VZCZCXRO4253
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #1995/01 2161239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041239Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4432
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001995 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG GM UK FR SW OSCE
SUBJECT: TENSIONS WITH GEORGIA: NATO ALLIES PONDER 
DEMARCHE, MFA DOWNPLAYS PROBLEMS 
 
REF: A. 08/04/09 RUBIN-RUSSELL EMAIL 
     ¶B. 08/02/09 STATE-MOSCOW AND TBILISI EMAIL AND 
        PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. TBILISI 1427 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary. On August 4, NATO Quad Allies proposed a 
joint demarche to the GOR regarding the rising tensions with 
Georgia, accompanied by a similar approach to the GOG.  On 
August 2 and 3, the MFA told us it had no information why 
Russian forces did not respond to Georgian attempts to 
contact them via the hotline August 1, or why Russia failed 
to attend the July 31 Incident Prevention and Response 
Mechanism (IPRM) meeting.  The MFA urged that we stop pushing 
for access to South Ossetia by international observers, and 
said South Ossetia, followed by Russia, would boycott the 
IPRM if the OSCE did not "correct" its plan to open an office 
in Tbilisi.  Russia urged Georgia to accept South Ossetia's 
proposal for border delimitation talks to avoid recent border 
disputes.  In a non-sequitur, Rossiskaya Gazeta published an 
interview with DFM Karasin that possibly predated the rise in 
tensions, as Karasin did not address them in remarks that 
added nothing new.  End Summary 
 
------------------ 
Quad deliberations 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) On August 4, NATO Quad Allies in Moscow proposed a 
joint Quad demarche to Acting FM Karasin or MFA IVth CIS 
Department Director Andrey Kelin this week to underscore the 
GOR's responsibility for actions, or lack thereof, of its 
military in Georgia, as well as for South Ossetian actions, 
and voice concern over the rising tensions in advance of the 
anniversary of the August 2008 war.  The Allies suggested 
making a similar approach to the GOG, and informing the GOR 
of that step.  Any approach, they counseled, should be made 
after obtaining their capitals' concurrence, and after the 
Swedish EU presidency delivers its August 3 statement 
regarding the tensions along the South Ossetian 
administrative boundary line (planned for August 4).  See ref 
A (NOTAL) for more details. 
 
----------- 
DFM Neverov 
----------- 
 
¶3.  (C) On August 2, 2009, Charge called Acting DFM Igor 
Neverov to express U.S. concerns with Russia's absence from 
the July 31 Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) 
meeting, as well as Russia's failure to answer GOG attempts 
to contact Russian forces August 1 via the hotline (ref B) to 
discuss the alleged shelling of Tskhinvali from the Nikozi 
area in Georgia proper.  Charge stressed the importance of 
non-escalation in words and rhetoric, as negatively 
exemplified by the Russian MOD's August 1 statement, in which 
the MOD compared the current events to the run-up to the 
August 2008 war and threatened to "use all means and 
resources available to protect the citizens of the republic 
of South Ossetia and the Russian servicemen."  Neverov 
responded that he understood Under Secretary Burns had raised 
the same points with Karasin on August 2, who had agreed to 
stay in close contact on the issue. 
 
---------------------------------- 
IVth CIS Deputy Director Dvinyanin 
---------------------------------- 
 
Russian non-engagement 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On August 3, MFA IVth CIS Deputy Director Alexei 
Dvinyanin told us he did not know why Russian forces did not 
respond to Georgian attempts at contacting them via the 
hotline.  He implied that the call did not go through, as 
opposed to Russia deliberately ignoring the call.  Dvinyanin 
said that Russia's non-participation in the July 31 IPRM 
meeting was not a sign of political unwillingness.  Instead, 
the Russian side had not been reached in advance of the 
meeting.  He underscored that Russia supported the IPRM. 
 
EUMM 
---- 
 
 
MOSCOW 00001995  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Dvinyanin said it would be necessary to redefine the 
EUMM's mandate if the West wanted it to access South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, given that the September 8 Sarkozy-Medvedev 
agreement had spoken of the "deployment of additional 
observers in the zones adjoining South Ossetia and Abkhazia," 
which excluded the breakaway regions from the mission's 
mandate. 
 
¶6.  (C) Dvinyanin went on to say that the West should abandon 
its goal of inserting international monitors into South 
Ossetia under current circumstances.  He said the West's and 
Russia's positions were clear, and that reiterating them 
would not change anything. 
 
OSCE office in Tbilisi 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Dvinyanin said that the Greek OSCE 
Chairmanship-in-Office's plans to open an office in Tbilisi 
threatened the IPRM, as South Ossetia had stated it would 
boycott the IPRM if the Greeks were to go forward with their 
initiative.  In that case, Russia would also boycott the 
IPRM, as there was agreement that the meetings could only 
take place if all members participated.  Russia would make 
this point to OSCE special representative Ambassador 
Charalambos Christopoulos when he visited Moscow August 5. 
Dvinyanin charged that the Greek proposal was meant to 
circumvent the need for OSCE Permanent Council agreement. 
 
¶8.  (C) Dvinyanin maintained that, according to the Greek 
initiative, the Tbilisi office was not simply to render 
logistical support to the OSCE IPRM representative, which was 
acceptable, but to provide "political functions," including 
establishing a permanent base for the OSCE representative and 
following any humanitarian projects agreed upon in the second 
Working Group of the Geneva talks.  Dvinyanin said that South 
Ossetia would only agree to such an office if an equal and 
independent one were opened in Tskhinvali, which would 
similarly participate in the IPRM talks. 
 
¶9.  (C) Dvinyanin stated that Russia was "prepared to take 
any position that helps."  When urged to persuade South 
Ossetia to soften its stance, he responded that Greece, not 
South Ossetia, needed to "correct" its position, by either 
having the OSCE office in Tbilisi only provide only 
logistical support to the OSCE IPRM representative, or by 
establishing an equal and parallel office in Tskhinvali. 
 
Military action 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Finally, Dvinyanin said that the USG should direct 
its concerns to the MOD regarding its August 1 statement, not 
the MFA.  He doubted Russian forces were moving 
administrative border posts near Kveshi (ref C), but said 
that such problems could easily be remedied if Georgia were 
to accept South Ossetia's proposal to start border limitation 
talks.  We responded that that would hardly be possible. 
 
----------------- 
Karasin interview 
----------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In the meantime, Rossiskaya Gazeta on August 4 
published the transcript of an interview with DFM Karasin, 
likely conducted prior to the recent events.  While 
containing the usual tough tonality and language, Karasin did 
not address any of the recent events.  Instead, he noted 
Medvedev's January decree on sanctions for supplying arms to 
Georgia and criticized recent military maneuvers in the 
region.  He touted the Big Treaties with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia and other Russian efforts to rebuild the regions, as 
well as the April 30 border guard agreements.  While 
professing Russian willingness to engage with the EUMM and 
support for the IPRMs, he repeated the usual accusations 
against the West regarding the failure to renew the UN and 
OSCE mission mandates. 
RUBIN