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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000837 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION UNITY EFFORTS: A PROMISING 
START BUT WILL ALEMAN PLAY? 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Callahan, Reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. For the first time in nearly a year, serious 
efforts are underway to foster opposition unity ahead of 
Nicaragua's 2011 national elections.  The goal of these 
efforts is to encourage the Constitutional Liberal Party 
(PLC), led by ex-President Arnoldo Aleman, and the 
Independent Liberal Party (PLI), led by 2006 presidential 
candidate Eduardo Montealegre, to unite via a step-by-step 
process that includes opposing constitutional reform and 
forming a new Supreme Electoral Council, with the ultimate 
goal of forming an alliance with other smaller parties to 
present one common slate for the 2011 elections.  Both 
parties have participated in the initial stages of these 
efforts, but confidence on both sides is low and significant 
hurdles remain.  Ultimately, unity will require meaningful 
concessions on the part of Aleman and breaking of his current 
"pacto" with President Daniel Ortega, two elements he has 
resisted so far.  End Summary. 
 
 
FORCES DIVIDED 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Following the November 2008 municipal elections, 
Nicaragua's opposition remains divided between Aleman's PLC, 
which holds 22 votes in the National Assembly, as well as 
half the magistrates on the Supreme Court and CSE, and 
Eduardo Montealegre's forces, now under the PLI banner, with 
16 National Assembly deputies.  Recent polling continues to 
show that Montealegre is viewed as the "leader of the 
opposition" and holds the highest favorable ratings of any 
prominent opposition leader, even among the PLC.  Aleman 
remains less popular than even Ortega and is increasingly 
unpopular even within his own party, despite a nation-wide 
effort to rehabilitate his public image, including a weekly 
television show and radio show and the opening of a 
charitable foundation in his name.  The left-of-center 
Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) remains in third place 
among the opposition, with its support concentrated in the 
Pacific coast and larger urban areas.  A plurality of the 
electorate increasingly identifies itself as "independent" 
though anti-Sandinista.  A successful coalition, especially 
the presidential candidate, will need to be able to motivate 
these independent voters to participate in an election 
process that they increasingly view as corrupt and 
ineffective. 
 
STEPS TO UNITY 
-------------- 
 
¶3. (C) One effort to unify the opposition is led by the 
"Reflection Group," headed by Antonio Lacayo, Minister of the 
Presidency under Violetta Chamorro (his mother-in-law) and 
Roger Arteaga, president of the American Chamber of Commerce 
(AMCHAM).  The group also includes prominent businessmen, 
media figures, and former politicians.  The Group recognizes 
the lack of confidence between the main parties, especially 
between Aleman and Montealegre personally, and envisions a 
long-term process to foster unity through dialogue and a 
series of step-by-step actions.  To try to unify forces now, 
they believe, would be impossible and any formal union could 
not be sustained in the current political environment.  To 
start the parties on this process, the group has held a 
series of meetings with the leaders of the three main 
parties, to be followed by joint meetings of the three groups 
together, with each side represented by five members each. 
 
¶4. (C) The Reflection Group envisions a three-step process to 
form a unified opposition by mid-2010.  Between now and 
December, they believe the opposition must focus solely on 
opposing constitutional reforms, which would permit President 
Ortega to run for re-election, among other changes.  On this 
issue, there is at least rhetorical consensus among the PLC, 
PLI and MRS.  If they succeed in blocking reform, Ortega will 
be dealt a significant political blow and he will be forced 
to deal with internal party struggles in the race to control 
succession within the FSLN party.  Further, the process of 
blocking reform will establish the confidence necessary to 
advance unity in more practical terms. 
 
¶5. (C) Beginning in January 2010, the opposition would next 
focus on filling more than 30 upcoming vacancies in key 
government offices, including the Supreme Electoral Council 
(CSE), the Supreme Court (CSJ), the Comptroller's Office, and 
 
MANAGUA 00000837  002 OF 003 
 
 
the Prosecutor's Office.  Through the "pacto," Aleman and 
Ortega have split these positions in order to maintain their 
control over the country.  Breaking the "pacto's" hold on 
these positions, particularly filling the CSE with 
independent or respected individuals, is key to establishing 
a more democratic electoral environment and to restoring 
public confidence in governmental institutions, especially 
the CSE.  The leaders of the Reflection Group acknowledge 
that this will be the most difficult hurdle, as Aleman 
continues to view these positions as critical to his power 
and political (and legal) protection.  But without new 
individuals, in whom the leaders of the PLI, MRS, and civil 
society have confidence, unity will not be possible. 
Finally, should an accommodation be reached on filling by 
consensus the public positions, the Reflection Group believes 
it will be an easier process to negotiate the joint 
opposition ticket, determine the division of seats for each 
group/party in the National Assembly and Cabinet, and put 
together a formal unity ticket. 
 
 
UNITY AMONG THE LIBERALS 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Concurrent with the Reflection Group's efforts, 
Abelardo Mata, Bishop of Esteli, has initiated an effort 
focused solely on uniting the Liberals, mainly the PLC and 
PLI.  Mata is enormously popular among Liberals and 
anti-Sandinista activists and has been one of the leading 
figures in denouncing Ortega's anti-democratic actions.  Like 
the Reflection Group, he believes there is too much animosity 
and too little confidence between the two parties to permit 
unity at this time and advocates a gradual process of 
encouraging the Liberal forces to work together on practical 
issues in order to pave the way for a broader unity effort. 
 
