VZCZCXRO2736
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0342/01 2261138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141138Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7167
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000342 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - KANEDA AND BAIN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS PHUM LY QA SU UN CD
SUBJECT: FORMIN DENIES ATTACKING SUDAN AND SEIZING 
PROPERTY, CONFIRMS CHAD OPEN TO "VERIFICATION" 
 
REF: A. NJAMENA 336 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 334 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 311 
 
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SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Chadian Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat told 
Ambassador August 13 that no/no Chadian military units had 
attacked Sudanese villages in recent weeks; that the GOC had 
not/not seized any Sudanese properties in Chad, but had 
prohibited the reopening of the Sudanese School in Ndjamena 
for security reasons; and that Chad was willing to let 
third-counties "verify" its compliance with commitments on 
assistance to Sudanese rebels on Chad territory.  Faki 
indicated that Libyan bilateral efforts to normalize 
Chad-Sudan relations were taking precedence over the Dakar 
Accord process, that Ahmat Soubiane would be welcomed back to 
Chad when his current activities in Tripoli and perhaps 
Khartoum were finished, and that the GOC had welcomed 3,000 
ex-rebels to Chad in 2009.  The FORMIN also reiterated that 
UNICEF was welcome to visit any military installation at any 
time. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Faki's denial of Chadian military incursions into 
Sudan and his remarks on the Sudanese School in Ndjamana are 
consistent with other views here on these subjects (REFS A 
and B). We got the impression that the GOC was souring on the 
Dakar Accord process and cottoning to Libya's renewed 
interest and investment in the bilateral relationship and its 
effort to see Chad-Sudan relations normalized (SEPTEL).  We 
will continue to monitor (and mentor) the GOC on TIP 
compliance. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Given Faki's repetition of Chad's willingness to 
have others "verify" its compliance with commitments to end 
support to Sudanese rebels on its territory, we should think 
about making a concrete proposal on this issue.  The Libyans 
have been talking to the GOC about "verification" and 
MINURCAT SRSG Angelo told us last week (REF A) that he could 
support "verification" by providing transport and security to 
verifiers.  We should consider crafting a concrete proposal 
if we want to move forward on "verification." END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The FORMIN discounted all Sudanese claims that 
Chadian National Army (ANT) had crossed the border and raided 
Sudanese villages in recent weeks.  He stated that he had 
instructed Chad's Ambassador to the UN to respond in kind to 
Sudan's accusatory letter to the Security Council.  Faki said 
that Sudan utilized such propaganda either to justify, or 
alternately to draw attention away from, Sudanese military 
activity in the border area.  He underscored that Chad troops 
had no intention of crossing the border, unlike Sudan whose 
military had infiltrated villages in eastern Chad. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Faki said unequivocally that the GOC had not/not 
seized any Sudanese properties in Chad.  He said there was 
one school in N'Djamena that the GOC had decided not to allow 
to reopen, because the GOC had its doubts about the true role 
of the "teachers" the GOS provided.  He added that another 
Sudanese school existed in Abeche, but that it had not 
functioned for a long time.  Faki emphasized that the GOC had 
not seized anything, "not even one paper" of Sudanese 
property despite Sudanese aggression against Chad.  Faki 
complained that the contents of the Chad Embassy in Khartoum, 
looted in May 2008, had never been returned to the GOC. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Faki confirmed that Chad was willing to let 
third-counties "verify" its compliance with commitments on 
assistance to Sudanese rebels on Chad territory (REF C). Faki 
noted that a meeting of the Dakar Contact Group was still 
possible at the end of September, after Ramadan, in Khartoum, 
but said that there still had been no Sudanese invitation to 
such an event.  Faki added that Tripoli was increasingly 
active in trying to normalize Chad-Sudan relations, including 
through the Chad-Libya Mixed Commission, at meetings 
 
NDJAMENA 00000342  002 OF 002 
 
 
following the AU summit, and a proposed end-of-August 
conference in Tripoli on "Conflict in Africa." 
 
---------------------- 
CHAD-CHAD REBEL GROUPS 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) On GOC views of the Chad rebel groups, Faki said 
that the situation was consistent with the normal quiet 
period of the rainy season.  Faki said that Soubiane had 
returned from Khartoum and gone to Tripoli for meetings with 
The Guide, among others, but would definitively return to 
Chad.  The FORMIN stated that there were substantive 
discussions with other rebel groups at the moment and that 
the GOC would not shut the door on additional returns.  Faki 
noted that the GOC counted nearly 3,000 rebels who had 
deserted the rebellion and returned to Chad since January of 
this year. 
 
----------- 
GOC AND TIP 
----------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Faki commented that the GOC was open to UNICEF 
visits to military installations for assessment of child 
soldiers.  He emphasized that UNICEF was free to visit any 
GOC military installation at any time.  (NOTE:  UNICEF ResRep 
told us separately August 13 that he had yet to receive any 
GOC permission for these visits.  END NOTE.) 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Faki's denial of Chadian military incursions into 
Sudan and his remarks on the Sudanese School in Ndjamana are 
consistent with other views here on these subjects (REFS A 
and B). We got the impression that the GOC was souring on the 
Dakar Accord process and cottoning to Libya's renewed 
interest and investment in the bilateral relationship and its 
effort to see Chad-Sudan relations normalized (SEPTEL).  We 
will continue to monitor (and mentor) the GOC on TIP 
compliance. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Given Faki's repetition of Chad's willingness to 
have others "verify" its compliance with commitments to end 
support to Sudanese rebels on its territory, we should think 
about making a concrete proposal on this issue.  The Libyans 
have been talking to the GOC about "verification" and 
MINURCAT SRSG Angelo told us last week (REF A) that he could 
support "verification" by providing transport and security to 
verifiers.  We should consider crafting a concrete proposal 
if we want to move forward on "verification."  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO