Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2241, SOLIDARITY LEADER MILOV DISCUSSES UPCOMING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW2241.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2241 2009-08-28 14:00 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO3535
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2241/01 2401400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281400Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4678
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002241 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM RS
SUBJECT: SOLIDARITY LEADER MILOV DISCUSSES UPCOMING 
ELECTIONS, FUTURE 
 
 1. (U) Summary: Leading member of Solidarity and candidate 
for Moscow City Duma Vladimir Milov outlined for us his 
election platform and personal vision for the movement. Milov 
predicted overwhelming victory for ruling United Russia in 
city elections. He expects to lose election for his district 
but hopes to capture 20 percent of the vote and retain 
influence and personal political capital. He foresaw that the 
financial crisis would lead to tension within United Russia 
and popular disillusionment with government at the national 
level, allowing Solidarity to compete successfully in 
elections in Moscow and St. Petersburg at some point in the 
future. End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
City Duma Elections 
------------------- 
 
2. (U) Milov told us August 13th that he expects 25 to 30 
percent turnout for Moscow city elections, a majority of 
which will be older voters focused on quality-of-life issues. 
 There is little appeal for a broader campaign platform of 
comprehensive democratic change.  Milov is running electoral 
district 13 to the South of Moscow, his home of 26 years. A 
well-known and well-regarded economist, he is arguing for 
aggressive measures to combat the financial crisis, a major 
issue for opposition parties seeking to disparage United 
Russia.  Recognizing that by virtue of political intrigue or 
merely age Mayor Yuriy 
Luzhkov may leave politics before the next mayoral election, 
and that the city Duma would then appoint a 
successor, he has gained political traction by pointing out 
that the Duma would select a replacement, not citizens 
through direct voting. A United Russia-controlled Duma would 
confirm a close Medvedev or Putin associate nominated from St 
Petersburg instead of a Muscovite, Milov argued.  Milov hopes 
to earn 20 percent of the vote, and would call that a success. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Focus on Moscow and St Petersburg 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) Based on his visits to 35 Russian regions in the last 
18 months, Milov remains deeply pessimistic about the 
opportunity for Solidarity to attract support. Media latched 
on to the political unrest in Vladivostok in late 2008 as an 
opportunity for opposition parties to make electoral inroads. 
 Instead, Milov argued, the situation is just the opposite. 
Local workers were striking out against the federal 
government, but were not attacking President Putin in spite 
of some placards calling for his resignation.  Reminiscent of 
petitions to the Tsar, the protestors requested that Putin 
intervene on their behalf with the corrupt bureaucracy. 
Solidarity has never successfully backed a regional protest 
because locals are 
wary of any political involvement. This fact, and weak 
finances, have almost completely confined the movement's 
electoral viability to Moscow and St. Petersburg. Milov sees 
no chance that a legitimate challenge to United Russia can 
come from the provinces. 
 
-------------------- 
Future of Solidarity 
-------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Acknowledging that no Solidarity candidate is likely 
to win election in Moscow, Milov maintained outward optimism 
about the future of the party in the long term. He sees 
himself as one of a cadre of strong leaders of a movement 
with no real activist base. Though the movement has 
approximately 900 members, he estimates that only 50 to 60 
are actively working to promote it in Moscow.  While 
leadership may envision a future as elected members of 
government, Solidarity as a potential political party has 
little popular support. The movement appears to be in stasis, 
waiting for a time undetermined when the economic crisis 
lowers approval ratings for United Russia and individual 
Solidarity leaders are able to gain office. Milov predicts 
that Solidarity could one day appeal to 20 to 30 percent of 
federal voters and join a coalition government. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment:  Milov identifies himself as an individual 
- with vision and supporters - who is "affiliated" with 
Solidarity. He suggested that association with Solidarity is 
not always personally useful. There is no internal 
discussion, he observed, of the movement coalescing into a 
registered political party, due in part to its depleted 
financial resources and a genuine lack of appeal to the 
general public.  Milov aims to maintain his public standing 
 
MOSCOW 00002241  002 OF 002 
 
 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg and capture 
enough of the vote in his district to remain a serious player 
within Solidarity.  The movement as a whole, however, plans 
to tread water and wait for United Russia to fall in public 
opinion polls. Without funding or public interest, it is 
unclear how Milov expects Solidarity to build a grass roots 
base over the coming years.  End Comment. 
Beyrle