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P 281719Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9245
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1201
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1722
RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000379 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PGI, INL, DRL, PRM, USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: ASSESSING LIKELY ELECTION PARTICIPATION 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Debate among stakeholders continues on 
modalities for and risks associated with holding elections on 
November 15 in the new Serb-majority municipalities formed through 
Ahtisaari-mandated decentralization, but we are edging towards a 
solution along U.S.-shaped lines: elections in at least one or two 
new, Serb-majority municipalities (possibly more), but not putting 
decentralization at risk by staging failed elections where the 
outcome is predictable and negative.  After reviewing new, more 
reliable polling data now available to us and considering other 
factors, our assessment is that Kllokot and Ranilug offer the 
greatest likelihood for successful elections, where Serb voters will 
both participate in and win local office.  Slightly more risky, but 
worth looking at further, are Partesh and "New" Novo Brdo. 
Gracanica and North Mitrovica, the most significant Serb settlements 
poised to become new municipalities, are not yet ready to hold 
elections.  Our Quint partners and the ICO are pressing us on both 
Gracanica, and to a lesser extent, North Mitrovica, but we believe 
that the goal is a successful outcome to the elections rather than 
the process for its own sake.  Therefore, we have counseled against 
moving forward with municipalities where the risk of failure is 
unacceptably high, especially with regard to Gracanica.  We can ill 
afford outcomes that will discredit decentralization, the Ahtisaari 
Plan's central tenet for Serb integration in a stable and democratic 
Kosovo. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONT:  With the above in mind, the Ambassador has 
suggested to our Quint partners and proposed to PM Thaci and 
President Sejdiu that November elections in Kllokot and Ranilug, 
coupled with a plan to create conditions for elections in the others 
by next spring, offers the best way forward.  The UK Ambassador here 
has told us privately that this approach could satisfy his 
government's wish that decentralization be demonstrably moving 
forward, but he continues to argue for 38 during Quint exchanges. 
France is clearly okay with 38-minus; Germany and Italy appear to 
follow this line but still want to see Gracanica included.  Events 
of the last week have probably stifled enthusiasm for trying to 
include North Mitrovica at this time.  Both Thaci and Sejdiu have 
signaled that they could support elections in some new 
municipalities provided there is confidence the Serbs will win, and 
we avoid a situation that would annul an outcome which elects a 
minority Albanian.  Our recommendation is to position ourselves in 
favor of 33-plus, the current municipalities along with Kllokot and 
Ranilug, and if we can get greater clarity on several issues, 
perhaps "New" Novo Brdo and Partesh. END SUMMARY 
 
Ethnic Breakdown of Serb-Majority Municipalities 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (SBU) As debate continues locally on how many municipalities 
should participate in the November 15 municipal elections -- the 33 
existing municipalities or these municipalities plus some, or all 
six, of the proposed new Serb-majority municipalities -- we are 
assessing what may occur if the new municipalities were to 
participate in the elections.  The new Serb-majority municipalities 
are Novo Brdo, North Mitrovica, Gracanica, Ranilug, Partesh, and 
Kllokot.  Demographic data in Kosovo are unreliable and coarse, but 
using information gleaned from the International Civilian Office 
(ICO) and OSCE, we can approximate the ethnic breakdowns in each of 
the new municipalities (see Table 1) that should provide a starting 
point for estimates of voting outcomes in the November municipal 
elections. 
 
Table 1:  New Serb-Majority Municipalities 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Municipality     % Alb     % Serb     Pop. 
------------     -----     ------     ---- 
Gracanica          11         89     18,600 
Kllokot            26         74      4,500 
North Mitro        10         90     20,000 
New Novo Brdo      26         74      9,000 
Partesh             0        100      5,200 
 
PRISTINA 00000379  002 OF 004 
 
 
Ranilug             0        100      5,000 
 
 
Kosovo Serb Opinions on Elections, Decentralization 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Successful decentralization hinges both on building 
functioning municipalities and Serbs winning elections in those new 
municipalities.  The presence of a Serb majority is no guarantee of 
a Serb victory.  Serb turnout is the key.  Our greatest concern 
remains that a small number of Albanian residents in each of the new 
municipalities might be sufficient to elect Albanian candidates. 
This is no theoretical threat.  In the 2007 municipal elections, 
Strpce municipality, which is roughly 66 per cent Serb, saw Albanian 
parties capture over 99 per cent of all votes cast.  The UN Special 
Representative (SRSG) intervened and installed a Serb mayor and 
ethnic Serb municipal assembly members.  For reasons we have already 
reported, we are skeptical of claims that some within the 
international community are making about the prospects for 
meaningful Serb turnout.  We now have available to us more focused 
polling for Kllokot and Grancanica that we believe provides a more 
reliable basis for making turnout assessments.  The results are 
summarized below. (Note: The poll was conducted by USAID-implementer 
the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in August.  We have asked 
NDI to expand the poll to include all the new Serb-majority 
municipalities. End Note) 
 
Kllokot: Some Good News 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The NDI poll shows that 25 percent of Serbs in Kllokot plan 
on participating in the November municipal elections.  When 
respondents were asked if they would vote in the elections if 
Kllokot became a new municipality, the likelihood of participation 
jumped from 25 percent to 38 percent.  While a quarter of Kllokot's 
new municipal population will be Albanian, the poll suggests that 
its Serb residents have embraced decentralization.  Certainly, 
elections in Kllokut will probably be a close race.  Using our 
polling numbers and population estimates from ICO, we can make a 
rough approximation that 1265 Serbs will go to the polls in Kllokot 
alongside 1125 Albanians.  These numbers underscore that even with 
relatively positive numbers on possible Serb turnout holding an 
election is a risk, particularly if the Serb vote splits, but this 
may be a risk worth taking.  An additional reason for optimism is 
that tangible, meaningful decentralization beyond merely 
establishing a Municipal Preparation Team (MPT) is beginning to take 
place in Kllokot.  These two factors -- positive indicators on 
turnout and progress on the ground -- are reasons for including 
Kllokot in the pool of municipalities going to the polls. 
 
Gracanica: Too Ambivalent and Too Important to Rush 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Grancanica is one of the two most politically significant 
of the new Serb-majority municipalities.  [Note: The other is North 
Mitrovica, and events over the last several days -- i.e., ongoing 
tensions between Albanians and Serbs with occasional outbreaks of 
violence -- make clear that it is nowhere near ready for elections. 
End Note] Our NDI poll shows that only 14 percent of Serbs in 
Gracanica intend to vote in November.  Unlike Kllokot, this number 
is constant; it does not improve if Gracanica became a new 
municipality before election day.  In addition, though an MPT has 
been established in Gracanica, unlike in Kllokot, there has been 
little municipal development program.  No Serb party has a dominant 
position in Gracanica; there are at least five Serb parties who 
could participate in elections.  They would likely split the Serb 
vote.  We expect Albanians, by comparison, to rally around the Prime 
Minister's PDK party.  This dynamic -- a small, divided Serb turnout 
and a united Albanian populous -- creates the very real possibility 
that Albanians could win power in most significant Serb enclave 
south of the Ibar River. 
 
Ranilug and Partesh: It's About More than Numbers 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
PRISTINA 00000379  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) When Ranilug becomes a new municipality, virtually 100 
percent of its residents will be Serbs.  While we have no polling 
data, the Deputy Mayor of Kamenica -- the mother municipality ceding 
territory to Ranilug -- is a Serb from Ranilug who has long lobbied 
us to kick start decentralization there and describes a community 
that is ready to stand on its own and wants to participate in Kosovo 
institutions.  (NOTE: The ICO and Ministry for Local Government 
Administration appointed Ranilug's Municipal Preparation Team on 
August 28.  END NOTE) With apparent buy-in from local Serb 
leadership, enough Serbs may come to the polls to elect both a Serb 
mayor and a Serb municipal assembly that takes office with a 
reasonable decree of legitimacy.  With no Albanians to swamp even 
low Serb voter participation, there is an acceptable risk of 
failure. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Partesh has similar demographics to Ranilug, but it also 
faces more significant challenges.  As an undeveloped community 
without any meaningful infrastructure, its MPT, once it starts 
working, will confront more work than in other places in 
establishing the basic structures necessary for creating a 
functioning municipality.  In the absence of any local Serb 
leadership committed to advancing Partesh's development, the 
settlement might benefit by waiting for extraordinary elections in 
the spring, but we recommend keeping this option in play over the 
next couple weeks as it may help us build agreement within the 
Quint. 
 
