Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1794, SOMALIA - MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT DISCUSS PROGRESS,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09NAIROBI1794.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI1794 2009-08-24 14:39 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO9748
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #1794/01 2361439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241439Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0769
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI KDEM PTER SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT DISCUSS PROGRESS, 
PROBLEMS, PERCEPTIONS 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 1732 
     B. NAIROBI 1735 
     C. NAIROBI 1698 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: From August 18 - 20, the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) hosted a three day parliamentary 
training seminar in Nairobi, Kenya for over 30 Somali Members 
of Parliament (MPs). On the margins of this seminar, we were 
able to conduct a number of insightful conversations with a 
cross-cutting segment of Somali MPs, many of them based in 
Mogadishu, on issues related to security, political trends, 
economic challenges, minority concerns, and MP perceptions of 
international involvement in Somalia. The MPs came from a 
variety of clans and regions within Somalia, and were 
involved in parliamentary committees including security, 
finance, religion and reconciliation. Their most pressing 
concerns were security and funding for basic infrastructure. 
End summary. 
 
The Evolving Security Situation 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) MPs consistently highlighted security as one of 
their top personal and political concerns, advocating the 
creation of Parliament offices within a protected buffer area 
or  green zone, in Mogadishu, and citing the lack of a safe 
venue for meetings. The MP,s fears were compounded by 
intimidation; they described phone calls threatening both MPs 
and their families, and they risk attacks by al-Shabaab when 
they travel. Sheikh Jama Hagi Hussein (Bantu), the Chairman 
of the Justice Committee, noted that he had been attacked by 
al-Shabaab in 2008, specifically targeted because he was an 
outspoken Sufi MP and had made a statement welcoming U.S. 
educational support. MP Omar Mohamud Mohammed (Hawiye, Abgal) 
noted that the TFG lacked the intelligence capabilities 
needed to protect officials, even within the limited area of 
government control in Mogadishu. One MP also mentioned that 
bounties were at times offered for killing government 
officials. 
 
3. (SBU) Describing the current violence in Mogadishu, 
numerous MPs noted a growing public hatred for al-Shabaab, 
which is seen as brainwashing local youth into violence. 
These sentiments are contributing to the formation of local 
TFG-aligned militias in Mogadishu neighborhoods such as 
Medina, and in regions outside the capital. We met with 
Security Committee Chairman Mohammed Husain Afarale (Dir, 
Isak), and Security Committee Secretary Ahmed Ali Yakhle 
(Darod, Harti), to discuss recent fighting. They emphasized 
the importance of ongoing regional efforts against al-Shabaab 
and Hisbul Islam, such as operations by ASWJ and the fighting 
in Gedo, Galgadud, and Hiran in mid-August. These operations 
were seen as essential in relieving pressure from the TFG in 
Mogadishu, and prompting the withdrawal of numerous 
al-Shabaab fighters, many of which were relocating out of 
Mogadishu back to their traditional strongholds in southern 
Somalia. Some MPs praised improved cooperation between the 
TFG and ASWJ, while others argued that the TFG still does not 
fully support or trust ASWJ, and that this imperfect 
relationship hinders security progress. 
 
4. (SBU) Mohamed Omar Dalha, First Deputy Speaker of the 
Parliament, added that government and aligned forces had 
recently made gains in Hiran, Gedo, Bay, and Galgadud regions 
and claimed the TFG had plans to push into the rest of Bay 
and Middle Shabblle as their next steps. He emphasized the 
need to rehabilitate some of the more moderate rank-and-file 
anti-Government insurgents, particularly following desertions 
by Hisbul Islam fighters, and to use influential clan and 
religious leaders to sensitize at-risk Somali youth and avoid 
future recruitment and indoctrination by al-Shabaab. Dalha 
noted that in the past few weeks, the failure of al-Shabaab 
to defeat the TFG, which he attributed to the involvement of 
AMISOM, had shifted the momentum in Mogadishu. He 
corroborated information from the Security Committee 
representatives that many al-Shabaab forces, including 
foreign fighters, fear being surrounded in Mogadishu and have 
consequently left the capital to relocate to more secure 
regions farther south, leaving primarily local al-Shabaab 
fighters in the capital. Dalha noted that the 
al-Shabaab/Hisbul Islam alliance, which was a key factor in 
the fighting in Mogadishu since May, was an alliance of 
convenience base solely on anti-TFG sentiment. The two groups 
disagree on most other issues, with Hisbul Islam locally 
focused, but dependent on al-Shabaab for power and political 
relevancy. 
 