¶7. (C) In the first meeting he convoked between Aleman and 
Montealegre, he urged both sides to end their public 
criticisms of each other.  Second, he urged the two parties 
to work on a common legislative agenda and establish a 
working group to coordinate joint actions in the National 
Assembly.  In particular, he urged the PLC to formally 
endorse a resolution submitted by Montealegre's deputies 
calling for the expulsion of Honduran President Mel Zelaya 
from Nicaragua.  All sides agreed on the threat posed by 
Zelaya and the instability he had caused in the north of 
Nicaragua and therefore the two parties together could push 
the non-binding resolution through the Assembly.  Once the 
two parties begin working together in the Assembly, the group 
would be expanded to include the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance 
(ALN), formerly led by Montealegre, which holds two seats on 
the Assembly's Executive Committee and represents 6 key 
votes. 
 
¶8. (C) In Mata's view, a regular dialogue between Aleman and 
Montealegre, matched with coordinated joint efforts between 
the two parties, should pave the way for the two sides to 
deal with the more complex issues of making changes to the 
CSE, including others in the coalition, and forming a joint 
ticket.  Mata is clear that Aleman cannot be the candidate, 
but believes only a negotiated process can convince him to 
join the opposition, reject the "pacto" with Ortega, and 
endorse another candidate.  "If we fail to unite all the 
democratic forces," he warned, "Nicaragua is finished." 
 
 
WILL THE PLC PLAY? 
------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) It is not clear that Aleman and the PLC leadership are 
prepared to seriously engage in these efforts.  They have met 
several times with the Reflection Group, put forward 
representatives for the next round of joint meetings (all 
Aleman hard-liners), and participated in one meeting called 
by Bishop Mata.  However, Aleman failed to show for Mata's 
second round on August 18, with his close associates first 
claiming that former 2006 PLC presidential candidate Jose 
Rizo was out of town, and then later "confidentially" 
asserting that Aleman was too drunk to attend.  Tellingly, 
the PLC has demurred on agreeing to another date for the next 
round of Mata's meetings. 
 
¶10.  (C) Aleman confidant and PLC National Assembly Deputy 
Jose Pallais told us that Aleman has no choice but to attend 
the meetings with Mata, as Mata is too popular with the PLC 
 
MANAGUA 00000837  003 OF 003 
 
 
base.  Pallais acknowledged that the party base remains 
unhappy with Aleman's continued cooperation with Ortega and 
that the opposition would face serious difficulties with 
Aleman at the top of the ticket in 2011.  Nonetheless, 
according to Pallais, Aleman feels confident at the moment 
that his image campaign is working, noting that party member 
registration is up significantly.  He also admitted that 
Aleman generated Montealegre's ongoing problems within the 
PLI, hinting that Aleman was behind the CSE's warnings that 
the PLI could face de-registration. 
 
¶11. (C) Pallais told us that Montealegre has only two options 
with regard to Liberal unity and the filling of the public 
positions.  For Aleman, these public positions are 
"non-negotiable" and are key to his political power and 
protection.  "We are a political party that wants to win and 
holding these seats is part of winning," he said.  The PLC, 
therefore, will not permit the MRS or civil society to name 
their candidates to these positions.  Pallais warned that 
Montealegre can agree to a formal unity with the PLC prior to 
March 2010, otherwise the PLC will negotiate the filling of 
the public positions with the FSLN and Montealegre will be 
forced to negotiate terms for unity afterwards from a 
position of weakness.  If he agrees to formal unity prior to 
March 2010, Montealegre can select PLC members in whom he has 
confidence to be included in the lists for the public 
positions.  Pallais further cautioned that Montealegre will 
not be able to launch his own presidential campaign under the 
PLI banner should efforts to form a unified Liberal party 
fail. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) The efforts by Mata and the Reflection Group 
represent the first serious and potentially viable efforts to 
start a process that can unite the disparate opposition 
forces ahead of the 2011 national elections.  These efforts 
recognize that the struggle for unity has already begun 
through the debate on presidential elections, on which a vote 
must be scheduled in the National Assembly before the end of 
the year.  Similarly, they recognize the confidence deficit 
and that success will be gradual and built upon a series of 
concrete actions, not merely words or a last-minute backroom 
deal. 
 
¶13. (C) Unfortunately for the opposition, and the Nicaraguan 
public, the key to the success of these efforts is in 
Aleman's hands.  He holds the votes to join the FSLN in 
passing constitutional reform, and deregistering competing 
opposition parties, or to break with the "pacto" and form an 
effective opposition coalition.  It appears that he is 
playing both sides at the moment, on one hand participating, 
even personally, in the opposition dialogue, while on the 
other continuing to negotiate behind closed doors with the 
FSLN to engineer the destruction of his opponents.  Pallais' 
comments indicate that Aleman continues to view Montealegre 
as his greatest threat, not Ortega.  Moreover, it appears 
that Aleman remains convinced that he can defeat Ortega in 
2011 if only he can absorb the other elements of the 
opposition into his party, on his terms of course. 
 
¶14. (C) Our policy should remain to make clear that the USG 
will not get involved in the selection of a candidate nor 
directly facilitate the unity process.  At the same time, we 
will continue to encourage all pro-democratic groups to work 
together to advance their common goals, including uniting for 
¶2011.  It is clear that this message has been understood by 
some in the political and business community, fostering the 
above unity efforts.  We believe this posture will help 
compel the Nicaraguan opposition to resolve this problem on 
their own and create a durable broad-based movement in which 
our democracy and political assistance can have a greater 
impact. 
 
CALLAHAN