"New" Novo Brdo 
--------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) "New" Novo Brdo, builds on the existing Novo Brdo's 
municipal structures and redraws its municipal borders to make an 
Albanian municipality into a Serb municipality.  The problem is that 
no one is quite sure what "New" Novo Brdo's demography will be. 
While ICO speculates that that "New" Novo Brdo will be 76-24, 
Serb-Albanian, estimates about Serbs in the region have varied 
significantly over the past several years.  No one is sure. 
Elections in "New" Novo Brdo may be a real possibility, but we need 
to see reliable polling numbers prior to committing our support. 
Given that Albanians in Novo Brdo will be moving from a majority to 
a minority, we expect that "New" Novo Brdo will engender Albanian 
resentment and motivate large turnout.  This creates the possibility 
for this new Serb-majority municipality to fall under Albanian rule. 
 However, ICO tells us that Serbs in Novo Brdo, who currently 
coexist happily with an Albanian mayor, are unlikely to react 
angrily should Albanians win significant control in the November 
elections.  We believe more facts are required to confirm this 
hypothesis, but if ICO is right, holding elections in "New" Novo 
Brdo may be possible, and once again, we should keep it in play for 
now. 
 
Belgrade: Another College Try 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Though some within the international community dismiss the 
importance of signals coming from Belgrade, we continue to believe 
that the surest way to motivate Serb turnout is a clear signal from 
Belgrade that it supports decentralization and wants Kosovo Serbs to 
vote on November 15.  We are skeptical that Belgrade will provide 
the clear signal we are looking for, but Quint partners, 
particularly the UK, want to make another run at it.  We support 
making the effort, but in the wake of the GOK-EULEX flare up over 
the police protocol, we advise against approaching another status 
neutral organization (i.e., Council of Europe) about a statement 
Belgrade would sign up to "outside the context of Ahtisaari" 
supporting decentralization.  The reaction from the GOK would likely 
be neuralgic. 
 
Recommendation 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Ambassador made clear during the August 28 Quint meeting 
that we cannot support elections in 38 municipalities.  North 
 
PRISTINA 00000379  004 OF 004 
 
 
Mitrovica is off the table.  If Belgrade were to give an unambiguous 
signal that it is encouraging Serbs to participate in Kosovo's 
municipal elections, then we could reexamine the possibility of 
including Gracanica.  We are, however, running out of time and need 
to come to a consensus within the next two weeks.  The Quint will 
meet again on September 11 to review information and, we hope, agree 
on a final position based on instructions from capitals. 
(Regardless of the decision, Kosovo's Central Elections Commission 
faces a critical benchmark on September 15 when it must certify 
parties and candidates in each of the municipalities, something that 
it cannot do until there is agreement on where elections will take 
place.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) At this stage, Kllokot and Ranilug appear to offer the 
best opportunities for moving forward, and we believe that the 
Kosovars will support this suggestion.  Thaci told Ambassador on 
August 26 that he was open to including one or perhaps two new 
municipalities in the November elections, provided that we have 
strong confidence that Serbs will run, vote and win.  This openness, 
however, also comes with a warning.  Both Thaci and Local Government 
Administration Minister Sadri Ferati have told us consistently for 
weeks that this year Albanians will not step aside if they win in 
Serb-majority municipalities. The Quint appears prepared to accept 
this risk.  The UK ambassador continues to advocate for elections in 
all 38 municipalities within the Quint, but has suggested privately 
that they might settle for less. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Introducing elections in Kllokot and Ranilug should 
address concerns among the Quint and the ICO that Serbs will lose 
faith in decentralization without them and demonstrate that the GOK 
and the international community are serious about the process.  We 
will continue to explore the viability of elections in "New" Novo 
Brdo, Partesh, and to a lesser extent Gracanica.  Our sina qua non 
for Gracanica ought to be a direct and clear message of support from 
Belgrade.  Without that, an election in Gracanica will lead to a 
train wreck, which could well derail the decentralization process 
altogether.  We should resist any temptation to include North 
Mitrovica.  It is not ready.  Politically, this will also 
necessitate balancing it with one or two new municipalities that 
will also not participate in the elections so that it does not stand 
out as an exception further underscoring the north-south divide. 
Regardless of the final list, risks will remain, and we need to go 
into this with our eyes wide open.  Our goal should be to limit 
these risks by a) holding elections only where the calculated risk 
makes sense, and b) developing a plan for building the new 
municipalities over the next 6 to 8 months in order to lay the 
groundwork to elections next spring. 
 
DELL