvajal denied that the GOE had used any 
inappropriate rhetoric, justifying his assessment by saying 
that the GOE had not used derogatory terms such as "yankee" 
when referring to President Obama. 
 
FINDING A COMMON WAY FORWARD 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Focusing the conversation back on practical matters, 
DAS McMullen stressed that Ecuador and the U.S. were partners 
in counternarcotics cooperation.  He pointed out that 
although the Manta FOL agreement had not been renewed, the 
U.S. was hopeful regarding Ecuador's ongoing review of the 
"Gas and Go" proposal, which might allow U.S. planes to fly 
anti-drug missions out of Guayaquil's airport (Refs E and F). 
 Returning to the DCA issue, McMullen explained that the USG 
had not consulted with Ecuador or other countries because it 
was bilateral in nature; the negotiations with Colombia were 
ongoing, so we could not predict the final form of the 
agreement; and the DCA does not break new ground, it would 
merely formalize existing cooperation.  He said that had the 
GOE asked for information regarding the issue, prior to 
making public accusations, the USG would have responded 
immediately (as was done at the request of the Brazilian 
Embassy in Washington).  He suggested that Embassy Quito and 
Ecuador's Embassy in Washington were the appropriate channels 
for requesting this type of information.  MFA Under Secretary 
Orbe suggested the OAS as a forum to discuss the issue. 
McMullen countered that the U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral Dialogue 
would be a more appropriate forum for discussion of Ecuador's 
security concerns vis-a-vis U.S. security cooperation with 
Colombia. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) This meeting was useful in airing the frank views of 
 
both sides regarding U.S.-Colombian negotiations on the DCA. 
While Carvajal recognized the importance of sharing 
information and perspectives, he was mostly interested in 
communicating the GOE's concerns to the USG.  It is clear 
that the GOE's mistrust of Colombia will continue to affect 
its views of U.S.-Colombian security cooperation.  In the 
absence of any formal bilateral mechanism between Ecuador and 
Colombia, and in response to Foreign Minister Falconi's 
suggestion to the Ambassador (Ref C), the U.S. might be able 
to play a useful role in facilitating communication between 
the GOE and Colombia, although the personal bad blood between 
Correa and Uribe will ultimately limit the extent to which 
the U.S. can resolve this vexing bilateral dispute. 
 
¶12. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS McMullen. 
 
HODGES 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================