NAIROBI 00001794  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Of concern, Ibrahim Ali Jeebo (Hawiye, Abgal) 
Chairman of the Parliament's Reconciliation Committee, 
criticized cronyism within Sharif's government, remained 
unconvinced that TFG will ensure Abgal interests, and favored 
developing an Abgal strategy to take Hiran, Middle Shabelle, 
and a southern portion of Galgadud region. Jeebo plans, in 
the next several weeks, to organize a meeting of Abgal Imams, 
clan, and religious leaders to advocate this agenda, and he 
hopes to raise financial support from donors in the diaspora. 
If it moves forward, such a plan could likely undercut the 
TFG by creating a precedence for clan based sub-states, and 
potentially derail efforts by TFG President Sharif to mend 
fences with his Abgal co-clan members (Ref A). 
 
MP Political Views 
------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) The MPs had mixed views on recent TFG political 
progress, citing good intentions by the TFG's top leadership, 
and improved cooperation between the TFG's President, Prime 
Minister, and Speaker. However, MPs noted the lack of 
infrastructure and transparency, and criticized many 
political appointments, including a number of unqualified 
ministers appointed due to power alliances or clan interests 
rather than based on individual merit. Several MPs noted that 
militia leaders are able to  blackmail, the President, 
forcing him to compensate them financially or politically for 
their military support. They widely described the recent TFG 
cabinet reshuffle as  zero change, or even a potential 
mistake that could anger political leaders from other clans 
(Ref B). Mohamed Omar Dalha, First Deputy Speaker of the 
Parliament, noted signs of political progress under President 
Sharif, which he attributed largely to international support 
from the European Union and United States, particularly 
emphasizing the importance of Secretary Clinton's meeting 
with Sharif. However, Dalha argued that the TFG needed to 
gradually shift current strategy, which he viewed as somewhat 
short-sighted and overly focused on building alliances with 
powerful militia leaders. According to Dalha, the TFG now 
needs to systematically select government positions based on 
merit, experience and popular support, rather than control of 
arms and militia. He suggested that this would require 
replacing militia leaders with influential political 
representatives from their same clan/sub-clan. 
 
Financial challenges 
-------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) MPs highlighted continued revenue problems and 
sporadic pay for government officials. Several MPs complained 
that they had not been paid in 2-5 months, and that they 
typically have no staff, clerks, or office space for 
meetings. Similar financial problems plague police and 
security forces, consequently increasing road blocks and 
criminal activities perpetrated by rogue security personnel. 
Unpaid individuals within TFG security forces have at times 
sold their weapons or ammunition in arms markets; some of 
these arms are likely purchased by insurgents. MPs pointed 
out that improved training for TFG security and police forces 
would likely be ineffective unless the payroll problem was 
resolved. Furthermore, an Abgal clan contact noted that 
TFG-aligned Abgal militia are largely unpaid and underfed, 
prompting Abgal leaders to pay their own clan militia, and 
hindering efforts at integration with TFG forces. 
Parliamentarians consistently cited the need for checks and 
balances to avoid corruption and insure accountability at all 
levels of government. 
 
Minorities and Reconciliation 
----------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Poloff also met with several MPs from minority or 
woman's rights committees, including Sheikh Jama Hagi 
Hussein, a Somali Bantu who is Chairman of the Justice 
Committee. Jama expressed support for the TFG from both the 
Bantu community and other minorities, who view a stable unity 
government as key to representing their concerns. Jama was 
pleased that several Bantus have already been given political 
positions, bringing them up to 14 MP slots.  Likewise, Lul 
Abdi, a member of the Gender Committee and one of 36 women in 
Parliament, noted that lobbying over the past year had raised 
the profile and rights of women within the Government, and 
emphasized that women could be a strong force for 
reconciliation due to their ability to reach out to relatives 
across clan divisions. 
 
NAIROBI 00001794  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
Perceptions of the International Community 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) The MPs had positive perceptions of the 
international community, praising both U.S. support for the 
TFG, and AMISOM's role in halting the joint al-Shabaab/Hisbul 
Islam offensive against the TFG in Mogadishu from May - July. 
Secretary of State Clinton's August 6 meeting in Nairobi with 
TFG President Sharif was repeatedly raised as key to 
reinvigorating TFG efforts and demoralizing members of the 
anti-TFG opposition (Ref C).  MPs urged international donors 
to continue directing support for anti-al-Shabaab forces 
through the TFG, which could then channel support to allied 
forces such as ASWJ. The only consistent critique of the 
international community's efforts was the need to support 
institutions, rather than individuals. Several MPs felt that 
the U.S. and the international community often provide 
support directly to TFG individuals, leading to a lack of 
transparency within the government, resulting in cases where 
Parliament was unaware of what support had been provided, and 
allowing recipients to use international aid without 
oversight. The MPs felt this impeded progress by weakening 
the role of government institutions. One specific example was 
UNDP financial aid, of which the First Deputy Speaker claimed 
the Parliament was able to account for only two months over 
the past year. MPs urged the United States and international 
community to increase mechanisms to insure transparency and 
accountability when supporting the TFG. 
RANNEBERGER