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RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL MARR SNAR EC CO
SUBJECT: FM FALCONI ON ECUADOR-COLOMBIA RELATIONS, US BASE 
ACCESS IN COLOMBIA. 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reas...


id: 219977
date: 8/7/2009 15:53
refid: 09QUITO704
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 
header:
VZCZCXYZ0352
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #0704/01 2191553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071553Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0728
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8298
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4240
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3666
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AUG LIMA 3348
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4537
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL


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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL MARR SNAR EC CO
SUBJECT: FM FALCONI ON ECUADOR-COLOMBIA RELATIONS, US BASE 
ACCESS IN COLOMBIA. 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
¶1. (C) At Foreign Minister Fander Falconi's request, the 
Ambassador met with Falconi the morning of August 5 to 
discuss Ecuador-Colombia relations.  Also in the meeting for 
the Foreign Ministry were Under Secretary for Bilateral 
Affairs, Jorge Orbe, and North American Affairs officer 
Cristina Camacho.  DCM accompanied the Ambassador. 
 
¶2. (C) Although Falconi began the meeting inquiring after the 
status of the U.S. delegation to Correa's inauguration on 
August 10, his major agenda item was Colombia.  He reviewed 
the historically good relations Ecuador has maintained with 
Colombia, despite the decades long conflict within Colombia 
which has negatively affected Ecuador with spillover across 
the border.  Falconi stressed that Ecuador's position has 
always been one of non-interference in Colombia's internal 
affairs.  Then along came "March 1" (a common way of 
referring to the Colombian cross-border attack on FARC at 
Angostura on that day in 2008).  President Correa felt 
betrayed by President Uribe, since they had spoken that day. 
Since then there have been a number of attempts to arrange 
reconciliation, by both the OAS and Carter Center.  These 
attempts have been useful in identifying commonalities, but 
were unsuccessful. 
 
¶3. (C) Now the issue is again heating up in the media. 
President Correa condemns and is completely committed to 
investigating any supposed links between Ecuadorian officials 
and support to the FARC.  The latest report of information 
from another Raul Reyes diary -- if the diary is verified -- 
suggests serious linkages and problems. 
 
¶4. (C) That said, Falconi stressed that there have been 
substantial and positive discussions between the Colombian 
and Ecuadorian governments, below the level of the 
Presidencies.  Falconi believes the relationship is ready to 
enter a new stage, with "more optimistic relations."  The 
basic Ecuadorian requirements for re-establishing diplomatic 
relations are known, and these can be discussed.  Falconi 
acknowledged that finalizing a reconciliation is difficult, 
given media stories, or the propensity of Uribe, Foreign 
Minister Bermudez or Correa to harsh words.  Uribe and Correa 
are "strong personalities." 
 
¶5. (C) Falconi commented that they were harmed by the 
breakdown of the &cartilla de seguridad8 (a mechanism by 
which the GOE and the GOC communicated border security 
alerts) since this considerably affected Ecuador,s security 
on the border.  He emphasized that they wanted a diplomatic 
resolution of the situation and certainly did not want to get 
involved in an &arms race.8  This was not their vision. 
He knew that the two countries would have things they 
disagreed on, but with a roadmap they could have a better 
relationship that would provide greater trust and security. 
He asked that the U.S. play a role in Ecuadorian-Colombian 
rapprochement. 
 
¶6. (C) As part two of the conversation, Falconi said he 
wanted to ask about the issue of U.S. bases in Colombia, 
which was causing worry in Ecuador.  What would be the 
purpose of the bases?  Falconi said he wanted to hear 
directly from the U.S. on this. 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador concurred with Falconi that renewed 
positive relations with Colombia were very important, and 
asked after the status of efforts by the Carter Center. 
Falconi said that the Carter Center had been helpful in 
defining the common issues between Colombia and Ecuador, but 
that reconciliation would not work if either Ecuador or 
Colombia were forced into dialogue.  Dialogue needs to be 
built, and both countries were "constructing a process of 
dialogue," something the U.S. government could assist with. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted that our involvement has only 
been through the OAS, and asked if Falconi had something 
specific in mind for a U.S. role.  He did not.  Turning to 
the issue of the non-bases in Colombia, the Ambassador 
pointed out that there was much exaggeration and unfounded 
concerns reported in the press.  First, there was no 
agreement at the moment, just bilateral conversations with 
the Colombians about access to Colombian bases.  Any 
 
agreement would regularize already existing activities and 
practices.  Of course this was related to our loss of access 
to the Manta Forward Operating Location (FOL), and the need 
to substitute coverage for the eastern Pacific. 
Additionally, the U.S. has shared a defense vision with 
Colombia for years, and the current discussions are looking 
at deepening our cooperation on bilateral interests, which 
are in Ecuador's interests as well. 
 
¶9. (C) Falconi appeared to take the Ambassador's comments on 
board, but added that both Chilean President Bachelet and 
Brazilian President Lula had "expressed worry," as well as 
Spanish FonMin Moratinos.  The Ambassador pushed back, saying 
that these were press reports and not necessarily accurate. 
In the case of Moratinos, it was highly unlikely that the 
Spanish, with actual U.S. bases on their soil, would be 
saying anything so simplistic.  The Ambassador repeated that 
it was in Ecuador's interest that Colombia be able to fight 
narcotrafficking effectively. 
 
¶10. (C) Falconi paused, but agreed, and said the problem was 
the need for official information from Washington.  The 
Ambassador agreed that information was good, but it was not 
necessarily appropriate to share the details of our 
conversations with the Colombians. 
 
¶11. (C) Falconi then turned the meeting over the Under 
Secretary Orbe for a status report on the Bilateral Dialogue. 
 Orbe summarized the proposed modification of the Dialogue, 
to encompass "four pillars": Security, Cooperation and 
Technical Assistance, Migratory Issues, and Trade and 
Investment.  He also reviewed the proposed timetable of 
discussions, culminating in Washington on October 20.  Orbe 
noted that the GOE did not want this to be a once-a-year 
event and hoped to engage with the U.S. in other ways 
including maintaining a &strategic dialogue8 as &agreed by 
the two presidents at the Trinidad Summit.8 (Note:  On 
several occasions both Falconi and Orbe have referred to an 
alleged conversation between Correa and President Obama in 
which they claim that the latter agreed to said dialogue.) 
The Ambassador noted that there had not been enough time to 
address the content of all the pillars.  Nevertheless, in 
some areas, for instance, ideas on the content of the 
security pillar, there appeared to be agreement on both 
sides.  Since Orbe had mentioned discussion of Ecuador's 
proposal for a Trade for Development Agreement, the 
Ambassador cautioned that the Dialogue was not a negotiating 
platform, and that the Administration did not even have trade 
negotiating authority in general at this point. 
 
¶12. (C) The Ambassador brought up the current status of our 
agreements on cooperation with vetted units, stating that we 
appeared to be very close to being able to conclude 
agreements with DEA and DHS, which would also allow signing 
of the NAS agreement.  However, a pending written agreement 
with another agency (to be discussed in septel) was looking 
unlikely.  She said that the U.S. would be proposing renewing 
cooperation following an oral agreement. Falconi replied that 
he would do a note relaying those points to Minister of 
Government Jalkh, who led the GOE interagency group on this 
issue. 
 
¶13. (C) Comment:  This meeting was the most professional we 
have had with Falconi to date.  He was careful and moderate 
with his language, and not particularly partisan.  It is the 
first time we have heard him allow for a Correa fault, in his 
description of Correa's "strong personality" causing problems 
for the diplomatic negotiations with Colombia.  On the issue 
of Colombia and U.S. military presence, the GOE appears 
genuinely worried, and this may have prompted Falconi's 
suggestion that the U.S. take a role in Colombia-Ecuador 
reconciliation, seeking to divert us from a more unilateral 
engagement with the Colombians.  We feel it would be 
extremely useful to be responsive to Falconi,s request for 
more, and preferably written, information on the DCA 
discussions. 
HODGES 

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