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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2055, RUSSIA GETS USED TO THE IDEA OF A NON-COMMUNIST MOLDOVA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2055 2009-08-11 13:39 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO0228
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2055/01 2231339
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111339Z AUG 09 ZDK CTG NUMEROUS SVCS
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4494
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002055 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD RS
 
SUBJECT: RUSSIA GETS USED TO THE IDEA OF A NON-COMMUNIST MOLDOVA 
 
MOSCOW 00002055  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Moscow is coming to terms with the Moldova 
election outcome, and has reached out via its ambassador to liberal 
party leaders.  Experts, who describe the elections as a "peaceful 
example of post-Soviet countries' forging new political identities," 
assume Russia will cooperate with the new government in Moldova as 
long as it does not attempt to lead Moldova into NATO.  The Duma's 
International Affairs Committee head Kosachev assured Transnistrian 
leader Smirnov that Russia would not treat Transnistria as a 
bargaining chip, while DFM Karasin discussed post-election 
Transnistria settlement prospects with Transnistrian "FM" 
Yastrebchak.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Russian views of the post-election situation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Russia is coming to terms with the fact that Moldova for 
the first time since 2001 will not be governed by the Party of 
Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), the party the GOR had 
unofficially supported in the April 5 and July 29 elections in that 
country. 
 
3.  (SBU) Some experts believe Moscow became disillusioned with 
Moldovan President Voronin after the Communists' inability, despite 
Russian support, to win the April 5 elections.  Adjusting to the new 
realities in Moldova after the July 29 repeat elections, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta said Russia signaled it would work with all 
parties in the new Moldovan Government when Russian Ambassador to 
Moldova Valery Kuzmin met August 6 with Liberal Party of Moldova 
leaders Dorin Chirtoaca and Michael Gimpu.  The newspaper described 
the meeting as "the first time in the history of Russian-Moldovan 
relations" that the GOR spoke with a Moldovan "non-majority" party. 
In return, Nezavisimaya Gazeta argued that the Russian-speaking 
population in Moldova and Moldovan guest workers in Russia, along 
with Russia's energy resources, demand for imports from Moldova, and 
role in the Transnistria conflict forced the Moldovan election 
winners to engage with Russia. 
 
4.  (SBU) Alexei Vlasov from Moscow State University suggested 
Moscow had originally supported Voronin in order to maintain 
stability in Moldova.  Noting Voronin's pro-Russian policies, he 
thought Moscow would not view a liberal coalition "too negatively," 
if it somehow included the Communists.  Moscow Carnegie Center's Sam 
Greene thought Moscow would only have "limited goodwill" for the 
liberals' plans for a more pro-Western Moldova, saying Moscow's 
goodwill would end if the new government attempted to lead Moldova 
into NATO. 
 
5.  (SBU) Sergei Markedonov from the Institute for Political and 
Military Analysis called it premature to consider the era of the 
PCRM to have come to an end.  The poverty in Moldova coupled with 
the social cost of aligning the country with the EU, as well as the 
prospect of continued corruption would conspire to keep the PCRM's 
hopes for future government responsibility alive.  In addition, 
Markedonov saw instability due internal divisions between the 
coalition partners as bolstering the PCRM's position. 
 
6.  (SBU) Markedonov went on to tie the election results in Moldova 
to a "weakened integration capacity" of the former Soviet Union 
space and the "crisis of integrating ideology" (Soviet communism). 
He suggested the defeat of the PCRM was a peaceful example of 
post-Soviet countries' forging new political identities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Russian continues to support Transnistria resolution 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The outcome of the elections will not affect Russia's 
involvement in solving Transnistria.  Russian DFM Grigoriy Karasin 
met Transnistrian "FM" Vladimir Yastrebchak July 31 to discuss 
prospects for resolving the Transnistria conflict in light of the 
election outcome.  The discussions included Russia's cooperation 
with the region on socioeconomic, humanitarian, and economic issues. 
 Head of the Duma International Affairs Committee Konstantin 
Kosachev told Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov July 16 that 
Transnistria would never be a "bargaining chip" for Russia, and that 
Russia would make sure the Moldova-Transnistria dialogue would not 
stop. 
 
8.  (SBU) While Carnegie's Greene posited that the election result 
might make Russia more constructive in resolving the Transnistria 
conflict, Russian website politcom.ru picked up Transnistrian 
"Proryv" leader Dmitriy Soin's opinion that the "communist paradise" 
in Moldova had come to an end, placing Russia at a crossroads.  He 
posited that Russia lost its dream of a pro-Russian Moldova, and was 
now left only with a pro-Russian Transnistria, unless Moscow 
persisted in "dreaming of Moldova returning to the fold." 
 
------- 
 
MOSCOW 00002055  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Despite its support for Voronin before the elections, 
Russia has little choice but to work with whichever new government 
forms in Moldova.  This will also extend to Russia's intentions for 
resolving the Transnistrian conflict, however sincere they may be. 
 
RUBIN